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[index] [conclusion]
In this chapter, I will turn to the impact of the events in the homeland
on American-Armenian identity. I will examine the reinforcement of the
permanency of the diaspora, the emergence of a new raison d'etre for
diasporan existence, and the reimagination of the 'myth of return' and
homeland orientation to accommodate the new diaspora-homeland configuration.
I will also discuss the reimagination of American-Armenian identity
in a way that takes into account the permanency of the diaspora and
the shared and different destinies of the two parts of the Armenian
nation. Finally, I will discuss the symbolic nature of the current homeland
orientation in the diaspora and provide some projections regarding its
future.
Diasporan Permanence and the New Homeland Orientation
For seven decades, the dominant discourse portrayed the diaspora as
a temporary aberration. The guiding rhetoric was the aspiration of returning
to the homeland. Furthermore, at least in rhetoric, the diaspora was
presented as a means to an end, the end being the homeland, its restoration
and security.
At the same time, there was an increasing willingness to acknowledge
that, given the opportunity, most diasporans would not return to the
homeland, at least not to live. The rhetoric about 'going back' is often
just that - rhetoric. "We are and most of us will remain diasporan",
exclaimed one respondent. [Acad.SF.FB] The diaspora, as Levon Kasbarian
argued, is "an irreversible reality." Of the many diasporans
who visited Armenia since 1988, only a handful were likely to settle
there permanently. There are marked differences in culture, mentality,
political culture and socio-economic conditions between the homeland
and the diaspora. Over time, these differences have become practically
irreconcilable. In the words of Mihran Agbabian:
"It has been said many times that we should stop referring to
each other as 'we' and 'they', because we are all Armenians. In an emotional
moment we accept this admonition, but in reality, the distinctions between
'us' and 'them' are fundamental."
My AGBU respondent also pointed out that:
"There is a difference. First of all there's a terrible difference
in mentality, so that it's like Armenians who come form Armenia, or
Armenians who come from Beirut, or something, there's a great difference
in people, just as mine is different form being American. So, I mean,
I don't think any of those people who lived there for most of the last
fifty years of their lives will go to Armenia. . . . And they talk about
going back, but there is no going back." [AGBU.NY.USB]
At the same time, though, this interviewee said:
"I think it's hard to understand your identity without visiting
the homeland." [AGBU.NY.USB]
In 1991, the Los Angeles Times featured a very interesting article
which examined the phenomenon of return in the light of Armenia's newly
found independence. The article explained that:
"After decades of exile, Armenians around the world now face the
possibility of return to an independent homeland . . . the opportunity
presents both a victory of perseverance and a vexing personal dilemma."
The article stated that, for many American-Armenians, the 'myth of
return' was for decades at "the core of their lives". However,
as one interviewee was quoted as saying: "It has all happened so
suddenly . . . Now the dream is becoming a reality. What do you do?"
Some said they would consider returning, but they were not sure when,
and did not think it would be on a permanent basis. Another said that
he "would only go back if [he] could be of some help." Still
another said, "My fantasy is to go back and help, spend a month
at a time." Another spoke of returning permanently. Interestingly,
a Hayastantsi immigrant was bewildered by all this talk of return, seeing
"the exiles as idealists who have no concept of what life was like
in Armenia."
It must be remembered, however, that when most diasporans talk of 'return'
to Eastern Armenia they are engaging in a process of 'double imagination'.
For most diasporans, the Republic of Armenia is not their true homeland:
"Well you know you have to be careful about this 'Going back'.
An awful lot of people did not originally come from [present-day Armenia],
and some did. I mean you may have a hundred thousand in Los Angeles
or in America that actually came from there, but it's far from my father's
homeland." [AGBU.NY.USB]
The fact of this double imagination was highlighted through greater
contact between the diaspora and the homeland. This interaction further
entrenched the sense of diasporan permanency, by confirming the fact
that the diaspora had developed, and would continue to develop, its
own identity or identities.
Nowhere is this gap more evident than in the Western diaspora, of which
the Armenian-American community is the epicentre. Armenians living in
Western countries are the least likely to migrate to Armenia, since
modern pluralist democracies such as the United States, Canada, Australia,
France and the United Kingdom offer a fair degree of tolerance and security
to ethnic minorities. Furthermore, there are obvious economic advantages
in remaining in these countries, and little to lure the diasporan 'back'
to the homeland on a permanent basis, at least in the current circumstances.
An article in the AW, written in 1987, rightly pointed out that:
"Armenian Americans will stay put because they like peace, prosperity
and freedom - doesn't everybody? - and because they are losing their
identity. . . . The ones who might realistically be expected to immigrate
to Armenia, or help resettle a liberated Western Armenia, are those
in the Middle East. Only in hostile Islamic societies like Syria or
Iran can Armenians maintain their identity and pass on to their children
the dream of moving to the homeland."
My SDHP respondent agreed that Middle Eastern Armenians were more likely
to go back to Armenia than American-Armenians. [SDHP.LA.FB]
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, only a small number of
American-Armenians 'returned' to the homeland on a permanent basis.
Instead, there was an acceleration of short 'pilgrimage' visits (often
referred to as garod or nostalgic nationalism) and visits for humanitarian
purposes. Der Yeghiayan found in 1991 that 88.73 percent of his American-born
Armenian respondents said they would like to visit Armenia at some point,
whereas less than 50 percent said they were either "most likely"
(11.2 percent) or "somewhat likely" (38.01 percent) to take
up residence in Armenia "if political/economic conditions [were
to] improve" there. In response to the question, "If occupied
lands are returned to Armenia, would you consider living there?",
15.41 American-born respondents replied "most likely", and
33.13 percent "somewhat likely". Bakalian confirmed these
findings, arguing that despite the changed conditions in Armenia, 'return'
to the homeland was most likely to continue to be limited to visits
and 'pilgrimages'.
All of this could, of course, change if the homeland was to achieve
greater economic and political stability, or extend its boundaries to
include the historic Armenian territories in Turkey. Diasporan Armenians
might also be more likely to 'return' to the homeland if the economic
conditions in the host country deteriorated, or there was persecution,
in which case, instead of fleeing from one diasporan country to another,
they might seek asylum in the homeland. However, neither of these scenarios
is likely to occur in the short term, and even if they did eventuate,
it is still questionable whether many diasporans would return in the
light of the well-entrenched cultural disparities mentioned above.
With this background in mind, what is to be made of the diversion of
financial, material and human resources to meet the urgent needs of
the homeland in the period 1985-1993, and the growing interest among
diasporans in interacting with the homeland? My responses and sources
differed in the explanations they offered. For many, the rush to help
the homeland was a natural humanitarian response to disaster. Countless
American-Armenian newspaper articles expressed this kind of instinctive,
humanitarian response to a catastrophe that devastated their kin in
the homeland. For others, as I will discuss later, the homeland was
seen as instrumental in preserving the diaspora and cultivating and
reimagining its identity. As my ARS respondent argued:
"We continue to live as we did before. And so, our sense of activism
must continue - as long as there is struggle, we can guarantee our existence.
Once we cease to engage in the struggle to maintain diasporan civic
life, it does not bode well for us." [ARS.LA.FB]
Whatever the reasons or motivations, the earthquake and the establishment
of an independent homeland served a politically mobilising function
in the diaspora. At the moment of independence, the diaspora adopted
a new homeland orientation, and the myth of return began to take on
a new meaning. Recent events did not reduce the need for political 'readiness'
in the diaspora, but increased it, since the needs of the homeland created
new demands on the diasporan communities.
Both AGBU respondents also believed that the homeland had mobilised,
and would continue to mobilise, the diaspora:
"I think Armenia has changed much in the diaspora. A lot of people
are much more energised and there's an awful lot of new activities that
weren't there five years ago. And I think this can grow as fast as we
want, we will see it grow more and more." [AGBU.NY.USB]
"It's a shame that an earthquake happened in Armenia. But this
earthquake also caused an earthquake in the heart of every Armenian.
When I first came here my focus was to preserve the Armenian youth.
Now that's not my intention - I don't care less, and I don't need to
try since they are already mobilised." [AGBU.DC.FB]
Many of the respondents offered homeland-centred analyses of this phenomenon:
"It's crucial to maintain the diaspora for future generations,
not least because to divert everything to Armenia now would mean depriving
Armenia of help in a second earthquake in the future." [ANC.LA.FB]
"I want to encourage everything that will assist the independence
of Armenia." [AMAA.NJ.FB]
Similarly, In Asbarez, Levon Kasbarian wrote that the slogan 'To the
Homeland' had taken on a new meaning in the post-Soviet period. The
myth of return, he argued, must now be expressed in the form of economic
assistance and of pursuing the Armenian Question on the homeland's behalf.
Writing for the AW, Garo Tertzakian also called for a new homeland orientation
among diasporans, arguing that throughout the seventy years of Soviet
rule in Armenia:
"The 'preservation of Armenianism' - Hayapahpanoum - has been
the main philosophy of the Diaspora and the axis of its activity. Totally
cut off from the Homeland, Diaspora Armenians felt abandoned and subject
to assimilation. At this time, this approach is anachronistic. . . .
Real Hayapahpanoum is the preservation of the land and people of Armenia.
. . . Now is the time for the Diaspora to reach out to the much-loved
and dreamed-of Motherland."
My ANC respondent also affirmed the need for constant vigilance within
diasporan communities as long as the homeland was in need:
"There's an interesting paradox. On the one hand, there are those
who talk about the Armenian cause dying. I think that's a false argument
. . . As long as there are Armenian people, not only in the homeland,
but in the world, the Armenian cause will exist. . . . everyone would
like for there to be a beginning and an end . . . But to keep it an
open book is troubling for some people, because at the end of their
experience in the diaspora and they would like to think back and say,
'We finished things, and it worked out so well. Now we have a free -
well, not united - but a free and independent Armenia, isn't that fantastic.
Now our children don't have to worry about it.' . . . That's not the
psyche that will lead to a healthy diaspora, it's detrimental, but there
are a lot people who feel that way. . . . I think the very real fact
is that to be an Armenian in the diaspora is to be uncomfortable - always
uncomfortable with yourself; always a sense of unease. . . . Speak to
people who have been involved and truly understand the nature of the
diaspora (hopefully some of the people whom you'll get a chance to speak
to), and some people who understand it from a sociological point of
view. . . . now, and I suspect for centuries to come, the Armenian question,
the Armenian existence in diasporan communities will be an open book,
never-ending." [ANC.LA.FB]
Finally, an East Coast ARF respondent argued that the diaspora would
continue to have a political role as long as the dream of a 'Free, Independent
and United Armenia' had not been totally fulfilled:
"Our dreams for the past seventy years now haven't been realised
- something was wrong, either with the dream or with the current reality."
[ARF.DC.FB.2]
In this way, despite the growing recognition of the diaspora's permanency,
the diaspora did not dispose of the myth of return even following independence.
The reason for this is that the myth of return had, over time, become
so much a part of the diaspora's "core heritage", that in
most cases its abandonment would have destroyed the very cornerstone
of diasporan identity. Furthermore, the maintenance of a reimagined
myth of return continued to serve a politically mobilising function
in the diaspora, giving diasporan ideologies, institutions and culture
a sense of mission. In the period under examination, countless symposia,
fora and lectures were held in the United States and elsewhere seeking
to formulate new directions for the diaspora and diaspora-homeland relations.
Therefore, rather than forfeiting this 'special role' or 'mission' by
acceding to the primacy of the homeland, the diasporan response to the
chaos and uncertainty of the new diaspora-homeland configuration was
to engage in reimagination, and to engage in new forms of political
mobilisation.
A New Role for the Diaspora
Most of my sources and respondents believed that the diaspora is a
permanent entity, that it had been mobilised in response to events in
the homeland, and that it had a specific political role to play within
the Armenian nation. By opening the door for greater diasporan involvement
in the affairs of the homeland, the declaration of Armenian independence
in 1991 had a double impact. On the one hand, it confirmed the fact
that the diaspora and the homeland shared some kind of common heritage,
"despite vast distances, ideological differences, as well as differences
in mentality". On the other hand, increased homeland-diaspora interaction
confirmed the political division of labour between the homeland and
the diaspora, leading to a more definite role for the latter and encouraging
more autonomous expressions of diasporan identity. [SDHP.LA.FB] For
example, the diaspora was naturally in a better position to lobby for
the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, since the homeland needed
to walk a diplomatic tightrope in its relations with neighbouring Turkey
and, therefore, could not afford to put the Genocide on the agenda.
In an article in the AMS, Edmond Azadian argued that this situation
would most likely continue into the next century.
Yet another example of this division of labour was the diaspora's ability
to encourage foreign investment in Armenia. Levon Kasbarian argued that
"[t]he past two-three years showed that had the diaspora not existed,
it would have needed to have been created". In other words, the
existence of the diaspora was critical for the survival of the homeland
and is essential if the Armenian nation was to achieve its goal of a
"United, Free, Independent Armenia". For this reason, both
Kasbarian and Mouradian argued that the homeland needed to be careful
not to kill "the chicken that laid the golden eggs" by politicising
the diaspora-homeland relationship or in any way "weakening the
very structures in the diaspora that it has great need for."
The diaspora clearly took on a significant role that suits both its
own interests and those of the homeland. In a speech delivered to a
convention of the Armenian Evangelical Union, Mihran Aghabian argued
that at the time of the first Republic, the diaspora was "powerless".
In contrast, he argued, in the 1980s and 1990s the diaspora had "tremendous
potential for influence" and could play a key role in helping Armenia
find its place in the world community. However, if the diaspora was
to properly fulfil its role, diasporan organisations and individuals
would need to put aside self-interest and partisanship and "unite
behind an independent Armenia" rather than "trying to establish
jurisdictional turf" in the homeland. For this to work on a long-term,
sustainable basis, some argued that the government of Armenia needed
to put forward a comprehensive plan for encouraging diasporan involvement
in the socio-political affairs of the homeland, and in particular for
encouraging foreign and diasporan investment.
Beyond the general agreement that the diaspora has a role, there was
a diverse range of views on the exact form this role should take. Tololyan
outlined three possible roles for the diaspora vis-a-vis the homeland
- "a calf to be milked by the homeland"; "a junior partner";
and an "equal partner", hinting that the last of these options
was the ideal. At the same time, he proposed a radical alternative to
challenge the popular expectations of a harmonious diaspora-homeland
relationship. He argued that the Jewish case, where on the whole the
diaspora acts in support of its homeland, is an exception. Most diasporas
tend to act as 'governments-in-exile' and seek to overthrow the homeland
government. Similarly, there may be times in the Armenian case, he argued,
where in the homeland "there may be a tyranny that we [the diaspora]
will have to overthrow."
In contrast to this view, many commentators felt that the diaspora
should not advise the homeland, but should restrict itself to providing
humanitarian relief and engaging in business investments. This was the
'junior partner' idea. In 1989, Edward Boghosian argued that:
"Irrespective of how one feels about the issue, it is quite certain
that the destiny of the Armenian homeland should be forged by those
who live in the homeland."
A year later, Nubar Dorian criticised the ARF for daring "to speak
on behalf of all Armenians abroad", the ADLP for its "communiques
and empty proclamations", and the SDHP for its "unsolicited
and wrong policies" and its attempt to establish its "almost
meaningless presence everywhere". He wrote that although the diaspora
must have an "increased involvement and role in Armenia",
it "must not attempt to run their country - Armenia - which we
abandoned long ago preferring the comforts of America."
In the aftermath of Raffi Hovannisian's resignation in 1992, Touryantz
argued that, as a general principle,
"no foreign citizen, notwithstanding his or her Armenian ancestry,
should have the right to interference in the internal affairs of Armenia.
Financial aid and technological advice are certainly welcome, no conditions
attached."
Touryantz accepted the possibility and even the need of having non-citizens
such as Hovannisian in public office, however only "as a temporary
arrangement for the present transitional period." Tabibian agreed,
but also argued that Hovannisian's appointment was perhaps a miscalculated
attempt at appeasing the diaspora - an attempt which had obviously backfired.
Since the 'cat had been let out of the bag' regarding diasporan participation
in the Armenian government, Hovannisian's dismissal would send the message
to the diaspora that a diaspora-homeland partnership was unworkable.
Although in the previous chapter I emphasised that Hovannisian's resignation
must primarily be viewed in ideological terms, it is also true that
his resignation was widely perceived among American-Armenians as a diaspora-homeland
issue. As Tabibian wrote:
"Unless [Hovannisian] is replaced by another Diasporan Armenian,
the reshuffle takes on a loaded significance since there are those who
believe that the Diaspora should have a voice and a role in the political
life of the Republic."
Tabibian then went on to ask the question: "Is the Diaspora a
stakeholder, client or constituency?" He answered this question
by arguing that Armenians should view themselves as "stakeholders",
in other words, as people with
"a stake in [Armenia's] continued existence, its independence,
its prosperity, the security of its border, the preservation of its
border. As stakeholders, our interests are cultural, spiritual, traditional,
affective."
Perhaps 'symbolic' could be added to this list. Thus the task of the
diaspora was one of "nurturing" this "entity" called
Armenia. The only political right of the diasporan, according to Tabibian,
was the right of "return". Similarly, Pierre Papazian argued
that, since the diaspora and homeland were so different, the diaspora
"cannot bring its own mentality and prejudices to bear on the Republic
of Armenia which by its very being has a different essence, a different
agenda and different goals."
Others argued that the diaspora was in some sense a 'client' or a 'constituent'
of the homeland, to use Tabibian's terms. The diaspora should not only
have a stake, but also a right, to participate in the nation-building
process of an independent Armenia and to influence the direction of
that process. This was akin to Tololyan's 'equal partner' idea. Certainly
this was the dream of the diasporan parties prior to the recent events
in Armenia. In a 1987 panel discussion of three Boston AYFers, the view
was clearly put forward that a future independent Armenia would be seen
as the homeland for all Armenians, not just symbolically, but in practical
terms as well:
"One of the things that I think is the most exciting is the fact
that all Armenians would have the opportunity to actually build the
government as we see fit. . . . going to a free Armenia and establishing
the government in the form you've always dreamed of."
"An independent and free Armenia would be something that all Armenians
could call their home. . . . A country that we could all come back to.
A country where (sic) we can fight for, a country we can die for."
The view of Armenia as the homeland of all Armenians continued to be
held by many diasporans even after Armenia declared its independence,
as reiterated by ARF leader Maroukhian in September 1991. The milder
version of this view was given by a Diocesan cleric: "Armenia is
not the sole property of those who live there. It belongs to all Armenians.
. . ." I call this the mild version, however, because this cleric
went on to imply that the diaspora is not a constituent of the homeland,
but its servant: "We must support [Armenia] with all we have."
[D.LA.FB]
As discussed earlier, the political parties and, to a lesser extent,
other diasporan organisations were quick to establish their presence
in Armenia. This stirred controversy in the diaspora, particularly with
regard to the activities of the ARF which appeared to have taken on
the role of 'government in exile'. The ARF, along with the other organisations
and parties, had throughout the decades invested a great deal in the
establishment of diasporan institutions. The declaration of Armenian
independence in 1991 seemed to pose a threat to the long-established
hegemony of the ARF in diasporan political life, in two ways. Firstly,
it threw open the question of the usefulness of diasporan institutions.
The ARF attempted to resolve this by reorienting its political, cultural,
and sporting organisations towards the needs of the homeland and the
discussion of issues relating to the diaspora-homeland relationship.
Secondly, the goal of the ARF had for many years been the establishment
of a 'United, Free, and Independent Armenia'. However, the ARF now argued
that since only one of these three goals had been achieved, that of
an independent Armenia, its job had not yet finished. The ARF came to
view its role as 'democratic watchdog', and dedicating itself to keeping
alive the issues of the Armenian Genocide and of a 'territorially complete'
Armenia. Characteristic of this role was the ARF's frequent criticism
of government corruption in Armenia, its lobbying for the recognition
of the Genocide by Western governments, and its claim to significant
military involvement in the defence of Nagorno-Karabagh. Inevitably,
this self-appointed 'role' came under criticism from many quarters,
namely from the Armenian government, from whom it attracted persecution,
the other diasporan parties and organisations, and even from within
the party itself.
The example of the ARF shows how the diasporan organisations and their
elites were faced with the task of striking a difficult balance between
several conflicting demands: the need to maintain some sort of connection
with the homeland; the need to provide the diaspora with an ongoing
raison d'etre; and the need to ensure that their own power base within
the diaspora is not eroded. This is the challenge of reimagination,
as Smith writes:
"[E]ach generation must re-fashion national institutions and stratification
systems in the light of the myths, memories, values and symbols of the
'past', which can best minister to the needs and aspirations of its
dominant social groups and institutions. . . . [Reimagination] is the
product of dialogues between the major social groups and institutions
within the boundaries of the 'nation', and it answers to their perceived
ideals and interests".
This was the very task facing the current American-Armenian community
as it began to explore the possibilities of a future role for the diaspora
vis-a-vis the homeland.
One Nation, Two Nations in One, or Two Nations?
Geographical distance from the homeland, the 'division of labour' between
homeland and diaspora, and the varying cultural milieux that the Armenia
diasporan communities find themselves in, give the diaspora a unique
sense or senses of what it is to be Armenian. However, there is still
the question of how this uniqueness is manifested. How much autonomy
does and can the diaspora have? How much is this identity a territorially
rooted one? Finally, how does this diaspora see itself vis-a-vis the
homeland: as simply part of a larger Armenian nation, and therefore
a means to an end, that end being the homeland; or as one of two 'cogs'
or 'nations' existing within a larger 'transnational' Armenian nation,
the homeland being the other cog; or as an end in itself, a nation in
itself, self-sufficient in identity and purpose (inknanbadag)? Of course,
an answer could be given that incorporates all three ideas; however
the impact of the question lies in its ability to stir sentiments one
way or the other.
Although some of my interviewees espoused a homeland-centred rhetoric
to explain the need to perpetuate the diaspora, other interviewees made
no apology for a diaspora-centred philosophy, pointing out that the
diaspora had its own needs and structures to attend to. [ARS.LA.FB,
Acad.MD.FB, ARF.DC.FB.1, ARF.DC.FB.2 and Acad.SF.FB] This response was
most common among the American-born, intellectuals and some Dashnaks.
For those who had been arguing for a distinct diasporan identity, their
case received greater momentum and a new credibility in the light of
recent events. For example, Vahe Oshagan - poet, critic and the son
of the late Hagop Oshagan - went so far as to argue that the homeland
and the diaspora should be considered politically distinct entities,
calling for a kind of "Diasporan declaration of independence, parallel
to that of Armenia but irrespective of it". The diaspora, argued
Oshagan, needed to accept its diasporan situation as permanent, and
to learn to "love, possess and cultivate" its communities
with all their diversity, strengths and weaknesses. The diasporan literati
needed to engage with these issues, to actively work towards formulating
a diasporan identity (or identities) that is (or are) less territorial
and relying more on the notion of diaspora as a "mental landscape".
Focusing on the creative potential of a cosmopolitan diaspora, Oshagan
observed that:
"In Paris, Beirut and Los Angeles, there are secret, restrained
urges, imaginations on the verge of explosion, passions and patiences
that are in search of a mode of expression."
Such assertions of diasporan permanence and autonomy were influenced
by the worldview that has increasingly come to prevail among the Parisian
Armenian intellectual elite. For them, the concept of an 'independent
diaspora' reflected the desire to preserve that which is diasporan -
namely the Western Armenian language, culture and heritage - and to
give it at least equal legitimacy alongside the Eastern Armenian culture
which had been preserved in the homeland. An example of this is Oshagan
himself who, as his interviewee commented, "has remained at the
vanguard of Western-Armenian literature." Speculations about diasporan
independence or permanency also served, as I have argued earlier, to
maintain a necessary degree of political mobilisation within the diaspora.
For others, the idea of diasporan self-determination was simply a recognition
of reality. Panossian argued that it was important to "debunk the
myth that the Armenian nation is one organic whole, and [that] therefore
its politics should reflect this mythical unity." Rather than "lamenting
this division", Panossian called for a recognition of the fact,
"for better or for worse", that within the Armenian nation
there is emerging "two separate entities, perhaps, in the long
run, even two different nations", the diaspora and the Republic.
Similarly, in 1992 Libaridian told an audience of 300 American-Armenians
that:
"Both Armenia and the Diaspora are free to decide issues for themselves.
Both may have different political agendas. Integration between the two
is not healthy. . . . The government of Armenia was elected by its citizens,
he continued, and its decisions should be made by its own people."
Libaridian then went on to say that the "Diaspora should not react
and try to push its expectations and desires on Armenia". Perhaps
his emphasis on the differences between the homeland and the diaspora
was based on a desire to preserve the homeland from unsolicited intrusion
by diasporan organisations. However, even though Libaridian might have
been motivated by political concerns, his statement indicated a strong
underlying conviction regarding the need for each entity to maintain
its own political and cultural identity.
Henry Astarjian similarly cited pragmatic reasons for the development
of a diasporan political identity. However, unlike Libaridian, he was
critical of the Armenian government. In 1993, Astarjian wrote that as
a result of the Armenian government's policy of "exclusion"
towards the diaspora, it was becoming apparent that the latter would
have to take charge of its own destiny and take upon itself the pursuit
of the Armenian Question. He argued that the diaspora was, "for
the second time in its recent history, amputated from its fatherland",
and compared the policy of the Armenian government towards the diaspora
to the policy of "lip service" of the Arab states towards
the Palestinians. Astarjian concluded by proposing that, just as there
are several Arab countries sharing a similar culture, so too there could
be "several Armenian countries", namely, the Republic of Armenia,
Karabagh, and the diaspora or diasporas.
One interviewee pointed out that "the ARF is a lot more dogmatic
about recognition of the diaspora by the homeland" than are the
other parties and organisations. This might be because, for seventy
years, the ARF had been the key stakeholder in the diaspora, at a time
when its opposing parties, the SDHP and ADLP, had some stake in the
homeland. [Acad.ARF.SF.FB.2] As noted earlier, the ARF strongly contributed
to keeping alive the 'myth of return' while simultaneously creating
permanent diasporan institutions. Regarding the latter, one of my East
Coast ARF respondents stated that:
"The diaspora has truly become a diaspora, in other words, an
entity independent of the homeland. There is no desire to return. Its
purpose is now self-perpetuation." [ARF.DC.FB.2]
Writing in 1989, Zeitlian agreed with that:
"The task of the Armenian intellectual of the diaspora today might
be to find creative ways of engaging our armenity or cultural identity
within the diasporan context, to become a truly diasporan nation."
However, Zeitlian rejected what he viewed as the two 'extremes' proposed
by Armenian thinkers: on the one hand, "the endless soliloquy and
nihilism of the statements that the diasporan conditions (sic) is a
culturally terminal process", a view which he attributed to Oshagan
and others; and on the other, "the traditionalist refusal to accept
the permanence of the diasporan condition of the armenian nation".
Zeitlian however seemed to have taken these views at face value, judging
them on their rhetoric rather than on the substance of their arguments,
and not engaging with the questions which they raised. In particular,
it needs to be emphasised that the "endless soliloquy" of
many leading diasporan academics is not indicative of cultural pessimism,
but of a painful and important process of self-discovery and reimagination.
To dismiss such a process as "nihilism" is surely to short-circuit
a crucial phase of diasporan development.
There are others who opposed outright the push for the formulation
of a distinctive diasporan identity and the creation of a sense of diasporan
self-determination. In Touryantz's critique of Oshagan and Tololyan,
these two thinkers were simplistically placed in the same camp. In a
1991 article in TAR, Touryantz argued that an acceptance of the diasporan
condition would only serve to further fragment the diaspora. Touryantz
acknowledged that the diaspora was already fragmented, both globally
and within each community, however he argued that "formalizing"
this reality would simply hasten "an already weakened consciousness
of sameness and unity" within the diaspora. Similarly, in response
to the question, "Can or should the diaspora be inknanbadag?",
a West Coast Diocesan cleric argued that if the diaspora became inknanbadag
it would become fragmented, because apart from the homeland there is
little to keep it together:
"If we become inknanbadag, the diaspora has no identity as a collective
entity, we will be reduced to the American-Armenian community, the Australian-Armenian
community, and so on." [D.LA.FB]
In an article in Nor Or, Rev. Yesayi Sarmazian voiced a similar protest
against what he described as the fatalistic view that the diaspora is
"a sacred status, permanent and eternal". He argued that the
proponents of this view were confusing "place of residence, citizenship
and homeland". Touryantz agreed, arguing that the notion of diasporan
permanency was influenced by "traditional pessimism" and "a
depressing attempt to eternalize an itinerant status." Vahrij Jerejian
wrote in Massis that the "transient [or unstable] communities of
the diaspora can (and should) never become the permanent homeland of
the Armenian." Writing for the same newspaper, Jirair Nairi exclaimed
that:
"The Armenian people, the whole Armenian people, constitute one
and inseparable totality. One as a people, homeland, Cause, rights and
responsibilities."
My SDHP respondent similarly argued that the diaspora could not be
considered inknanbadag:
"Since the diaspora by definition exists in relation to the homeland,
it cannot be inknanbadag! The real issue is interdependence. The Hayastantsis
must realise that the diaspora is not an appendage of the homeland."
[SDHP.LA.FB]
Though recognising that the diaspora is here to stay, my SDHP respondent
felt the need to reiterate the decades-old myth of return, in an affective
statement that provided stark contrast to the insightful analysis of
diaspora-homeland relations that preceded it:
". . . Until that beautiful day when there is no longer a diaspora."
[SDHP.LA.FB]
Such a statement is surely pure rhetoric, a means of ensuring the ongoing
mobilisation of the diaspora.
Perhaps the notion of "interdependence" provides a useful
synthesis of the various theories proposed concerning diasporan identity
and diaspora-homeland relations. This concept was alluded to by my SDHP
respondent, as quoted earlier, and was also proposed by Der-Karabetian
in 1992 as a possible paradigm for future diaspora-homeland relations.
Furthermore, if the diaspora is to be able to contribute its full potential,
it must necessarily begin to explore not only its role vis-a-vis the
homeland, but also its unique place in the history of the Armenian nation
of which it is an integral part. As Adalian writes:
"Only when the diaspora is studied as a historical entirety, as
an organic unity leading an existence that is an alternative to national
and state formations, an existence at odds with the prevailing modes
of societal organization, only then does the diaspora come into focus
as a potentially life-going (sic) alternative and ceases being just
the detached segment of a diminished center."
This may or may not involve a "Diasporan declaration of independence",
however it must involve some kind of healthy self-analysis and an acceptance
of the reality that the diaspora is here to stay. For the foreseeable
future, the diaspora is a permanent entity; yet the exact nature and
role of this entity and its relationship with the homeland is the subject
of disagreement.
It is interesting that none of the respondents or articles directly
asserted that the diaspora could or should be completely inknanbadag.
This is to be expected; nonetheless, it is in itself of no consequence.
As mentioned earlier, the significance of the word inknanbadag is in
its ability to provoke reactions and discussion. Some sources recognised
the diaspora's permanency, and the need for diasporan identity, more
than others. Interestingly, there was only a very loose relationship
between one's view of the role of the diaspora and its relationship
with the homeland, and one's affiliation. Overall, however, members
and hamagirs of the ARF were more likely to seek the promotion of diasporan
identity and political autonomy, and American-born Armenians were less
likely to want to return to Armenia.
Symbolic Ethnicity and the Future of American-Armenian Identity
Despite the differing views on the exact nature of the homeland-diaspora
relationship, homeland orientation was a common thread in both the newspaper
articles and interviews. This homeland orientation seems to have been
viewed primarily, though not solely, in terms of its usefulness in ensuring
the preservation of the diaspora, its institutions, and its identity,
thus implicitly reinforcing the permanency of the diaspora. At the same
time, homeland orientation took on different forms and carried different
meanings depending on the generation, the degree of assimilation, and
the political background of the individual. For some American-Armenians,
homeland orientation was a surrogate form of 'return'. For others, particularly
the American-born, the relationship with the homeland was largely symbolic.
For both groups, the homeland continued to function as a rallying point
for diasporan identity. Like the language, alphabet and church, the
homeland had become a useful 'artefact' that must be preserved and revered.
Going back was not an option for most, but the homeland must be preserved
as a source of inspiration and as a rallying point for diasporan unity
and identity.
In Chapter Five I discussed how the diaspora was called on to unite
to prevent assimilation. The homeland plays a similar role of rallying
the diaspora for the prevention of assimilation. In the panel discussion
referred to earlier, two of the participants agreed that
"without a homeland on which Armenians can interact with each
other at all times . . . In a Diaspora, eventually with external influences,
the culture becomes diluted to a point where it's only a matter of time
where (sic) the identity is lost."
Similar thinking was apparent in the aftermath of the earthquake. In
calling on diasporans to engage in the reconstruction of the homeland,
many American-Armenians were motivated not only by humanitarian concerns,
but also by the realisation that, without the homeland, the diaspora
would have little future. An AMS editorial argued that the diaspora's
"hope for . . . continued existence" is the continued "well-being
of our Motherland". A letter in the AMS made the same point, arguing
that: "If our people in Armenia fail, we fail everywhere. All of
our institutions will have no meaning." To cite another example,
an article in Nor Or proclaimed that:
"The Armenians of the Diaspora, whose meaningful existence is
contingent on the continuing existence of our brothers and sisters in
the homeland, must support the [reconstruction] efforts without reservation.
Leninakan and Spitak must not be repeated.
The whole nation must not be orphaned.
Erevan is our heart, our lifeblood, lymph gland.
Let's save Erevan, and in so doing let's save the Armenian nation."
The fact that the diaspora saw its fate as being tied in with the homeland
was also apparent in the interviews. Many of my respondents offered
diaspora-centred explanations for the new homeland orientation in the
diaspora, and viewed recent events in the homeland in terms of their
impact on the diaspora. An AGBU respondent argued that the establishment
of an independent homeland had brought the Armenian diaspora into a
new era in its struggle against assimilation and its search for an identity:
"The needs are different, no longer to perpetuate our Armenianness
since we now have a country and we no longer need to think about postponing
assimilation. Now we have different roles and duties to fulfil. It's
a new definition. We used to have to say, 'We are Armenian', but now
we don't have to say it, or, we can say it in a different way."
[AGBU.DC.FB]
An embassy staff in Washington, DC reiterated this argument:
"The Genocide caused anguish. Coming out of this situation, the
second generation strived to maintain its cultural institutions and
roots. However, being shut off from the homeland, it would have been
very difficult to perpetuate a sense of the Armenian essence [hai voki]
to the nth generation [without the homeland]." [Embassy.DC.FB]
At the same time, my AGBU respondent posited that independence had
had a profound impact on the diasporans' sense of self-respect:
"Now I have a free country - you know what kind of self-confidence
that gives a nation? A tangible belongedness." [AGBU.DC.FB]
A similar observation was made by three other respondents who focused
on the role of the homeland in keeping the diaspora mobilised, and in
helping prevent assimilation in the diaspora:
"I think [having a homeland] makes a big difference to people
because then they feel some respect for themselves. [Armenia] is a government
and it's a country, it's part of the United Nations, they can read it
in the New York Times. Of course it makes a difference. And I think
if it wasn't for such terrible trouble a lot more would have gone by
now to visit. Unfortunately it's a very expensive trip, and a lot of
people just cannot afford it." [AGBU.NY.FB]
"The existence of an independent homeland has emboldened the diasporans."
[ARF.DC.FB.2]
"Today if the homeland began to weaken, if the homeland 'closed
down', the diaspora would be nothing. The source of our inspiration,
the raison d'etre of our existence, is the homeland. . . . Ararat and
Echmiadzin. . . . The inspiration for our identity is the homeland.
The homeland is our protection against assimilation, though assimilation
is still inevitable within a few generations, and ultimately the diaspora
is not our future." [D.LA.FB]
My analysis of the American-Armenian community clearly points to the
maintenance of the homeland as a central feature of Armenian diasporan
identity. Following the declaration of Armenian independence, (the idea
of) the homeland continued to be regarded as a key agent in ensuring
the survival of the diaspora. The relationship with the homeland was
still central to the policies of most diasporan organisations, and the
continuing role of the homeland in the formulation of diasporan identity
meant that there was an ongoing motivation to ensure that the homeland
will not perish. Thus there was a continuum and a discontinuum. On the
one hand, there was clearly the persistence of a territorial concept
of nationalism, and of the centrality of the Armenian nation-state in
the formulation of diasporan identity. On the other hand, there was
the adaptation of this concept of territorial nationalism to meet the
changing configuration of diasporan life. Thus the homeland, like the
language and the church, took on a symbolic role in diasporan identity.
This symbolic homeland orientation has been expressed through visits
to the homeland, financial contribution to the reconstruction efforts,
lobbying Western governments on behalf of Armenia, and offering expertise
help to the homeland. It was also manifested in the restored sense of
dignity when American-Armenians are able to identify themselves with
a country that is, finally, a member of the United Nations, in a way
similar to their identification with Armenians who have achieved outstanding
success in their fields.
Such a manifestation of symbolic ethnicity carries within it a paradox
and a risk. On the one hand, moving towards greater symbolic identity
preserves the culture, while on the other hand exposing it to new possibilities
of assimilation. Certainly symbolic ethnicity as expressed in its current
form does constitute a recognisable reimagination of ethnic identity.
Symbolic ethnicity is entirely suited to the needs not only of the ethnic
group, but also of the host state, and must accommodate both. Smith
writes that the
"consistent privatisation of every manifestation of ethnicity,
its confinement to the realm of the purely symbolic and expressive,
and its outright separation from every political manifestation"
Yet 'symbolic ethnicity' represents neither a move 'downwards' from
full ethnic identification, nor a fast track towards assimilation. Rather,
it is a way of describing the 'new' mode of cultural imagination that
is appropriate for those groups living in pluralistic America. More
than that, it is in fact a way of slowing down assimilation. In the
words of an East Coast Diocesan cleric:
"We must assimilate before we become assimilated." [D.DC.FB]
In other words, American-Armenians must take the initiative and adapt
their identity to the American milieu, before that milieu completely
absorbs the Armenian culture into its own. The best approach would therefore
be to accept the need for dual identity and to reimagine American-Armenian
identity in a way that is appropriate to its American context.
Symbolic ethnicity is an internal dialectic that allows ethnicity to
perpetuate itself and to be reimagined without being destroyed. The
perpetuation and renewal of symbols is a means of securing a concrete
rallying point in times of fluidity of the community's boundary. Abner
Cohen has written that "symbols make it possible for the social
order to survive the disruptive processes created within it by the inevitable
areas of conflicting values and principles." Since most ethnic
symbols, even apparently 'new' or 'Western' ones, originate from within
the existing culture and polity, they should not be seen as foreign
to it, even though many members of the ethnic group might view them
as such. There is a strong continuity despite the shift in how the symbol
is perceived:
"[S]ymbolic formations and patterns of action tend to persist
longer than power relationships in changing socio-cultural systems.
. . . [This fact] inevitably lead[s] to cultural or symbolic continuities
amidst even the most radical political changes."
Therefore, perhaps what is commonly perceived as a move towards greater
symbolic ethnicity is in fact a symbolic 'adjustment' to a new milieu.
Gans agrees, and is keen in his more recent works to clarify that he
was not implying that symbolic ethnicity is in any way inferior to traditional
modes of ethnic identity. In describing symbolic ethnicity he was not,
as some of his critics have claimed, arguing that it was an "unauthentic,
unserious, or meaningless" expression of ethnicity. Rather, he
believes that symbolic ethnicity is likely to "persist for generations"
and will continue to create the social, political and other structures
that are necessary to support it. Certainly over time there will be
"less and less of an ethnic repertoire on which to draw" for
the reimagination of ethnic expression, and the symbolic ethnicity of
each successive generation will be less and less comparable to the ethnicity
of the immigrant culture. However, if it is to persist at all, an ethnic
identity has no choice but to undergo such a process.
In the final analysis, the question of whether symbolic ethnicity is
a new phenomenon, a destructive one or a positive one, will be answered
differently by different sectors of the ethnic group. The line of disagreement
is drawn, predictably, between symbolic ethnicists and intellectuals
who lean towards the idea of a strong diasporan identity on the one
hand, and traditional ethnicists who tend towards the 'one-nation' idea
on the other. Amongst the former group symbolic ethnicity is hailed
(though cautiously by some) as an act of realism and the means by which
'Armenianness' can ultimately be preserved. By the latter group it is
viewed as evidence that things would have been better if only the Armenians
had remained in the 'old country', where the forces of assimilation
were supposedly much weaker.
What then is the future of symbolic ethnicity among American-Armenians,
particularly with regard to the renewed homeland-orientation among American-born
Armenians? As I have argued, symbolic ethnicity is likely to persist
and to increasingly characterise the identity of future generations
of American-Armenians. This is so as long as ethnicity continues to
be viewed as respectable and to offer its adherents benefits within
American society: in other words, as long as the 'cost' of being ethnic
remains low. Over time, traditional institutions and discourses will
continue to decline and disappear, and those that survive will be the
organisations that deal with symbolic aspects of identity such as food
and historical artefacts (museums, libraries and so forth). However,
since I have argued that the traditional discourse feeds symbolic ethnicity,
it is possible, as Gans predicts, that as the traditional discourses
and organisations disappear, symbolic ethnicity will also gradually
wither. Waters argues that whatever form of ethnicity that continues
to exist will be symbolic, and will become increasingly integrated into
the popular culture. This might take place through the media, through
greater contact with the general population such as through intermarriage,
and through the 'marketing' of the symbols of that culture to the general
population in the form of food, artefacts, movies, literature and stereotypes.
It could be argued that the constant influx of immigration will facilitate
the preservation of ethnic identity even in its symbolic form. However,
since a regular flow of immigrants cannot be guaranteed in the long
run, it seems that the ultimate answer lies in strengthening both the
tangible and symbolic aspects of the diaspora-homeland relationship.
Thus the renewed reorientation of American-Armenians towards the homeland
among American-Armenians will increasingly become the key agent in perpetuating
Armenian ethnicity in the United States. This projection is in line
with the recent history of the Armenian diaspora as I have discussed
in previous chapters: along with conditions in the host country, events
in the homeland have been the main factor shaping the nature of diasporan
identity.
Among American-Armenians, the perpetuation of the role of territory
has contributed to the persistence of ethnic identity. At the same time,
it is only through the reimagination of the form of this role that the
persistence of that identity is ensured. Indeed, The reimagination of
this identity has led not only to its maintenance, but also to its reinvigoration.
The concomitant renewal of interest among Armenian-Americans in their
'ethnic roots' - albeit in increasingly symbolic form - indicates that
the nation remains a foremost source of identity for a large number
of Armenian-Americans. Even the alternative discourses of identification
- whether nationalist or non-nationalist - continue to define themselves
in response to the existing discourse(s), and are therefore technically
a part of the same discourse.
American-Armenian Identity and Diaspora-Homeland Relations
The greater accessibility of the homeland in the post-Soviet era led,
ironically, to the greater entrenchment of diasporan permanency. The
re-establishment of an independent homeland did not decimate the diaspora,
nor did it necessarily weaken it. At the same time, it did not resolve
many of the long-standing questions relating to diasporan identity,
nor did it bring about the political and administrative unity in the
diaspora that many would have expected. Instead, as I have shown in
the case of the united States, the establishment of an independent homeland
reinforced the existing partisan cleavages and entrenched the differences
between traditional and symbolic expressions of identity. Furthermore,
it raised a whole new set of questions by re-opening the debate over
the permanence and nature of the diaspora.
If these patterns are any indication, even with the permanency of the
diaspora, the diaspora-homeland relationship will continue to play a
significant role in the imagination of diasporan identity. However,
the form and significance of the relationship will be subject to reimagination,
being increasingly viewed in terms of its functional value for preserving
the diaspora and its institutions. As long as a large segment of the
nation continues to live outside the homeland, with no intention of
returning, the diaspora will need to creatively reimagine its own identity
vis-a-vis the homeland.
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