CHAPTER 5:
THE AMERICAN-ARMENIAN COMMUNITY AND POST-SOVIET ARMENIA, 1985-93

[index]  [chapter 6]

"When Armenia emerged into independence in 1991, it did not need to construct an identity but to bring one up to date. . . . This generation has a new historic mandate: to craft a commentary on Armenian identity that will be true at once to its often insular tradition and to its current movement outward toward world culture."

In this chapter I will examine the events in the homeland in the period 1985 and 1993. Continuing on from the previous chapters, I will then trace the impact of the events on diasporan cleavages, unity and identity, and the response of the American-Armenian community to these events. In the next and final chapter I will analyse the reimagination of the diaspora's role as it seeks to confront the fact of its own permanency.

This discussion draws on a wide selection of newspaper articles taken from the period 1985-1993, and interviews conducted between October 1993 and January 1994. An explanation of these sources is given in Appendix A. From these materials it is clear that many American-Armenians believed that the response of the diaspora to the events in the homeland was less than what it could have been. However, the analysis of the causes and implications of this response varies among the sources. Furthermore, the impact of these events was not felt evenly throughout the American-Armenian community.

The Collapse of Soviet Armenia, 1987-93: Re-Imagining The Nation

Following Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985, the Armenians took the opportunity offered by glasnost to appeal to Moscow with a range of demands. However, with the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia was unwittingly plunged into a situation of crisis. Broadly speaking, between 1987 and 1993 the national democratic movement in Armenia underwent three phases: the emergence of a democratic movement with moderate aims (1987-88); the radicalisation of that movement (1989-90); and the rise to power of the Armenian National Movement (1990-93).

The first phase began with mass demonstrations over environmental issues. In October 1987, two demonstrations were held in Erevan calling for tighter environmental policies to redress the large scale pollution problems caused by rapid industrialisation in the Soviet period. The environmental movement established a pattern of mass mobilisation which was to provide the basis for later demonstrations. In early 1988, thousands of Armenians staged a peaceful demonstration in the streets of Erevan, calling on Gorbachev to reunite the Nagorno-Karabagh Autonomous Region with Armenia. The Armenians feared that Nagorno-Karabagh might become "another Nakhichevan". The demonstrations were loyalist in nature, with people carrying portraits of Gorbachev and pointing out to Moscow that "Karabagh is a test of perestroika." The Armenians faithfully presented their demands to Gorbachev with full confidence that, in the context of the new 'openness', their demands would be heard.

However, it did not take long for this sense of optimism and expectancy to collapse. Gorbachev was concerned that handing Nagorno-Karabagh over to Armenia would antagonise the Soviet Union's large Muslim population. At the same time, he was aware of the possibility of an 'imitation effect': granting concessions to one autonomous region would inevitably set a precedent which the autonomous regions and 'stateless' minorities of the Russian Federation would want to follow. Consequently, in mid-February, Moscow rejected the Armenians' demands for reunification. In the meantime, Armenians in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) were massacred by Azeri mobs under the noses of Soviet troops. This situation, coupled with the USSR Supreme Soviet's second rejection of the Armenians' demands in July, radicalised the Armenian democratic movement. The Karabagh Committee, which consisted of a number of key Armenian intellectuals and dissidents, was increasingly emboldened, calling not only for the resolution of the Karabagh issue, but also for the dismissal of the Armenian Republic's corrupt leadership and the democratisation of that country's political system.

The second phase of the movement, which lasted from 1988 to 1991, saw the Armenians' modest irredentism turn into outright separatism as it became increasingly evident that Moscow was unwilling and unable to protect Armenian lives in Azeri territory. Sociologist Lyudila Arutunian described the motivation for this shift as follows:

"Armenia is on the border of Turkey, our historic enemy. That fact did not allow us to think about secession. But in the past two years, we have had a crisis of faith in Moscow . . If the union does not defend the people of Nagorno-Karabakh against violence, then the question arises, can we be part of the Soviet Union?"

The Soviet government responded by implementing a reformist solution to the Karabagh problem, namely, economic and cultural restructuring in Karabagh, and clamping down on the democratic movement in Armenia. In July 1988, Parouir Hairikian, who was formerly involved in the NUP and leader of the more radical wing of the new movement, was exiled from the Soviet Union. As the mood of the demonstrations in Erevan became increasingly radical, the Azeris began to reciprocate. Mass demonstrations were held in Baku, and sporadic violence broke out in Karabagh and in parts of Azerbaijan. Throughout the rest of the year thousands of refugees flowed between Azerbaijan and Armenia.

On December 7 1988, a devastating earthquake hit Armenia, killing an estimated 25-50 thousand and leaving hundreds of thousands homeless. The earthquake affected 40 percent of the country, and 65 percent of the population. 20 cities and 358 villages were seriously damaged, and 58 villages were totally destroyed. Gorbachev cut short an overseas trip to view the devastation first hand, and promised to allocate billions of roubles towards the reconstruction of the country. The Karabagh Committee also appealed to diasporan Armenians for aid. Nevertheless, the Soviet government used the chaotic situation as an opportunity to arrest the leaders of the Karabagh Movement. The Soviets declared martial law and attempted to co-opt the Armenian leadership and Church to re-establish political stability. In January 1989, Karabagh was placed under the direct control of Moscow, in partial fulfilment of the Armenians' demands.

It soon became clear that the promised reconstruction would not materialise due to the gradual collapse of the Soviet Union. At the same time, Azerbaijan imposed a blockade on all trade and supply routes to Armenia. These factors contributed to the further radicalisation of the Armenian National Movement. On April 24 1989, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators called for the release of the imprisoned members of the Karabagh Committee. They were eventually released, and on June 17 the Karabagh Committee announced a merger with several other unofficial organisations to create a new bloc called the Armenian National Movement (ANM). The ANM's agenda encompassed not only the Karabagh question, but also wider issues of national autonomy.

In the same month, Armenia's communist leadership saw it fit to make a number of significant symbolic concessions to the growing nationalist fervour, including the recognition of May 28, the date of the declaration of independence in 1918, as an official anniversary, and the restoration of the tricolour as Armenia's national flag. The Armenian government also extended official recognition to the ANM, inviting it and writer Zori Balayan to attend sessions of the Armenian Supreme Soviet. There, the differences within the democratic movement became apparent. In one session, when Balayan referred to the danger of pan-Turkism, ANM leader Ter-Petrosian and his colleagues responded by calling for priority to be placed on democratisation rather than on territorial issues which could endanger Armenia's relations with its Turkish-speaking neighbours and thereby compromise Armenia's security. However, this did not mean that the ANM had changed its long term goal regarding Karabagh, since it continued to call for that region to be joined with Armenia. Indeed, on the initiative of the ANM, the Armenian Supreme Soviet recognised the authority of the Karabagh National Council which had established itself in opposition to the Karabagh government and the Moscow-established special commission. The USSR Supreme Soviet responded by effectively placing Karabagh back under Azerbaijani control. To this, the Armenian Supreme Soviet responded on December 1 by declaring the merger of Karabagh and Armenia. By this time, the ANM had become further radicalised, and cooperation with the communist government seemed no longer possible.

In January 1990, further pogroms took place in Baku. Soviet troops intervened only belatedly, at the cost of hundreds of Azeri and Armenian lives. These events dealt a final death blow to confidence in Moscow among both Azeris and Armenians, and anti-Soviet sentiment expressed itself in popular outbursts in both republics. In Armenia, the ANM gained a clear victory in the 1990 elections to the Republic's Supreme Soviet. Later in the year, the Armenian Supreme Soviet released a declaration of "the initiation of a programme for the establishment of an independent state", in other words a declaration of its intention to work towards independence. In a speech delivered at the end of 1990, Ter-Petrosian argued that, through this declaration, the Armenian people "have resigned from the fetters of class ideology and has given its oath of loyalty to universal human values". He added that they had been "liberated from the delusions of traditional political thinking" and were now in a position to intelligently take charge of their own destiny.

With the ANM now firmly in power, Armenia entered the third phase of the democratic movement. In the early part of this period, Moscow clearly favoured Azerbaijan's pro-communist government over Armenia's non-communist leadership. This again contributed to the radicalisation of the Armenians. With the imminent collapse of the Soviet Union in September 1991, Armenia held a referendum which overwhelmingly supported independence for the Republic. In October Armenia held its first presidential elections, in which Levon Ter-Petrosian emerged as the clear leader gaining 87 percent of the votes. The ARF-endorsed candidate, Sos Sargsian, gained just over 4 percent of the vote, and the radical Parouir Hairikian a mere 7 percent.

At the same time, faced with the practicalities of running a country and the diminishing world interest in the events in Karabagh and Armenia, the Armenian National Movement embarked on a patient policy of diplomacy regarding the Karabagh issue, whilst maintaining its support for the aspirations of the Armenians in Karabagh. On September 23 1991, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed an armistice. Many critics, particularly in the diaspora, saw this as an unnecessary compromise, one that would reduce Armenia's bargaining power and hence limit its diplomatic options in the future. Azerbaijan's resumption of hostilities only three days later seemed to add weight to the sceptics' worst fears. In late November, Azerbaijan recommenced its blockade of Armenia.

Ironically, the blockade led the Armenian government to seek trade ties with neighbouring Turkey. Late in 1991, the government declared that it was willing to temporarily put aside the issue of the Genocide and of the Turkish-occupied territories, so as to ensure the immediate arrival of vital food supplies from Europe via Asia Minor. Beyond this need of the hour, however, the Armenian attempt at rapprochement with Ankara stemmed from a philosophy of Realpolitik, which held that Armenia needed to pursue realistic foreign policy goals rather than idealistic ones if it was to find its place in the international order. Furthermore, the move towards closer relations with Turkey was premised on the notion of the exclusion of the 'third force'. In other words, the Armenians would no longer rely on outside powers to support Armenia against an unfriendly second power such as Turkey. Having seen the futility of relying on Moscow, the Armenian leadership was increasingly of the view that it was time to 'go it alone', and this would involve dealing directly with Turkey as a neighbour. "No one will resolve the Armenian Question", wrote historian Rafael Ishkhanian in his article entitled 'The Law of Excluding the Third Force'. "We Armenians are the only ones who can resolve it."

In taking the path of self-reliance, the leaders of the new Armenia confronted difficult choices in foreign policy. The Armenian government often had to pragmatically weigh up different policy directions and make decisions that minimised loss. Some dilemmas that emerged were: should the government prioritise the liberation of Karabagh even at the expense of Armenia's own economic and political development? Should the government trade with Turkey thus placing the Genocide issue on the back burner? The traditional nationalist agenda - the 'Armenian Question - became the source of a series of apparently insoluble dilemmas.

With regard to the Genocide, Armenia's first Foreign Minister, Raffi Hovannisian, explained the government's policy as follows:

"The Armenian government never has, never will encourage the diaspora to play soft on an issue that is so central to our collective identity, and that is the genocide. . . . [However], parallel to our remembrance of history . . . we believe that Armenia should normalise relations with all its neighbours, including Turkey. That process initially began with commercial and economic ties and I'm sure it would develop into diplomatic relations."

The fact that it was even necessary to make such a statement indicates that the Armenian government was aware of the danger that it could be perceived as compromising on issues so central to the Armenian collective memory. Indeed, the tenuousness of the distinction between temporarily laying aside the Genocide issue on the one hand, and forgetting about it on the other, became apparent when Hovannisian apparently overstepped the mark by referring to the Genocide in a speech in Istanbul. Hovannisian, the American-born son of UCLA Prof. Richard G. Hovannisian and a Dashnak hamagir (sympathiser), made public statements that were not in line with its 'go-slow' policy on Karabagh and the Genocide, and therefore considered provocative by the Armenian government. In October 1992 Hovannisian announced his resignation at the request of the President.

Gerard Libaridian, in his capacity as foreign policy adviser to the Ter-Petrosian government, made similar statements as Hovanissian regarding trade with Turkey. In 1992, Libaridian categorically denied that the Armenian government would succumb to Turkey's "blackmail policy", in which that country's government had demanded that Armenia recognise the 1921 Treaty of Kars and disassociate itself from the Genocide issue. He explained that, although his government was seeking to separate the "historic" issue of the Genocide from "government dealings" between Armenia and Turkey, it would not discourage the annual commemorations in Erevan, nor would it "suggest to the diaspora to down play the genocide." Libaridian continued by emphasising that:

"Once our nation gets over the crisis we face, and in Nagorno-Karabagh, then we can spend more time on the genocide question. It would be preposterous to even think that we Armenians would forget. We cannot forget the genocide, nor should anyone even suggest it."

The balance between diplomatic openness and "remembrance of history" is a precarious one. The fact that the government had no qualms about establishing relations with Turkey disturbed many diasporan Armenians, particularly Dashnaks, who argue that until the Armenian Question is resolved, Armenia should maintain a vigilant stand towards Turkey. For those who had for seventy years lived with the dream of a united greater Armenia and Turkish recognition of the Genocide, the philosophy of Realpolitik seemed like a betrayal. In 1991 AIM reported that the SDHP was "not in favour of the Armenian government's attempts to establish economic relations with Turkey". As late as 1993, one AW article argued: "In the name of doing good business with Turkey and being good neighbours," the Armenian government has "totally and completely abandoned" the Armenian Question.

Thus the government of President Levon Ter-Petrosian came under heavy criticism from various sections of the Armenian community, especially in the diaspora. Most of the criticism, it seems, focussed on the gap between the present government's priorities and traditional nationalist goals. This gap was most apparent in matters of foreign policy and those of symbolic importance to the diaspora, such as the Genocide. Essentially, the debate between traditional nationalists and those who adopted Realpolitik revolved around the question of whether traditional ideals and goals can be maintained in a rapidly changing world. The political leadership in the homeland operated on the understanding that the only way to survive in the international order was by adopting a 'realistic', or pragmatic, political philosophy. In the diaspora, this found resonance with the emerging new discourse of pragmatism, professionalism and assimilation, which argued that Armenia must be willing to sacrifice the pursuit of cherished goals in the short term for the sake of achieving more secure yet modest goals over the long term.

Others such as the Dashnaks insisted on maintaining ideals and goals as eternal guiding principles which could, and should, direct the day-to-day decision-making process of the national leadership. Because they continued to hold firmly to the traditional symbols of Armenian nationhood, many Dashnaks felt that the government of Ter-Petrosian was abandoning the key issues of a united greater Armenia and the recognition of the Genocide for the sake of short term political expediency. The conflict, then, was between two diametrically opposed ideological perspectives. In this way, the policies of the Armenian government had an impact on the diaspora and exacerbated diasporan cleavages.

Similarly, the Ter-Petrosian government attracted mixed reactions over its policy towards the diaspora. As early as December 1987, Karlen Dallakian, President of the Committee for Cultural Relations for Armenians Living Abroad (Spiurk Committee), explained that the Armenian government wished to work with "[a]ll of the organizations of the diaspora, without any exceptions". In the same month, the President of the Writer's Union of Armenia, Vartkes Bedrosian, admitted that Armenia needed to reconsider its policy towards the diaspora: this would involve a "new attitude" and a rejection of "antiquated positions and outmoded stereotypes". Secretary of the Communist Party of Armenia Souren Haroutunian also acknowledged the shortcomings of the same Committee and called for its reform.

In 1989 Levon Ter-Petrosian expressed similar hopes in an interview with AW. The ANM leader said he believed that the diaspora could continue to play an important role in supporting the democratic movement in the homeland, for example, by influencing the international media. He went on to say that: "The day democracy asserts itself [in Armenia], the elements of the diaspora will be able to establish themselves in Armenia." In subsequent years, some positive steps were indeed taken. The new government of Armenia formally declared the separation of the Spiurk Committee from the government, thus permitting that body to act independently of any government or partisan interests. The Committee had long been criticised in both the diaspora and the homeland for inefficiency, mismanagement and politicisation.

On August 23 1990, the Armenian parliament declared its intention of extending citizenship to diasporans. It may have been anticipated that the Armenian government would at the very least follow the pattern of, say, Poland or South Africa, both of which gave its diasporans voting rights. However, a policy on citizenship was not enacted for several years, and in the end this did not include automatic citizenship to diasporan Armenians. The appointment of Raffi Hovannisian, an American-Armenian, as Armenia's first foreign minister sent a further message of hope to the diaspora. However this was also to be short-lived, as only a year later Hovannisian resigned at the request of the President. In the view of AIM correspondent Tony Halpin, Hovannisian's departure from Armenian politics raised anew the question of the nature of diaspora-homeland relations. AIM's Tony Halpin posed the question of whether the resignation would

"increase a sense of disconnectedness between republic and Diaspora? Or will it resolve an untidy situation and clearly define the relationship between the state and those with only an emotional connection to it, as Israel had to do with its own Diaspora?"

However, there have been other diasporans who have been able to retain their offices in the Armenian government, and this begs the question of why Hovannisian did not survive while others did. Although there was clearly a diaspora-homeland factor in Hovannisian's dismissal, it is more accurate to understand his resignation as a result of the clash of two ideologies: that is, between the traditional and pragmatic approaches to foreign policy making. Nevertheless, the impact of Hovannisian's resignation was felt by most diasporans, regardless of ideology. As Jivan Tabibian pointed out, Hovannisian's resignation at the very least led to a need to reassess the diaspora's understanding of its relationship with the homeland. Apart from reviving the question of citizenship for diasporans, it also raised serious questions as to whether the government in Yerevan could realistically function as the government of all Armenians, a possibility that had been often raised by "some romantic souls" in the diaspora.

At the same time, many diasporans, especially Dashnaks and Dashnak hamagirs, accused the government of wanting to influence or even control the diaspora. If diaspora-homeland relations are to work, argued ARF leader Maroukhian, "[a] great deal depends on the political policies adopted by the Armenian government . . . they must be able to view our diasporan reality 'from above', without descending into it and taking sides." Tololyan argued that the Armenian government most likely did not want the diaspora to remain a "wild card", and would want attempt to control or influence the diaspora through existing organisations or by circumventing them. The appointment of non-affiliated diasporans to government positions suited such a policy, argued Tololyan, though he did not venture so far as to posit that this was part of a deliberate plan by the government.

Clearly, faced with the task of governing a fledging new Republic, the Armenian government did not prioritise the issue of diaspora-homeland relations and citizenship for diasporans. For many, the diaspora-homeland relationship, and the homeland's policy towards the diaspora, was one of constantly recurring promise and disappointment. Henry Astarjian, for example, described the Armenian government's policy towards the diaspora as one of exclusion. Another contributor to the AW proclaimed that: "Barone Nakhakah [Mr President] is telling us, 'Diaspora, go to hell.'"

The Response of the Diaspora to Events in the Homeland

The Diasporan Parties' Response to Political Developments in Armenia

Suny points out that even in the early days of the Armenian National Movement in Armenia, enthusiasm among diasporan parties was generally low. Though humanitarian assistance began to pour in after the earthquake and various diasporan organisations made their entry into Armenia, there was among most diasporans a noticeable absence of the kind of euphoria that was apparent in the streets of Erevan in 1987-88. The expected euphoria was still absent as late as 1992, when only a small crowd attended when the Armenian tricolour was raised at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

Also indicative of this hesitancy was a communiqué produced by the three parties in response to the mass demonstrations in Erevan in late 1988. The communiqué started off by affirming the parties' "unfaltering support" for the people and governments of Armenia and Karabagh. It called on the Soviet government to punish those responsible for the pogroms and on the government of Armenia to place the Karabagh question on its agenda as a matter of priority. However, unlike earlier memoranda issued by the parties, this communiqué fell short of explicitly demanding the unification of Karabagh with Armenia. Furthermore, it then went on to cite the need for caution:

"We also call upon our valiant brethren in Armenia and Karabagh to forego such extreme acts as work stoppages, student strikes, and some radical calls and expressions that unsettle law and order in public life in the homeland . . . we should pursue our ultimate interests with farsightedness and determination."

As in previous moments of crisis in Armenia, the diasporan parties were able to present a unified voice in their response to events in the homeland. It is interesting, though, that the parties were so united in their caution. In its coverage of the communiqué, the TAR pointed out that the parties were perhaps fearful that the radicalisation of the democratic movement in Armenia might bring about violent intervention from Moscow. They feared that this would forfeit any chance of achieving the long-standing "hopes and aspirations" of the diaspora, namely the establishment of an independent, united Armenia. An article by Kevork Kherlopian appearing in Nor Or three years later reiterated this observation. "At the start," wrote Kherlopian, "the diaspora did not understand the situation, because it was shaken by it. Then it began to be afraid" of what would happen to Armenia if it separated from the Soviet Union. Kherlopian argued that only later, with the election of ANM delegates to the Supreme Soviet, did the diaspora change its tack and stand by the democratic movement in Armenia. However, this shift was not so apparent in the ARF.

It is interesting to contrast the response of the parties with that of Archbishop Torkom Manoogian, Primate of the East Coast Diocese. Manoogian sent two communiqués to Gorbachev. The first, which appeared in December 1987, called for Karabagh to be placed "under the control of the Armenian SSR", arguing that:

"It is apparent that the Soviet Government could easily satisfy the Armenian claims to Karabagh without any detrimental effects to the future social and economic development of the Caucasus."

A year later he reiterated the demand, acknowledging the Soviet government's argument that this could set a precedent, but arguing that Karabagh was a special case. The wording of Manoogian's communiqué was bolder and more forceful than that of the parties. Perhaps this was due to the Archbishop's close links with Echmiadzin which gave him a greater appreciation for the mood of the Armenian people and inside knowledge of the extent to which the limits of glasnost could be pushed.

A year after the joint communiqué, in an interview with the AW, the then leader of the Karabagh Movement Levon Ter-Petrosian stated that he could understand the parties' moderate position towards the movement in the homeland. Referring specifically to the ARF, he went on to surmise that "Dashnaktsutiune has not wanted to position itself at the point of combat, so that it would not be accused of manipulating the movement from outside." However, the parties' communiqué drew a much stronger response from other quarters in both Armenia and the diaspora. For example, Zoryan Institute Director Gerard Libaridian was critical of the communiqué which he saw as indicative of the parties' lack of understanding of the social and political complexities of the situation in Armenia. He wrote further that:

"the fear of not being liked by 'higher' authorities or [the naive] belief in the economy as a sphere independent of and unrelated to politics . . . are common to diasporan and colonial mentalities. Regardless, the Joint Statement displayed a marked absence of understanding of the role of people in politics and of popular movements in history."

In the homeland itself, the leader of the more radical National Self-Determination Group, Parouir Hairikian, accused the diasporan leaders of having "become allies of Gorbachev." The Self-Determination Group produced the following response which appeared in its organ, Hayrenik:

"Your silence was insulting; but your words even more so. . . .

Months after the beginning of major events inspired by [our love] of our people [in Armenia] your 'national leaders' sat around a round table , measured the good and the bad in Marlboro smoke-filled rooms and outlined their position with regard to events taking place in Armenia and to Hayastantsis living in critical times.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation is adding its once virile voice to those of the leftover Hunchakians and Ramgavars.

And that is being done by signing a document which condemns the tactics of our struggle."

The statement was particularly virulent against the ARF:

"But what did we get? Today you [the ARF] are signing a treaty against the strikers of Armenia along with the Hunchakians who were born out of anti-national 'isms' and who now parade as nationalists and with Ramgavars who are still looking for their birth certificate. Perhaps, while formulating this 'historical statement', you were concerned that your own rank and file may follow the example of their brothers in Armenia. . . .

There is more. Perhaps you were insulted that on the question of Artsakh we did not ask your opinion . . .

Poor Dashnaktsutiune . . . instead of feeling pride inside of you . . . that the [tricolour] is flying in your real fatherland, that millions are now in solidarity with your persecuted loneliness, you, [are] afraid of these numbers . . ."

The document acknowledged the work done by the ARF and the other parties in preserving the Armenian heritage in the diaspora throughout the Soviet period. Nevertheless, it went on to point out that while the diasporans had for seventy years lived in relative comfort and security, the people in the homeland had gone through a "second holocaust in 1937", a World War, and mass exile to the labour camps of Siberia. It is these same people, argued the communiqué, who are now standing on their feet, without the diaspora's help, calling for justice.

The parties, however, continued to be cautious. Again in 1988, a Massis editorial argued that the dream of independence must for the moment remain just that - a "dream". Separation from the Soviet Union would endanger Armenia by exposing it to its traditional enemies, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Similarly, an AMS editorial in 1989 argued that the call for independence by the democratic movement in the homeland was premature, indicative of "sentimentality and lack of trained politicians". While recognising the "frustration" of those living in the homeland, the editorial argued that "desperation is the worst friend we can listen to in our hour of extreme danger and disaster." The editor called on the diasporan parties to desist from pursuing grandiose goals of independence. The continuing conservatism of the diasporan parties was evidenced by an article which appeared in Nor Or in response to Rafael Ishkhanian's declaration in 1989 concerning the "exclusion of the third force". The article reiterated the argument that such a policy would lead the Armenian people into the "abyss of uncertainty". In other words, the policy of self-determination was seen as adventurist.

Also of interest is the communiqué produced by the Twenty-fourth World Congress of the ARF held in 1988, which again called for moderation while also reiterating traditional goals:

". . . the A.R.F. - Dashnaktsutiun reaffirms its immediate obligations toward the Armenian people of the homeland: namely, to stand in support of their aspirations and tendencies, their national liberties, and their social and political demands; to try by all means to maintain the homeland's right-claiming movement on a sound and realistic path, so as to safeguard it from inopportune and perilous initiatives; to assist to the advancement and development of the economy of Armenia and Armenian Artsakh; and finally, to contribute towards the enhancement of a deserving and dedicated national authority in Armenia, that holds the national-collective interests above any other considerations.

Paradoxically, the very party which called on the Karabagh Movement to take a "sound and realistic path", was later to become critical of the ANM for adopting Realpolitik with regard to trade with Turkey and the Genocide. However, despite the apparent contradiction, there is some degree of consistency underlying the ARF's policy throughout the decade under examination: that is, the priority placed on a united Armenia at all costs, as explained in the last sentence of the party's 1988 communiqué:

". . . [The] admirable pan-Armenian solidarity [of the early phase of the Karabagh Movement] should remain kindled and should prosper. The call for UNITED AND ONE ARMENIAN NATION IN A UNITED AND ONE ARMENIAN HOMELAND rings as true today as it ever did."

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ARF and the other parties had seen the best chance for achieving this goal within the context of the Soviet constitution. Later, with Armenia's declaration of independence, the ARF continued to call for a greater Armenia incorporating Karabagh as the best means of securing Armenia's borders against its enemies, while the other parties aligned their policies with that of the government. Furthermore, over time, the ADLP and SDHP began to accept the inevitability of independence, and developed a greater optimism regarding the future of an independent Armenia. Yet the ARF continued to insist that in calling for independence the democratic movement in Armenia had taken the fast track to destruction. It was argued that, even though Moscow was not operating entirely in Armenia's favour, it would have been better to stay within the protective structure of the Soviet Union until Armenia was in a strong enough position to go its own way. As Lebanese-Armenian Sahag Toutjian explained in a lecture delivered in San Fernando,

"if we are to ensure the physical survival of our people and the perpetuation of our nation, there is at the moment only one correct path - friendship with Russia".

Furthermore, it was pointed out that, by adopting a separatist position, the Armenian leadership was effectively forfeiting the possibility of Moscow's intervention in the Karabagh conflict in Armenia's favour. To make things worse, at a time when Armenia was alienating the Gorbachev government with its radical policies, Azerbaijan's communist rulers were successfully wooing the support of Moscow. In the meantime, it was argued, if Armenia became independent, it would be exposing itself to its 'eternal enemy', the Turk, who would take any opportunity to destroy Armenia and fulfil its pan-Turanian dream.

On the whole, it appears that, at least in the initial stages, the political developments in the homeland confounded the diaspora and challenged its raison d'etre. At an ANM Conference held in Erevan in November 1990, Libaridian boldly proclaimed:

". . . the national movement in Armenia and Artsakh had a profoundly destabilizing impact on diaspora institutions and values. . . . We, in the diaspora, should have the humility and courage to recognize that our institutions were not built to face the new, and bigger, challenges facing our nation; that in order for the diaspora to realize its great potential, our institutions must undergo actual transformations. . . . To have a right to continued leadership in the diaspora and before they can make a claim to leadership in Armenia, political parties must apply to their own past the same critical review which Armenians in Armenia applied toward their own past."

Libaridian went on to argue that: "For the first time in a long time we, as a nation, have a positive agenda not based on the hatred and fear of the Turk." However, in his view, the traditional organisations in the diaspora had not risen to the challenge of the new geopolitical realities. The only hope, then, lay in the

"new groups, smaller groups, that are coming together everywhere to fill the gap that is widening; groups that seek their legitimation in what they can do for the future, not in what they have done in the past."

Nevertheless, the parties took the first opportunity to present themselves as legitimate stakeholders in the life of the new Armenia. Their strategy was to establish regional committees in the homeland which in the early years operated as branches of the international party structure. The ARF was the first party to establish its formal presence in Armenia. In November 1990, the ARF held its first Regional Congress in Erevan. The Congress produced a comprehensive Platform dealing with a range of domestic and foreign policy issues regarding Armenia and reaffirming the ARF's commitment to

"'constant struggle' for the realization of our people's complete rights, from Artsakh to Moush, to Van-Vasbouragan, to Yerevan. Onward, for the sake of our fatherland, for the restoration of a free, independent, and democratic Armenia."

Thus the response of the ARF to events in Armenia was to reassert its traditional agenda and to assert its claim to political authority in the homeland. In the following year the ARF established its own newspaper and set up party cells throughout Armenia and Karabagh. In June 1992 Boghosian estimated the total number of ARF party members in Armenia to be around 5,000. The ARF contested the 1991 presidential elections, but its candidate was only able to gain about 4 percent of the national vote. The low response to the parties in general can perhaps be explained by the Armenians' suspicion towards political parties after seventy years of communist rule, and also by the absence of the various charitable, educational, cultural, sporting organisations and day schools that have normally acted as a base for recruitment of members in the diaspora.

From the earliest days, the ARF's presence in Armenia was shrouded in controversy. Unlike the other two parties, the ARF retained its hardline stance on the issues of economic privatisation, relations with Turkey, and Karabagh. With regard to the last point, even after the ANM had ceased to be a single issue movement, the ARF continued to view the Karabagh issue - and the issue of a united, greater Armenia - as pivotal to the Armenian nationalist struggle and to the survival of the homeland. For example, Dashnak writer Varant Papazian was of the opinion that:

"In response to the question of which is the most important, [Armenian] independence or the reunification of Karabagh [with Armenia], the revolutionary can give only one answer . . . the latter."

The reason for this, he argued, is that Armenia can never be certain about the intentions of its neighbours, and must therefore seek to strengthen its territorial base before going it alone. Therefore, the question of independence must be "incidental" to that of unification. In his view, Armenia would be too weak without the inclusion of, say, Nagorno-Karabagh:

"The struggle for self-determination (of Nagorno-Karabagh) is not in contradiction to Armenia's internal development. On the contrary. The struggle is the very foundation for the internal unity of Armenia's development and direction."

Furthermore, according to Papazian Armenia's true economic success depended on the reunification of Nagorno-Karabagh with Armenia. He argued that the very existence of Armenia would be under threat if the demand for reunification with Nagorno-Karabagh was not made.

The wedge between the traditional and pragmatic elements was driven deeper once the ANM came to power. As mentioned earlier, the Ter-Petrosian government was willing to make compromises that were viewed as treachery by some Armenians in the diaspora. For example, an article in AW criticised the Armenian government for acting on behalf of Karabagh but against the interests of that entity. Among some non-Dashnaks this view was also held, even into the early 1990s. A letter appearing in TAR argued that Karabagh must be defended "at all costs". Moorad Mooradian also wrote that the issue of Karabagh was central to Armenian identity.

Others such as Edward Boghosian were more willing to align their views with those of the Armenian government. Boghosian wrote in 1992 that "Armenia . . . cannot wage war against a neighbour, which controls its lifelines, and at the same time ensure its population a degree of comfort in their daily life." He argued that, when the Karabagh issue was first raised, Armenia was part of a larger political unit and the issue "could have been settled by a simple stroke of the pen by President Gorbachev." However, with the declaration of independence in 1991, the matter was complicated and the ANM had no choice but to place the Karabagh question in perspective alongside other domestic and foreign policy issues. Thus, "[e]motionalism must be totally shed (sic) aside", and Karabagh cannot realistically be supported at the cost of "jeapordizing the very existence of the Republic of Armenia". Consequently, he suggested, Armenia needs to strive for a cease-fire "even at the cost of making concessions to the enemy."

The ADLP and SDHP, too, moderated their policy on Karabagh over time. Though initially active in lobbying both the Soviet and Western governments to resolve the Karabagh question, once the ANM came to power the these two parties effectively reverted to their earlier policy of supporting the Armenian government whatever its regime. Thus they took on the role of 'loyal opposition', though since 1991-92 the emphasis has increasingly been on the 'loyal'.

In June 1991, the ADLP declared its official support for the ANM. One month later, the party was officially registered in Armenia, and by September 1992 could boast 45 chapters throughout the country. The editorials of the ADLP press reaffirmed that party's self-appointed role as a 'moderate' counterforce to the 'extremist' ARF which, it argued, engaged in "[p]olitical irresponsibility and adventurism". An AMS editorial argued that the ARF's 1991 election platform was exposed for its "bankruptcy" in contrast to the ADLP's 'sensible' economic policies. The editorial ended by claiming:

"ADL believes in cooperation, not confrontation.
ARF believes in confrontation, not cooperation. . . .
The ADL acts.
The ARF talks."

This attempt at moderation was further evidenced in the ADLP's criticism of Raffi Hovannisian's outspoken tenure as foreign minister of Armenia. At the same time, as 'loyal opposition', the ADLP in Armenia occasionally expressed criticism over economic policies, for example in January 1993 when it called attention to the excesses of privatisation.

As with the ADLP, the re-establishment of the SDHP in Armenia in October 1990 had an altogether different impact on the homeland than that of the ARF, since it did not present a fundamental challenge to either the communists or their successor, the ANM. Even throughout the final days of the fledging Soviet Armenian regime, the SDHP effectively continued its seventy-year policy of supporting the "reborn" homeland and seeking the resolution of the Armenian Question within the Soviet framework. A 1987 Massis editorial posited that:

"we are hopeful that the question of the Armenian 'internal territories' will find its proper resolution through a Soviet internal constitutional amendment . . .".

A year later, another editorial explained: "Soviet Armenia is the nucleus, the seed of the pursuit of the Armenian Question . . .". However, as a result of growing disillusionment with the Soviet regime, the SDHP later switched its support to the ANM and gave that movement the same kind of unconditional loyalty it had given the communists. Over time, with regard to the ANM it adopted a stance of 'loyal opposition' similar to that of the ADLP. For example, in the wake of the Baku pogroms in January 1990, a Massis editorial reiterated the need for every diasporan Armenian to bring his or her "unnegotiated dedication" to the needs of the homeland. Diasporan Armenians, whatever their political convictions, were called on to support the government of Armenia. With regard to the ARF, another Massis article accused that party of carrying out an "adversarial and unprincipled struggle against the Armenian government, based on that party's delusions of grandeur and thirst for power." Interestingly, the same article also criticised the ADLP for uncritically supporting the ANM, and for adopting an anti-ARF stance which was being carried out "for the benefit of the ANM".

Criticism of the ARF was also widespread among neutral (chezok) Armenians. For example, Mooradian criticised those in the diaspora whom he called "knee-jerk reactionaries, people who automatically oppose anything that Levon Der Petrossian and the current Armenian government attempts . . .". At the same time, most chezok papers strongly supported the Ter-Petrosian government. An English language editorial in NH stated that:

". . . Armenians learnt first-hand about the ugly side of western democracy as President Levon Der Bedrossian's government withstood the onslaught of demonstrations, name-callings, negative campaigning, and mud-slinging of political opponents."

A more colourful example of pro-government sentiment was expressed in the Armenian-language editorial of the same edition of NH. That editorial praised the President and his government, eulogising its achievements and proclaiming that the Armenians had witnessed the realisation of their dreams. "The taste and smell of our lives was truly changed in these historic days", and better days were surely to follow as the homeland flourished and persevered despite all odds. It is interesting to note the personal connections of the editors of the chezok papers with the Armenian President. The editor of one Los Angeles independent newspaper is close friends with the President; [Ed.LA.FB.3] the former editor of AIM is now a member of the Armenian government; and TAR editor Edward Boghosian meets with the President during his frequent trips to Armenia.

Tensions between the ARF and the government reached their peak on 29 June 1992 when, on the eve of the ARF's twenty-fifth World Congress held in Erevan, the Chairman of the ARF World Bureau, Hrair Maroukhian, was expelled from Armenia. President Levon Ter-Petrosian appeared on national television accusing Maroukhian of connections with the KGB, and alleging that the ARF had been conducting terrorist activities in the country. The President also rejected calls by the ARF for a more "belligerent" stance regarding Karabagh, describing such a policy as dangerous for Armenia. The subsequent trials resulted in the imprisonment of a number of leading ARF members on charges of terrorism, drug dealing and money laundering. However there has been much outcry in both the Dashnak and chezok press over alleged mishandling of the trial by the Armenian courts. Soon after Maroukhian's expulsion, the ARF withdrew from the government-sponsored Hayastan Pan-Armenian Fund, of which the ADLP and SDHP were also members. The ARF was subsequently banned from operating in Armenia, though ARF cells continued to exist and have since been quietly tolerated by the government. Nevertheless, the party was prohibited from taking part in the 1995 parliamentary elections which it had planned to contest as a member of the National Coalition.

These events have partially discredited the ARF both in the homeland and in the diaspora, and have severely limited its ability to contribute to the process of nation-building in Armenia. After seventy years of being at the margins of Soviet Armenian life, the ARF once again found itself in opposition to the Armenian government. The souring of ARF-government relations has also affected that party's ability to work together with the other diasporan parties. For example, attempts to organise joint Genocide commemorations in the United States fell apart in 1992, partly over the question of how much importance ought to be placed over the Karabagh issue. The ARF had proposed that the commemoration program "connect the 1915 Genocide to the genocide today in Karabagh." However, the ADLP disagreed, arguing that Karabagh was a political issue and must therefore be separated from that of the Genocide.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the Armenian National Movement not only exposed the diaspora's institutional weaknesses, but also exacerbated the cleavages and created an ideological vacuum which much of the diaspora was not able to effectively address. The diaspora was faced with a crisis of legitimacy which it was unable and, often, unwilling to confront. The response of the political parties to the re-establishment of an independent homeland was, on the whole, confused, defensive and belated. In general, traditionalists simply reasserted the traditional discourse and notions of identity. In so doing, they were ill-equipped to resist the development of alternative discourses which received a boost as a result of the events in the homeland.

Understanding the Parties' Response

There is general agreement, particularly among non-party members, that the parties had great difficulty in responding effectively to the events in the homeland in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One common explanation was that the diasporan organisations had lost their raison d'etre and had become more interested in partisan conflict than in serving the nation.

The accusation of partisanship was aimed most strongly at the ARF. An article in Massis named the ARF and, interestingly, the Armenian Assembly as two organisations which preferred to work on their own rather than in unison with other parties or organisations One commentator accused the ARF of wanting "Absolute Rule Forever", and of being more concerned with "power and control" than with patriotism. At the same time, the Dashnaks, argued the author, "were and still remain the most divisive force in the diaspora." For another writer, the ARF's desire for control was evidenced by its attempts to disassociate itself from a group bearing the same name that emerged in Armenia, desiring instead to bring it under the control of the World Bureau. The ARF's response to this last accusation was that the 'ARF-Armenia' was set up by the opponents of the ARF to try to split and thereby weaken the party.

Another area in which the ARF was accused of refusing to relinquish total control was with regard to the symbols of the Republic of 1918-20 - the tricolour flag, independence day (May 28 1918), and other related symbols. For example, in 1993 a Massis editorial quoted an editorial in Nor Or which recognised the 1918 Republic as the "cornerstone of all subsequent republics", contrary to seventy years of ADLP policy which had downplayed the importance of the first Republic. The Massis editor made the observation that the ARF's organ, Asbarez, was "unsettled" by the Nor Or editorial, feeling threatened by its loss of monopoly over the May 28 symbol. This was similar to the argument put forward in the communiqué of Armenia's National Self-Determination Group quoted earlier, which stated that: "It is incomprehensible to you [the ARF] that the Hayastantsi considers the tricolor flag . . . its own." The response of the ARF and its sympathisers to such accusations was to argue that the ARF had not itself chosen to become the sole custodian of the symbols of the first Republic. Rather, as one writer explained:

"The Dashnaks could not in any way 'usurp' the Tricolor unless all the other Armenians were willing to abandon it. That is exactly what happened."

My ANC respondent raised strong objections to this and other criticisms:

". . . the language that's being used in today's society becomes ever more fantastic - with words like 'crisis', 'harsh criticism' - it's all become very exaggerated so it's hard to get a sense of reality as it is on the ground. You know, with the ARF, vicious slander that goes on about having no purpose. That's been going on for a decade, and it will go on for another couple of decades. I think that's . . . part of dialogue about the diaspora, I always like to see dialogue, to the extent that it's constructive, that it leads somewhere, that it's not whining, which I think some people are apt to do." [ANC.LA.FB]

To the question of what role the parties can and should play in the current configuration, several respondents argued that, now that Armenia had declared its independence, the parties had little or no role, especially in the diaspora. Nevertheless, my first AGBU respondent conceded that perhaps the parties could find a new raison d'etre:

"Well, their role in Armenia is of course very different than their role in the diaspora. In Armenia, they are a legitimate political party in parliament looking for votes and power and everything else, so it is what a party is supposed to be. But their role in the United States or in the rest of the world is turning more and more just to support for over there." [AGBU.NY.USB]

With regard to the ADLP, the same AGBU respondent argued that they are

"more tradition bound and they're fighting a political battle which the AGBU is not." [AGBU.NY.USB]

As for the ARF, the respondent argued that that party "will always feel left out if they are not in power". However, this did not mean they would have to lose their raison d'etre if they were unable to obtain power.

Edward Boghosian was particularly critical of the response of the parties to the events in the homeland. In June 1992 he wrote that:

"The three Armenian political parties, which have played a divisive role in the Diaspora for the past seventy years . . . took advantage of the permissive atmosphere to move into the homeland . . . None of these parties which have moved into Armenia, have contributed a cent's worth of assistance to Armenia."

Certainly the latter claim is exaggerated, as it disregards the contribution of the parties' 'sister organisations', such as the Armenian Relief Society, to earthquake reconstruction in Armenia. However, Boghosian's critique was evidently driven by his concern that the parties were using their presence in the homeland to compensate for the fact that they are "now only marginal forces in the Diaspora". Furthermore, like many others, Boghosian took exception to the fact that all three parties were essentially being run from outside the homeland and with external funds. Boghosian also made reference to the ARF's overstated claim that it has "assumed the defense of Karabagh", arguing that the contribution of the ARF was in fact relatively small. Perhaps motivated by envy of the ARF's relatively powerful position in Karabagh, a 1992 Massis editorial accused the ARF of politicising the Karabagh conflict by claiming that front for itself, as did an editorial two months later in the AMS. In a clear reference to the same phenomenon, an ADLP declaration called on "all democratic entities, political parties, parliamentary factions in Armenia . . . to refrain from steps that lead to the disunity and division of our nation." In the same year, a representative of the ADLP claimed that the ARF "wants to monopolize April 24 commemorations . . . just as they have done with the struggle in Karabagh." Later in 1992 Kevork accused the ARF of "acting as if the nation is their private property" and "insisting on the Divine Right to Rule." Yet he was equally critical of all three parties which "invaded Armenia in order to recolonize the fatherland." Upon their arrival, he argues, "they confronted an indigenous political leadership that was performing miracles without their help", and as a result ended up feeling "disorientated" and "exposed".

The parties are seen by many as outmoded and irrelevant. Touryantz wrote that the parties "represent today nothing more than other remnants of old, for sometime (sic) already outdated and useless establishments." Gulvartian pointed to the key role played by the Assembly in hosting Ter-Petrosian's visit to the United States, in contrast to the parties which he called "the bastions of Armenian traditionalism and patriotic hurrah". One letter to TAR argued that many Armenians in the diaspora "associated survival with anti-intellectualism", and that it was time for "every free-thinking Armenian to send a clear and loud message to these Armenian dinosaurs of the Ottoman Empire. Change, or get out." In 1993 John Boloian wrote in AW that:

"There is, definitely, the need for the Armenian community to enter a stage of adjustment within the United States and to shed its neurotic tendencies anchored in past events and historical episodes . . . A suspicious and often paranoid mentality exists . . . that has been transferred from generation to generation . . . The newer generation cannot help but be caught up in this mess . . ."

In a 1988 TAR editorial discussing the response of the parties to the Karabagh Movement, Edward Boghosian wrote that:

"Recent developments and the mobilization of the Armenian people in Soviet Armenia came to prove that all of our disputes and quarrels in the Diaspora were worthless and had absolutely no bearing on the developments that we have been witnessing. Our role has been reduced to that of bystanders showing only marginal concern and we have failed in our obligation to support the claims of our brethren in Armenia. . . . The least we could have done in the Diaspora was to continually put pressure on the Soviet leadership so that they would meet Armenian demands."

Tertzakian also wrote that too much "energies and resources" were being wasted because of "meaningless factional disagreements and infighting." As a solution to the problem of organisational anachronism, Vartan Abdo argued that it was critical to activate the "silent majority" - Baliozian's "average Armenian" - by offering alternative avenues for participation in Armenian affairs. An article by Harout Kevork also discussed the need to cultivate the "silent majority". To do this, Kevork suggested that perhaps the diaspora should reverse the flow of ideas and learn some lessons from the progressive nature of the democratic movement in Armenia. Presumably this would involve the founding of new diasporan organisations, perhaps even on the initiative of the government of Armenia, as well as the co-operation of existing diasporan organisations with the Armenian government rather than acting as 'loyal opposition'. Haratunian proposed that, in response to events in the homeland, the American-Armenian community should establish a "broad-based group which would mobilize our total community in America." In 1990 Vosbikian called for "an international alliance of organisations - an alliance that is dedicated toward collectively supporting our new Republic of Armenia and further committed toward rejuvenating our Diaspora." In 1991 he called for a "new updated political organization that represents the views and ideals of our majority rather than a select self-appointed few."

There were also those within the parties who questioned the usefulness of the parties in the new diaspora-homeland configuration. Vache Semerjian, a member of the ADLP East Coast Central Committee, called for the dissolution of parties in the diaspora, arguing that they had outlived their usefulness. [ADLP.LA.FB] He also wrote in Nor Or that for seventy years the work of the parties has borne little or no fruit in resolving the Armenian question. More success had been gained, he argued, through the terrorist acts of splinter groups in the 1970s, than through the long-term efforts of the parties.

Beyond such exceptions, the parties themselves held a far more optimistic view of their current and future role in both the homeland and diaspora. My ANC respondent, for example, was of the opinion that the ARF had performed satisfactorily. When asked, "How do you think the ARF fared in response to recent events in the homeland?", he pointed to the ongoing visible activity of the ARF and its affiliated organisations in the diaspora as evidence of this success:

". . . take a look at our Armenian directory phone book. Take a look at organisations and what have you, look at schools which are affiliated with organisations that are sympathetic to the ARF. . . . When we look at groups like the AYF, which as far as youth is concerned is one of our great hopes, organisations like the ARS . . ." [ANC.LA.FB]

In contrast, the respondent regarded the Hunchaks as having little or no role, though the Ramgavars were seeing some growth:

"In the United States . . . I think to talk about the contribution of the Hunchak Party is a bit rough, because they have only a tiny presence in the community, at least in my experience. For example, on the East Coast at least, as far as I'm concerned they have no party structure, or very little - weak distribution of newspapers, no youth organisation, and so on. It hasn't attracted considerable influence in the community. As for the Ramgavar party, I think now they're seeing a bit of a revival. I know that Azk is now going to be printed in California." [ANC.LA.FB]

Although the respondent admitted that the ARF was confronting a massive challenge of change, there was no doubt as to the party's ability to adapt:

"Part of the problem . . . with established organisations is a lack of flexibility - they engage in a routine and to depart from that routine is difficult. You know the saying: 'It's hard to teach an old dog new tricks', and what have you. To the extent that these organisations are able to change, they will survive. I think the market in the Armenian community is a tough market now, and if you're not up to date, and if you're not willing to embrace these new realities, you'll be left behind. The community, in some ways, is ahead of the organisations - it's running, charging ahead - and the organisations are playing catch-up." [ANC.LA.FB]

To be sure, it is true that the ARF's youth wing, the AYF, has been experiencing steady numerical growth since the 1960s, as my own research also showed. [AYF.LA.FB] However it is drawing most of its members from the immigrants and, to a lesser extent, second generation American-Armenians.

An article in Massis similarly upheld the ongoing role of the parties in American-Armenian life. The writer, Haroutiun Saghrian, dismissed the argument that the political parties had been reduced to a "negative role" in American-Armenian life and that the demise of the parties had created a "gap" which organisations such as the Assembly were seeking to fill. He was particularly critical of TAR editor Edward Boghosian's critical view of the parties and his claim to be speaking on behalf of the "majority of Armenians" on this issue.

On the whole, non-party observers were more critical of the parties. One of the founders of the California Congress argued that:

"The old organisations didn't want to become Americanised, and the new ones wanted a new power base, and rejected the 'sentimental' approach. . . . for the diaspora to pursue that purpose, it has to change its entire purpose and structure. You can't perpetuate a culture when you don't have a critical mass. You can instil in them a pride, a sense of identity, a political awareness." [Acad.LA.FB]

Similarly, the parties' focus on clubs, schools and churches as epicentres of national activity was often criticised as being dysfunctional, and attracting mainly immigrants. Ara Baliozian made reference to a conversation with a writer friend in which he was asked to describe an "average Armenian". His description was as follows:

"[T]he average Armenian does not go near an Armenian community center or church, he does not send his kids to Armenian school because he is afraid they will be infected with partisan mumbo jumbo, and he is neither a member of one of our political parties not (sic) a so-called hamagir . . ."

An AW editorial, on the other hand, argued that these community centres are a significant component in the fight against assimilation, arguing that those communities that do not have a community centre are more likely to "assimilate". However, the editorial did not ask whether American-born Armenians were likely to patronise these clubs. Whereas in places such as Lebanon there existed a ghetto structure, and the community was more hegemonic in its geography and discourse, the big cities of the United States provide an altogether different context. The institutional forms which seemed to have worked in the Middle Eastern colonies were to a large part transplanted directly into the Western communities, without much consideration for their relevance or irrelevance to the new environment.

Returning to the parties themselves, events in the homeland brought about a need to rethink their political strategy. The challenge was for the diaspora to align itself with the Armenian government by adopting a new realism with regard to Armenian foreign policy and key aspects of the Armenian Question, a challenge that was not readily taken up. With the declaration of independence in Armenia, the call to change was intensified. "In the real world", wrote Touryantz, "to realistically distinguish between the good that can be done from the dream of the impossible." Touryantz wrote that he had often called for

"a 'modus vivendi' with our immediate neighbours when independence is eventually achieved. Having not heard an echo, I assumed that I had failed to reach out."

Friendship and animosity, argued Touryantz, are not eternal, and flexibility is essential in the conduct of foreign relations. Similarly, Barseghian wrote that:

"The Armenian struggle should not only be an emotional experience but also should become a calculated political strategy with short term and long term goals."

Along the same lines, Edward Boghosian argued that the parties should have settled for more moderate, achievable goals regarding Armenian territorial claims rather than "working for the impossible" dream of the return of the Turkish-Armenian lands.

The response from diasporan organisations and leaders to specific issues arising out of the re-establishment of an independent homeland makes sense in the light of the trends identified in previous chapters. Most significantly, the emerging new diasporan identity or identities found greater opportunity for legitimate institutional expression. New organisations gained greater legitimacy, as discussed earlier with regard to the Assembly and the Zoryan Institute. This happened for two reasons. Firstly, the need of the hour - especially earthquake relief - demanded a flexible response, something which some organisations were better equipped for than others. Secondly, the Armenian government has shown clear favouritism towards non-traditional organisations in the diaspora.

The new scenario and the problems presented by it renewed the challenge to traditional, anachronistic forms of national expression. As Paul Haidostian wrote:

"Can't we commemorate the Turkish Genocide of the Armenians and express our pain in more intelligent and creative ways than the ones we usually use? . . . because of our preoccupation with the vivid pictures and horrible facts of the Genocide in the Diaspora, and lack of independence in the homeland, . . . most of us have not had the freedom to transform the painful experiences of our people into creative expressions of survival, hope and life."

Along similar lines, Libaridian confessed to his audience at the Second Congress of the ANM in November 1990 that:

"We [the diaspora] thought we recognized ourselves in you when you insisted on a formal recognition of the Genocide. We failed to see that you wanted to set history in order, to learn from it and build on it. As for us, the Genocide has paralyzed us; it denied us the normal processes of growth and maturation."

For those who had been marginalised in diaspora community life throughout the Soviet period, the recent events in the homeland acted as a catalyst to liberate new and diverse forces of reimagination in the diaspora. On this point, it is worth quoting at length from an article written by Tabibian in AIM, which is a celebration of the return to 'normalcy' in Armenian life:

". . . in my own consciousness history had a bigger role than geography, aspirations were more deeply felt than concrete experiences, ideology was more crucial than practice, loyalty and commitment were more relevant than truth, polemic more frequent than discourse. . . . Whenever I stuck to my faith, I felt intellectually marginalized: an exile of the mind in the territory of the modern, international community. On the other hand, whenever I traded my faith for the cool comfort of dispassionate inquiry, of analysis and reason. . . . I felt marginalized within my own Armenian community. . . .

No more. For me at least, September 21 has changed all this. I am free, I am free of the guilt, I am free of the shame, I am free of the fear of betraying my loyalty through my reason. I am free to choose. I am free to be an Armenian, freely - not by obligation, not by duty, not by vengeful anger, not by the desperate need to cling to ethnic ritual and cultural self-insulation. . . .

I don't have to explain, because I do not have to justify. I simply have to point on a map or the globe, at this little spot, this little speck of land called Armenia. . . . I am no longer a refugee.

It is the end of exile, I am an expatriate: an Armenian residing abroad. . . .

Today, in the world in which we live, an independent and sovereign Armenian state legitimizes all Armenians. This legitimation of our national identity should help liberate those who may continue to feel compelled to justify their identity in a derivative way.

We do not have to go on making apologies and compromises. . . .

And finally, what this legitimacy allows us to do, is to regain and express our critical judgement. For if we are normal, disagreement is normal. The era of ideological orthodoxy and monolithic political legitimation should be over both within and outside Armenia. . . .

. . . until we possess that history not as dogma and propaganda but as the record of our collective experiences, enriched and suffused with the intelligence and critical judgement that have been born out of those experiences both within and outside our hairenik [homeland].

The recent events in the Soviet Union in general, and in Armenia in particular, demonstrate that no ideology, no party, no matter how universally conceived or totally structured, can forever expropriate and monopolize the truth, and substitute itself for people and their histories. We should do well to remember this while we look at pre-independence parties trying to claim for themselves the exclusivity of legitimacy by exploiting the explosive issues of territorial demands.

The debate about our national interest is open. It ought to be a national debate - a debate between, and of, free individuals, free to examine all the sacred cows and the emperor's garments. Free and thinking individuals, from whom no further rituals of loyalty should ever be required again."

As Tabibian points out, recent events brought about the need to rethink the diaspora's generally accepted political discourse and the tendency towards nostalgia. His critique both explicitly and implicitly targeted the traditional organisations, in particular the parties, which had perpetuated the traditional discourse and stifled the forces of change. Tabibian's piece is evidence that the events in the homeland intensified the cleavage between traditional and modern discourses in the diaspora, challenging the hegemony of the traditional organisations and giving the alternative discourses an opportunity to express themselves.

Diasporan Response to the Earthquake and Reconstruction

While the political developments in the homeland ultimately sharpened the cleavages in the diaspora, the diaspora's response to the 1988 earthquake was, at its most fundamental level, a manifestation of unity around a common cause. A joint communique produced by all three parties called on the diaspora to assist Armenia by every means possible:

"The united Armenians collectively will face this tragedy in unity and a cooperative spirit, displaying a strong sense of national awareness. . . . All resources available to the Diaspora - humanitarian, financial, health and hygiene-oriented, or social - must be utilized in order to mobilize all organizational institutions . . ."

Countless articles and editorials called on American-Armenians to help the homeland. An AMS editorial exhorted all Armenians to fulfil their "inescapable duty" of helping the earthquake-ravaged Motherland. Another editorial pleaded for Armenians "to put aside all individual or collective rivalries and to unite in a single purpose - the salvation of Armenia". The future of the homeland was seen as dependent on the efforts of the diaspora. As an AMS editorial argued, the earthquake offered the diaspora an "opportunity to go to the rescue of Armenia."

The three parties contributed to the reconstruction effort in a number of ways. In the diaspora, the political arm of the ARF, the Armenian National Committee (ANC), lobbied the United States government on issues such as aid and trade concessions for Armenia, and the imposition of conditions on humanitarian aid sent to Azerbaijan. The ANC often complemented and other times duplicated the work of the Armenian Assembly. Furthermore, the humanitarian arm of the ARF, the Armenian Relief Society (ARS), shifted a large portion of its resources from the diaspora to Armenia. Through its Earthquake Relief Fund for Armenia, the ARS was actively involved in providing emergency relief and self-sufficiency programs for earthquake victims, and established an Orphans' Fund and several medical operations. The ARS operated in conjunction with the United Armenian Fund in providing assistance to Armenia. In the peak year of 1989-90 alone, the ARS spent over one million dollars on its reconstruction project in Armenian villages. Similarly, the ADLP and SDHP contributed culturally through their educational, sporting and cultural associations, and also channelled financial assistance to the homeland through the Pan-Armenia Fund.

As for the Church, both the Prelacy and the Diocese were involved in spearheading the fundraising drive for Armenia. The Diocese in particular took advantage of its prior institutional presence in Armenia, facilitating the administration of funds and materials. Within the first five years following the earthquake, the Eastern Diocese alone managed to raise more than US$5 million both from the Armenian community and other organisations, as well securing US$6 million worth of donations in kind. It also established a child sponsorship program. Similar projects were undertaken by the Prelacy, which also allocated just over one million dollars to relief and reconstruction as of September 1989.

Another organisation that brought its contribution to the reconstruction of the homeland was the Armenian Missionary Association of America, the peak body of American-Armenian Evangelical churches. In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the AMAA made "[m]edical care, food and shelter" its priority. In the 1988-89 financial year, 16.91 percent of the AMAA's expenditure was channelled into 'Armenia Relief'. In the peak year of 1989-90 the figure was 28.09 percent, totalling just over US$750,000. The following year saw a slightly reduced figure of 22.84 percent. Among its ongoing basic relief projects, the AMAA set up an Orphan Sponsorship Program, a 'Hope for Armenia' scheme for economic revitalisation, and of course the distribution of Christian materials such as books, Bibles and Sunday School teacher-training manuals. It also established youth summer camps and has sent trained ministers from the diaspora on short term pastoral assignments.

The AGBU has also played a key role in the reconstruction efforts. In the period 1988-93, under the leadership of AGBU President Louise Simone, that organisation spearheaded a number of innovative programs in response to the needs of the homeland. The AGBU helped establish the American University of Armenia, a hospital, several schools, and an emergency relief fund. US$4.5 million was raised for cold food storage which was completed in 1992; the AGBU co-sponsored the establishment of a Technical University and contributed US$3.5 million; it coordinated a medical program with Yale University; soup kitchens and children's centres were established; and the list goes on.

Some critics argued that the AGBU unnecessarily undercut its diasporan projects for the sake of Armenia. An article in the TAR alleged that:

"In her years as president of the [AGBU], Mrs. Louise Manoogian Simone has demonstrated that the Diaspora is insignificant to her."

The article went on to claim that, under Simone's tenure, a number of Armenian day schools throughout the diaspora were either closed down or been wound down significantly. The reality, however, was that only one AGBU school was closed down, and that was due to the declining population - and hence budget - of that particular Armenian community. As for the accusation that the AGBU was neglecting the diaspora, my first AGBU interviewee responded as follows:

"[We] think Armenia is a priority which upsets certain traditional groups who feel that there should be just as much attention to the home because their institution needs support. Personally my support goes more to Armenia than anywhere else. . . . people living in America or Europe should be self sufficient and should not have to be subsidised." [AGBU.NY.USB]

However, there was more to Simone's policy than simply a renewed homeland-orientation. She was, and continues to be, highly motivated by a sense of professionalism, as my first AGBU respondent indicated:

"What has happened is that, with the way these schools are usually run, you just begin to attract more and more immigrant students. Local boys never come, and parents don't want their children going to schools with nothing but immigrants. . . . Everybody wants you to do a million things but it's a question of whether you do a few things really well or do you do a lot of things? . . . Well probably [we are] more program oriented than most, [we are] very disinterested in the social aspects of it . . ." [AGBU.NY.USB]

Perhaps, then, Simone's leadership could be best summarised by the following analysis:

"She is committed passionately to the belief that the shaping of community comes swifter and safer if left free of nostalgia and pining for the things of the past. This obviously is the reason she might be inclined to fight against some of our familiar attitudes and concepts."

The opportunities for innovation are no doubt fostered by the fact that, although the AGBU consists of a high percentage of ADLP party members and hamagirs (sympathisers), it is not organisationally attached to that party. Since it remains relatively aloof from partisan issues, it is hardly surprising that the AGBU has attracted a growing number of American-Armenian youth.

The Armenian Assembly, too, has recruited significantly from among American-Armenians. Though considered by some as "offensively neutral", its role has been significant in representing Armenians on Capitol Hill, and it is this sense of leverage within American affairs that makes it so attractive to American-Armenians. Its goal has been "Legitimacy without Partisanship". Beginning in the late 1980s, this role was boosted by its creation of a number of innovative projects in Armenia. Its office in Erevan, established in 1990, oversaw an extensive airlift program for earthquake relief. Its professional approach to management and strategic planning evidently appealed not only to American-Armenian youth, but also to the Armenian government. Consequently the Armenian government 'adopted' the Assembly as its unofficial eye on Capitol Hill. The Assembly was crucial in mediating links between Erevan and Washington, which it viewed as its primary role, as well as lobbying the United States government on a number of important issues such as humanitarian aid and Karabagh. For two years the Assembly Published the Monthly Digest of News From Armenia, which in its depth of coverage surpassed the ANC's Transcaucasia Chronology. In November 1990 the Assembly coordinated President Ter-Levonian's visit to the United States. It was also invited by the Armenian government to act as "in-country NGO coordinator for refugee affairs", and it has since been pivotal in bringing about Armenia's membership in several international organisations.

In the eyes of many American-Armenians, the Assembly exemplified the 'new ethnicity', in contrast to the embarrassingly 'old world' behaviour of the parties. Bakalian writes that as a "goal-oriented group" the Assembly

"indirectly challenges the traditional political leadership of the Armenian-American community by offering programs that are of particular relevance to American-born generations, feasible programs that are unlikely to offend many people."

Needless to say, the parties accused the Armenian government of showing favouritism towards the Assembly. Many Dashnaks in particular argued that such a policy is merely a continuation of "the Communists' divisive approach toward the American-Armenian community", which sought in particular to offset the chezok organisations against the parties which had served the diaspora for so many decades. For example, a joint statement issued by the three parties during President Ter-Petrosian's November 1990 visit to the United States accused the Assembly of by-passing the parties and keeping the President to itself. However, even those friendly to the Assembly were critical of the apparent inefficiency of the organisation of the trip. Perhaps the Assembly was more interested in arranging meetings between the President and non-Armenian organisations, yet even the meetings with the President, Vice-President and California Governor Deukmejian did not eventuate, and the Assembly seems to have not been able to satisfy anyone. In the end, in the words of AIM correspondent Tony Halpin, instead of "uniting Armenian-Americans in celebration of their homeland's new hope for the future, Ter-Petrosian's visit has intensified rivalries . . .".

The Zoryan Institute has been yet another challenger of the intellectual and organisational status quo. Like the Assembly, it offered an opportunity for American-Armenians to by-pass the traditional community structures. In 1988 it published the Karabagh File, a compilation of historical documents and essays on the Karabagh issue and the Karabagh Movement in Armenia. In 1991 it published a similar compendium entitled Crossroads, this time dealing with the emerging democratic movement in Armenia. Throughout the crisis period in Armenia, the Institute continued to attract professionals and academics who constitute the majority of its members. It goes without saying that the Institute has drawn a large proportion of its support from American-Armenians for whom it offers a low-cost, professional form of involvement in Armenian affairs. Interestingly, though, it has also drawn a large number of foreign-born Armenians, primarily intellectuals. This is perhaps due to the mobile and cosmopolitan nature of the Armenian intellectual elite throughout the diaspora.

It is also worth mentioning the role played by the Land and Culture Organisation (LCO). Formerly the LCO concentrated its efforts on the restoration of Armenian-style homes and churches in and around the Syrian village of Kessab, as well as the renovation of Armenian monasteries in Northwestern Iran. With Armenia's doors open to the diaspora, the LCO embarked on a number of similar projects in the homeland. In the summer of 1992, for example, just under a hundred volunteers, the majority from France and the United States, went to Armenia to help construct houses for Armenian refugees, plant fruit trees, and reconstruct a church. The volunteers also investigated the possibility of further projects in the future.

The work of the LCO is of particular interest to this thesis, since it provides diasporans to 'engage' with the land. As discussed in Chapter One, the soil of the homeland is of special significance to nationalist movements. As Smith writes, working on the land is a good way to mobilise a nation. People are

"made to feel part of a project and a community and a destiny larger than themselves, one in which they can find a personal meaning for their lives and where they can come to feel a sense of likeness and belonging with their fellow-toilers."

The participant in this kind of work is able to tie his/her destiny in with that of the nation in a tangible way. Involvement in the work of the LCO carries great symbolic significance for those involved, since it is an act of preserving the architectural and other visible aspects of the national heritage. By working on the land, the participants develop a stronger 'feel' for their ethnicity and a sentimental attachment to the homeland. At the same time, working on the land is an activity with practical benefit for those living in Armenia, thus appealing to the 'functional' component of American-Armenian ethnicity. Ultimately, this kind of activity carries appeal to Armenians of different types of ethnic expression, traditional through to symbolic.

Finally, in response to the earthquake, an array of new fundraising organisations sprung up on both the East and West Coasts. A glance through the 1993 California Armenian Telephone Directory reveals over thirty professional and relief organisations other than the parties and churches and their affiliated societies, at least half of which were established after 1988. Many of these are run by individuals, and some were very short lived. Concerning some of these organisations, there were rumours of financial mismanagement and scandal:

"While each individual may want to glorify the particular project they're working on, we should be big enough to appreciate all the work that goes on in the diaspora - without fear of being critical, though, because you have many shysters out there . . ." [ANC.LA.FB]

The mushrooming of such organisations indicated that many Armenians were seeking alternative channels of involvement through which to assist the homeland. Evidently it was felt that the traditional organisations were not sufficiently tapping the grassroots. Though not all of these organisations were established for the express purpose of helping the homeland, it seems that their establishment was encouraged by the flurry of fundraising activity and the general shift of attention towards the homeland. In particular, the renewed homeland orientation had two effects on the more assimilated American-Armenians. Firstly, the images of earthquake ravaged Armenia in the media struck a chord with even the most marginalised Armenians. Secondly, it gave them an opportunity to 'be Armenian' in a practical way. In doing so, it allowed for Armenian involvement that could in large part bypass the traditional organisations.

Finally, it is worth noting that a number of chezok American-Armenian individuals were also recruited to key roles in the Armenian government. I have already mentioned the case of Raffi Hovannisian, who was exceptional in that he came from a Dashnak hamagir family. Sebouh Tashjian, also a Californian, became Armenia's first energy minister. Also, as early as 1989, Zoryan Institute Director Dr Gerard J. Libaridian and American-Armenian International College President Dr Garbis der Yeghiayan were invited to serve on the Armenian government's Commission for the Study of the Armenian Diaspora.

Analysis of this Response and of the Impact of these Events on the Diaspora

As stated in the introduction to this chapter, despite widespread enthusiastic response to earthquake relief efforts in the homeland, overall the response of the diaspora has failed to live up to the expectations of both the homeland and the diaspora. Politically speaking, the diasporan parties have been stunted in their response to the rapid succession of events in Armenia, and political cleavages within the community have been reinforced. As for the diaspora's contribution to the economic reconstruction of the homeland, there is general agreement that the American-Armenian community has functioned below its full potential. Numerous newspaper articles expressed this sense of disappointment, for example:

"With the exception of some organizations investing in factories and permanent fixtures, the diaspora's aid to Armenia has not yet reached its multi-million dollar capacity."

". . . the assistance provided by the Diaspora was modest at best, compared to its assumed potential."

Tololyan, in a lecture delivered in October 1992, agreed:

"The Armenian Diaspora has not done enough for the homeland, and its contributions are minuscule when compared to those of [other diasporas]."

My first AGBU respondent also echoed this sentiment. In response to the question, "Are you disappointed with the American-Armenian response or happy?", the reply was:

"Well probably I'm disappointed, because [we] have a mailing list of 85,000 Armenians in the United States, and during this oil emergency, or last Spring when we did emergency food, which is nothing somebody can turn down, I think we've had a response of about 6000." [AGBU.NY.USB]

Among my interviewees and newspaper sources, there were both commonalities and differences regarding the causes of this response. Similarly, there were both commonalities and differences in how the interviewees and articles described the impact of events in the homeland on the American-Armenian community. On the whole, the differences can be explained by a number of factors, namely generation, political or organisational affiliation, educational level and mode of ethnicity of the respondent or writer.

For the purposes of analysis, I will examine the sources under the following headings: communal and institutional malaise; disunity and cleavages, old and new; and professionalism, new organisations and 'symbolic Armenians'. I will show how the response of various sections of the American-Armenian community to the events in the homeland has been shaped by each of these factors; and conversely, how the events in the homeland have impacted the American-Armenian community in each of these areas.

Communal and Institutional Malaise

The response of the American-Armenian community to the 1988 earthquake and the ensuing crisis in the homeland was first of all hampered by structural dysfunctions in the community, namely the lack of coordinated plans, the lack of vision, and the absence of visible leadership. So far, there has been an absence of analysis regarding the causes and patterns of this poor response. In searching for explanations, at one level it is possible to suffice with the observation made by my ANC respondent:

"There is a paradox in the community. There is a massive commitment to the Armenian homeland, and at the same time, a commitment to securing self-determination for the people in Nagorno-Karabagh. At the very same time, there is 'compassion fatigue' in the community." [ANC.LA.FB]

The same respondent also pointed to the lack of political consciousness among American-Armenians as a possible explanation for the poor response:

"You don't revive the consciousness of the diaspora by giving a thousand tonnes of sugar to Armenia. You don't tap the potential of Armenia by getting two millionaires to give this much money and not get the involvement of the grassroots of the community. . . . It's exceedingly harmful to have spectators in the Diaspora. There has to be a role for everyone in the diaspora." [ANC.LA.FB]

The respondent then went on to refer to another common reason given by people for not assisting relief projects for Armenia. That is, the general lack of confidence concerning the proper distribution of the monies raised for earthquake relief:

"Since 1988, there has been a constant demand for people's funds from a variety of organisations, a growing list of organisations, a growing list of projects and plans from some very new organisations with some very fresh and good ideas, but also from some shady organisations that seem to pop up. . . . Some of these are not established organisations, which makes some people in diaspora uneasy, which perhaps is just, and in some cases, not justified." [ANC.LA.FB]

These observations beg a number of bigger questions. For example, why were there so many organisations raising money, all for similar purposes? In 1986, prior to the catastrophic events in the homeland, Vartan Abdo had observed that the Armenians were "unorganized" and "uncoordinated", and that community organisations often "senselessly duplicated" each others' efforts. This problem continued in the immediate aftermath of the earthquake. Initially, the absence of a centralised economic infrastructure and fundraising system resulted in each organisation seeking its own means of raising funds. In the words of a representative of the East Coast ARF:

"The response of the diaspora has been very lax, and the reason for this is that the diaspora is not well organised." [ARF.DC.FB.2]

In February 1989, New York city hosted a conference of over thirty North and South American-Armenian organisations and the two Catholicoses. The meeting, however, was primarily consultative, and no permanent forum of co-operation emerged. Only at the end of 1989 did the six major American-Armenian charitable organisations - the AGBU, AMAA, ARS, Assembly, Diocese, and Prelacy - come together with businessman Kirk Kerkorian's Lincy Foundation, to form the United Armenian Fund (UAF). By the end of 1993, the Fund had conducted 39 airlifts of nearly 2,000 metric tons of supplies to Armenia to the value of $US35 million. In a major co-operative effort, the community organisations mobilised their personnel to collect the materials, and the Lincy Foundation funded the airlifts. The "emergency oil" project mentioned earlier was also administered by the UAF. That project reached its target of raising US$13 million for the winter of 1993-94, which was matched 2:1 by Kirk Kerkorian's Lincy Foundation.

In May 1992, the Armenian government gave its blessing to the establishment of the Hayastan Pan-Armenian Fund, which subsequently enjoyed limited but growing success in raising diasporan money for the homeland. The Fund also provided a rallying point for many diasporans and, in the words of Louise Simone, a symbol of "unity between the homeland and the Diaspora." Following the expulsion of ARF leader Maroukhian from Armenia, that party withdrew from the Fund, serving as a reminder that partisan cleavages continue to affect the diaspora's ability to be involved in the nation-building process in Armenia. Still, the ARF continued support the Fund in principle, confirming its willingness to put aside political considerations in support of Armenia's reconstruction. In short, attempts at a unified effort were slow in developing, and even then they did not succeed in mobilising the full potential of the diaspora.

Another problem frequently mentioned as contributing to the diaspora's poor response to events in the homeland was the lack of leadership. With regard to the Californian community, the first AGBU respondent commented that:

"There's a lot of talent out there but there's just no leadership and they're kind of lost. They're not mature enough yet, it's a new community because the American community just pulls away almost completely. Even those who have been there for thirty years are cooling off and the more recent fifteen years group has taken over." [AGBU.NY.USB]

With regard to the American-Armenian community as a whole, different reasons were proposed for this problem. Armand Boghosian argued that Armenian professionals and intellectuals "are mostly uninvolved in group life", since within traditional organisations leadership structures are informal, and as a result "[p]ractically anyone who wants to can become a leader." A TAR editorial blamed 'gerontocracy' among the existing leadership for the chair-grabbing that is characteristic of American-Armenian organisations. Kevork Heoshgerian cited the "love of titles" as a problem among American-Armenians, particularly among the leadership. A common theme in the articles was also the absence of visionary leadership and the abundance of petty bureaucratic nepotism. "The Armenian people", wrote Pierre Papazian, "have not had 'national prophets' for several decades." He argued that the diaspora's present leaders are merely the "heads of their organizations" rather than "functional leaders". These leaders were accused by another observer of being "self-serving". The lack of appropriate leadership, it was argued, was a key factor hampering the American-Armenian response to the crisis in the homeland.

Closely connected with the leadership issue, there were frequent complaints of a lack of a master plan or vision in the community. In 1986 Levon Krikor Topouzian called for the establishment of a 'think tank' to bring about such a master plan. In the same year an editorial in the AMS argued that "we still lack a coherent, all-embracing and far-reaching plan for our future." An article in Nor Or echoed this concern, reminding its readers that "where there is no plan, there is no purpose." In 1987 J. Michael Hagopian, founding director of the Armenian Film Foundation, called for greater vision in the Armenian community. A year later, Haratunian lamented that for all the "meetings" and "committees" taking shape in the diaspora in response to events in the homeland, "there exists no real direction or leadership." The answer to the problem, he argued, would be in channelling the community's efforts through organisations such as the Assembly. This view was shared by a large number of professionals and academics, as confirmed through my interviews. [Ed.LA.FB.3; Acad.LA.FB]

Finally, the observation as often made that although the homeland had embarked on the path of democratisation, the diaspora had not undertaken an equivalent process. Thus Sarkis Kalayjian called for a 'perestroika' of diasporan institutions, as did Libaridian:

"It is one of the paradoxes of diasporan development that, of all the adjustments our institutions made to host societies in their quest for survival and self-preservation, democratization was not one of them. . . . We, in the diaspora, should have the humility and courage to recognize that our institutions were not built to face the new, and bigger, challenges facing our nation; that in order for the diaspora to realize its great potential, our institutions must undergo actual transformations; . . . To have a right to continued leadership in the diaspora and before they can make a claim to leadership in Armenia, political parties must apply to their own past the same critical review which Armenians in Armenia applied toward their own past."

Ara Baliozian argued that the best way to introduce democratic reforms in the homeland would be for the diaspora to first do so among its own organisations. A contributor to TAR called for "a popular, peaceful revolution . . . that will replace dictatorship with democracy . . ." Rev. Barsamian wrote that the diaspora was in no position to "preach" democracy to the homeland when its very own institutions were not democratised. One evangelical pastor wrote that the contribution of the evangelical churches could be precisely in the area of democratisation, since historically the evangelical churches "have been trained in the modes of democracy." It is worth noting, however, that not all diasporans were convinced that Armenia was democratising. For example, Baliozian pointed out that Armenia's leadership was insecure about its power and was exhibiting "insecurity bordering on paranoia" in its response to dissenters such as Hrair Maroukhian and Raffi Hovannisian.

The problems related to institutional inefficiency and lack of vision and leadership were not equally present in all sectors of the community. In particular, the proponents of traditional ethnicity seemed less equipped to participate in the new era of diaspora-homeland relations, and their institutional weaknesses were exposed and become the subject of public scrutiny. At the same time, the call intensified for the formation of new organisations predicated on a professional ethos and offering vision and leadership to the American-Armenian community.

Disunity and Cleavages, Old and New

It is important at the outset to define precisely what is meant by unity, since, as one article in the AW argued protested:

"The word 'unity' has been bandied about and has an enchanting effect. Yet no-one can define, explain how to arrive at, determine the costs of, or list the benefits of this wonderful thing known as 'unity'."

The most helpful way to define 'unity' is to contrast it with 'unification'. The former refers to the ability to work together and mobilise a community towards a common goal. The latter refers to the bringing together of organisations into one centralised, administrative body. Even within such definitions, however, unity can mean different things in different contexts. For example, when used with reference to the Armenian Apostolic Church, it means the administrative unification of the Diocese and the Prelacy. When used by the political parties, it generally means co-operation on issues of common interest. By the opponents of the parties, it usually refers to the establishment of pan-Armenian organisations which would either include or by-pass the parties. Few commentators, however, proposed full unification of all American-Armenian organisations, except with regard to the Apostolic Church.

Certainly, the absence of 'unity' is a natural phenomenon in any nation. After all, nationality and ethnicity are imagined identities and are therefore by definition fragmented in their essence. Nationalism is that ideology which draws these fragments together into an imagined whole. As Suny writes:

". . . the very idea that a diaspora community or a whole diaspora could (or should) act in concert or harmony may be as mythic as it would be for a nation-state."

This is particularly so in the case of diasporas, where there is no state which can rally the nation around a common cause. Furthermore, diasporan Armenians have traditionally had their needs met through the various diasporan organisations, consequently their primarily loyalty is often to those organisations. Thus it is possible to view 'disunity' as a normal part of national or ethnic life, rather than lamenting it as a hindrance. For all these reasons, it may be unrealistic to expect the type of unification that is often called for.

Nevertheless, the issue of unity has been a perennial one in the American-Armenian community for much of the twentieth century, and became integrated into the diasporan discourse. As discussed in Chapter Four, in the 1960s and 1970s attempts at unity and at establishing non-partisan and pan-Armenian organisations in the diaspora had achieved limited success. Yet in the American-Armenian press, countless editorials, articles and letters continued to point to "disunity" as the root of many of the problems facing the American-Armenian community, and called for unity around common issues such as the 'Armenian Question'. In 1986, Vosbikian argued that unity was the only way to avoid assimilation. At the same time, Haratunian argued that: "As long as our 'leaders' can get away with appealing to our narrow interests, we will remain divided and impotent." According to a Massis article, "internal bleeding" - or partisanship - was diverting much-needed resources away from the pursuit of the Armenian Question. An article in the same newspaper called for Armenians "to work towards the elimination of discord".

With the rise of the Karabagh Movement, the earthquake and the declaration of independence in Armenia, the issue of unity took on renewed significance. In the early years, there was much hope that the homeland would act as a catalyst for unity (as opposed to unification) among diasporan Armenians around a commonly shared set of goals. Comparison was often made with the Jews, who, it was argued, were able to unite at least around a set of common causes concerning the state of Israel. As with the Genocide and the territorial claims against Turkey, in the post-Soviet period the Armenian homeland had the potential to rally diasporan Armenians around a single cause. In 1985 an article in TAR proclaimed:

"Where mortal danger showed its ugly head . . . the Armenians have always united and risen as one and preserved their spiritual and phyisical existence."

The implication is that a similar unity could have been expected in response to the recent events in the homeland. In 1988, in the midst of the catalytic events in Armenia, Haratunian expressed such a hope:

"Is it possible that events in Armenia will finally motivate us to bring about fundamental changes in this community? . . . Who knows? If we can work together for Karabagh, maybe we can accomplish even more in the years ahead with issues relating to our own community. Let us hope we have the courage to bury the hatchets (sic) and join hands together. Our brethren in Armenia deserve no less."

In November 1990, Libaridian contended also that:

"Statehood, along with the problems and promises it holds - is the only category that could have transcended the important - and sometimes not so important - differences between Armenians with varying partisan, religious, clannish, or even esthetic allegiances."

Certainly, there was an initial united response from the three parties to the early rumblings of dissent in Armenia, as discussed earlier. Edward Boghosian commented in March 1988 that the Karabagh issue had "served to galvanize our people coast-to-coast and internecine struggles and arguments were set aside, at least temporarily". However, this unity was short-lived. Suny has argued that the diaspora's inability to a "act in a concerted way, with a single voice" meant that "its influence in the homeland has been far less than it might have been." In January 1989 the AMS was already lamenting that diasporan relief efforts to the homeland were disappointing, asserting that although the earthquake had united diasporan Armenians, in practical terms the relief effort had not reflected this unity of purpose. Another editorial argued that the Armenian organisations were "working separately, without coordination, without a general and comprehensive plan", thus stifling the relief effort. In 1991, Libaridian commended the diaspora's enthusiasm but argued that the efforts to help the homeland had fallen short because of lack of coordination and proper organisation. In 1992, Vosbikian wrote that although fundraising for homeland reconstruction "has been more than generous . . . the lack of concerted effort meant that the diaspora's contribution to the homeland was less than what it could have been."

Many articles commented on the need for unity in Armenia's moment of crisis, which implied that such a unity was absent, or perceived as being absent. A TAR editorial called for unity in relief efforts and even the formation of "'World Solidarity Committees' for this purpose." In December 1989, one year after the earthquake, AMAA President Rev. Movses Jambazian commended the efforts of American-Armenians to help the homeland, while also lamenting the fact that "their noble efforts were often undermined by duplication, senseless competition and uncooperative attitudes." He called for "stronger interorganizational ties" in the face of the post-earthquake crisis and that "our well-intentioned efforts [not] be lost in the small worlds of our personal and organizational egos." In March 1990 Nor Or published an article arguing that "now is not the time to arouse old conflicts." Other sensationalist titles included 'Unity in Armenia - Division in America' and 'Who Will We Blame this Time if Armenia Fails'. In the same year, Hagop Touryantz called for more unified efforts to help the homeland. Garo Tertzakian argued in 1992 that the relief efforts were hampered by "the lack of efficient and centralized . . . structures", leading to "duplication in every field." In 1993 Salpi Kasbarian wrote in Massis that unity between Armenian organisations was essential if the homeland was to remain independent. Edward Boghosian called for 'Solidarity for Survival's Sake'. Joseph Vosbikian argued that a 'Fragmented Diaspora Won't Help Armenia', and later claimed that

"were it not for the continuing disunity of our Diaspora churches and communities, the aid we have been providing might easily have been doubled or tripled through a more united effort."

As late as 1991, Vosbikian could still lament that "[o]ur organizations have still not learnt to work collectively toward common goals." In the following year he argued that:

"if we want to leave our coming generations a stronger Armenian legacy and, at the same time, be more effective in helping our new Republic of Armenia in her desperate struggle for survival, we must rediscover Armenian unity in North America."

He also contended that, if the diaspora did not unite, then it must carry a large share of the blame if the Armenian Republic does not survive.

The rapid deterioration of inter-party solidarity and the prolonged absence of co-ordinated relief efforts gave ammunition to the theory that disunity was a hindrance to an effective response to the events in the homeland. Thus the urgent demands of the homeland increased the pressure on the American-Armenian organisations, especially the parties and the Apostolic Church, to seek unity. For example, an article in Nor Or by Kevork Kherlopian called for an end to "old-time fanaticism", arguing that the perpetuation of partisanship was to the detriment of the homeland. Another article argued that since the homeland was facing so much turmoil, the diaspora should put aside its petty cleavages and work together to help the homeland. However, except in the early days of the Karabagh Movement, the parties did not succeed in reaching agreement on crucial strategic issues such as Karabagh and relations with Turkey. Once again, much of the diaspora was polarised between the ARF on the one hand, and the ADLP and SDHP on the other; once again, there was disagreement over the cause of this problem. A cursory glance through the newspapers shows that the ARF frequently accused the other groups of trying to marginalise that party, while the SDHP, the ADLP and the government of Armenia typically accused the ARF of wanting absolute power and of obstructionism against the government.

At the same time, internal cleavages within the parties developed over what policy to take towards the homeland. As the ANC respondent commented:

"The Ramgavar Party in Hayastan and the Ramgavar Party in America are two legally separate entities. . . . Evidently the party had divisions and the diasporan Ramgavar party could not become an all-Armenian party, which is interesting." [ANC.LA.FB]

When asked whether there would be reasons for the ARF to split as well, the respondent replied:

"No, I don't think so. . . . historically, one of the strengths of the party has been its decentralised nature; and it's very natural for there to be loose ends, but they're all bound together by common ideology." [ANC.LA.FB]

The reality is, however, that the ARF in the United States experienced intense factionalism over the party's policy towards the Armenian government. For example, a number of circulars surfaced signed by 'A Group of Concerned Dashnaks' calling, among other things, for a more moderate and co-operative stance towards the Armenian government, and exposing the allegedly corrupt practices of some ARF leaders in Armenia. At the same time, long-standing internal party cleavages surfaced. In 1994, the son of assassinated Lebanese-Armenian Dashnak Sarkis Zeitlian published a book alleging that Hrair Maroukhian and the ARF Central Committee were involved in his father's death.

In this environment, the call for the dissolution of the parties took on greater vehemence, often failing to distinguish party politics with partisanship. Partisanship is best defined as the inability to see beyond party interests and to embrace the interests that are common to a nation. In discussing the lack of jubilation within the American-Armenian community in response to Armenia's declaration of independence, one editorial attributed this to the fact that "patriotism has been replaced with a sort of tribalism, wherein people seem to shift their loyalty to a political party, organization or even a church." "[T]he root of our misfortune", wrote another observer, "is in our partisanship". Joseph Vosbikian, frequent contributor to the TAR on the topic of church unity, called for Armenians to place "Armenian Consciousness Ahead of Party Loyalty". He also called for the creation of alternatives to represent "the views and ideals of our majority rather than a select self-appointed few." An article in the TAR accused the ARF of continuing to divide the diaspora over Cold War issues. An article in Nor Or entitled 'Is the ARF a Religion with its own Catechists?' appeared in 1986. ARF responses to such criticism was to remind their readers that throughout the Soviet period the ARF had preserved the diaspora's heritage and maintained its political mobilisation. At the same time, these sorts of articles deepened the ARF's own sense of isolation and paranoia, reinforcing the only partially untrue perception that anti-ARF sentiment and activity exists as a constant theme in modern diasporan life.

At the other end of the spectrum, there were those who believed that the complaints about disunity were exaggerated. An article in Nor Or sought to dismantle what it called the "disunity myth". As another writer put it, the "rift in the church is only a passing phase in the history of our nation." In any case, he argued, the idea of "unity" is elusive and a

"utopian dilemma . . . the impression that there is fundamental disunity among the Armenian people . . . is not a true picture of the basic reality. . . .

Concern over disunity seemed least apparent in the ARF press. An article in the AW argued that "we are not as disunited as we think we are", and sought to distinguish between unity and cooperation: "[R]ather than advocate that all Armenian institutions become one, what we really need is for all these groups to work with each other rather than against each other." Another article argued that "political divisions don't bother me, provided they are based on principle, not prejudice." My ANC correspondent supported this view:

"There's often a healthy competition in the Armenian community. There are those who say there should be a monolithic Armenian organisation, and it's good rhetoric, it sounds very nice, but again, it's ridiculous. . . . I wholeheartedly disagree with that. It's foolish. . . . No, there are differing beliefs and there are serious differences on serious issues. People who would like to see this amalgam would be ruining the character of the diaspora. . . . I hope that their broader purpose is the same, and I think in many instances it is; but on the lower level, to group these all together would be a big mistake. There is an inevitable entrepreneurship that comes in with people who work in a small environment and work in a decentralised setting." [ANC.LA.FB]

An article in the AW made the interesting and historically verifiable claim that much of the call for unity is aimed at discrediting the ARF. Tololyan made a similar observation, confirming the suspicion of many that those who claim to be chezok are not always what they appear to be:

"[T]he appeal for unity is a calculated political move, in which some individual who is secretly an advocate of some political group, under the guise of a plain concerned Armenian, [asks] for Unity only to make it look as though the 'Others' are standing in the way of Unity."

Not surprisingly, the accusation was often made by the ARF's opponents that it was divisive, an accusation vehemently denied by the ARF. Referring to the inability of the three parties to organise joint Genocide commemorations for April 24 1992, a spokesman for the ADLP claimed that: "The ARF has a political agenda to be separate - a worldwide, political agenda." It is true that the ARF has been more willing than the other parties to go it alone. This may be due to the fact that the ARF is the largest of the three parties and can afford to operate separately. Furthermore, the ARF places strong emphasis on ideology over pragmatism. This emphasis flies in the face of the de-politicised and de-ideologised environment of post-1960s America, and the pragmatic approach of its political opponents. However, whether this constitutes a deliberate "political agenda" is a matter for speculation. For the ARF, the word 'unity' carries different implications and expectations. When the ARF talks of unity, it is often referring to its call for the Armenian government to work in co-operation with the ARF and the diaspora in general, rather than in conflict with it.

Another aspect of the unity issue is the administrative separation of the Apostolic Church. Writing in 1992, Edward Boghosian stated that:

"For the last two decades and until the momentous events in Armenia, the single greatest preoccupation of the Armenian community in America was [church] unity."

Confirming this observation, a survey on church unity conducted in 1987 indicated that 96 percent of Diocesan respondents favoured unity, and 88 percent of Prelacy respondents. Throughout the period under examination, the three major East Coast newspapers - TAR, the AR, and the AMS - carried frequent articles, editorials and letters on the issue. In particular there is hardly an edition of TAR that does not mention "church unity", a phrase used with reference to the administrative reunification of the Armenian Apostolic Church in North America. Joseph Vosbikian, who in 1985 began to contribute regularly to TAR on church unity, saw the resolution of that issue as a prerequisite to solving all other problems. For example, in 1993 he argued that the continuing division of the church was yet another factor that would accelerate Armenian assimilation in the United States. Not only was church unity frequently written about, but it was and continues to be one of the most talked about topics on the East Coast, as even a brief visit to that community would confirm.

However, it appears that there is still a long way to go before full administrative unification can ever be achieved. Real differences have always existed on the manner and time frame in which church unity is to be achieved. For example, those on the Prelacy 'side' have consistently emphasised cooperation as a prelude to future unity, a view clearly not shared by the Diocese and its sympathisers. Furthermore, as Michael Haratunian rightly pointed out, the recent influx of immigrants postponed any chance for unity:

"[A] major opportunity was lost in the late 1970s and early 1980s before the mass immigration from the Middle East had any effect. The newcomers revitalized the political parties, and brought with them all of the prejudices and extremism prevalent in their former countries."

This view might understandably be perceived by some as inflammatory. However, Haratunian's analysis stands to reason, since immigration has historically exacerbated traditional cleavages in the American-Armenian community, as discussed in Chapter Four.

Symptomatic of the staggering of unity negotiations was the fact that, in April 1985, the Diocese and Prelacy failed to organise joint commemorations for the seventieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide. A joint statement claimed that this was due to "circumstances beyond our control", and called on "parishes to avoid conflict in the scheduling of local commemorative observances." However, at the very least, this situation was indicative of a lack of communication between the two bodies. Throughout 1986, unity negotiations arrived at an impasse. Early in that year, the Diocese issued a communiqué which, according to the Primate of the Eastern Prelacy Mesrob Ashjian, effectively nullified the previous sixteen years of negotiations. In response to the diocesan communiqué, the Prelacy postponed the January 1986 meeting of the Armenian Church Unity Committee. A further impasse was reached in May, when the Prelacy laid the blame "for the stalled negotiations" at the feet of the Diocese and Catholicos Vazken I. In September 1986, following meetings with three representatives of the Diocese, Vazken I reversed his earlier stand and refused to ratify the guidelines which had been verbally agreed to by the Prelacy and the Diocese. The visit by Catholicos Vazken I to the United States in November 1987 raised hopes for renewed negotiations. However this did not produce any long-term, tangible results. Instead, it helped deepen the chasm. An editorial in the AW argued that, throughout the Catholicos' visit, "real national concerns have consistently taken a back seat to symbolic gestures, long-winded greetings, and other hollow expressions." In short, the period 1986-88 was a frustrating one for church unity, which an AMS editorial described as "elusive".

The emergence of the Karabagh Movement in Armenia once again raised expectations that a rapprochement might yet be possible between the Prelacy and the Diocese. Expressions of solidarity and unity among Armenians in support for Karabagh, it was thought, could surely be translated into church unity. The events in the homeland did, in fact, trigger a new, though short lived, phase of Diocese-Prelacy talks. In March 1988, the two East Coast Primates joined together in a New York rally of solidarity with the people of Karabagh. Further joint meetings and gatherings in support of Karabagh were subsequently held throughout the year. In this atmosphere of euphoria and pan-Armenian solidarity, the push to unity received new impetus, and talks finally resumed in October 1988. A further breakthrough came when, in response to the earthquake, the two Catholicoi produced a Joint Statement in December 1988 calling for unified relief efforts. In May 1989, a Joint Communiqué was issued specifically calling on the Diocese and Prelacy to cooperate in their fundraising programs. Early in the same year, the two Catholicoi had participated in a consultative meeting for relief efforts held in New York. While in the United States, Catholicos Vazken I visited a Prelacy Church in New York. These events boosted the morale of the unity negotiators, and talks opened in an atmosphere of enthusiasm.

However, the new push to unity was to be short lived. As Vosbikian lamented, "Once the Vehapars [Patriarchs] Left, Unity Talk Ended". Though in fact the talks did continue for a while, Vosbikian was right in that the impetus was lost once the two Catholicoi had departed. A joint commemoration of the Armenian Genocide was held in April 1990. However no attempt was made to repeat even this symbolic gesture in 1991 or 1992. The only remaining cooperative action was the instigation of joint programs for Armenian and religious education in the northeast of the country, which gained momentum in late 1992. Apart from this, two years after the visit of Vazken I, the churches were no closer to unity.

It appeared that two fundamental issues remained unresolved in the negotiations: the structure of the national assemblies in the case of unification; and the distribution of real estate holdings between the two Catholicosates. Another apparently insoluble issue seems to have been the ongoing influence of the ARF on the Prelacy Church. The ARF was accused of exercising direct influence over the Prelacy in an attempt to shape the outcome of the church unity talks to its advantage. One Diocesan priest went so far as to suggest that members of Prelacy congregations should 'cross the floor' to Diocese churches in protest against party infiltration of the Prelacy and as a way of hastening the process of unity, an idea totally rejected by Vosbikian. At the same time, a pro-Prelacy commentator argued that it was the Diocese which was the real opponent of unity, blaming it for stalling negotiations on three separate occasions on the basis of technicalities.

It is ironic that the declaration of Armenian independence, rather than encouraging the unity talks, seemed to have had little or no impact on the process. In fact, unity discussions seemed to have wound down to a grinding halt, resulting in much talk and very little action, particularly at the local level. Both sides, it seems, at various points engaged in "foot dragging". Hopes were frequently raised that unity was finally around the corner, only to be dashed over this or that technicality. In the words of one man closely involved in the negotiations, the hope of church unity had turned out to be a "cruel hoax".

The partisan cleavages and the Church split were seen by many as reflecting historical rather than current issues, as Bakalian has also found. There seemed to be a permanent deadlock in community politics, stemming from an emphasis on 'historical politics' (past issues) rather than 'real politics' (present issues). Although some progress was made with the setting up of bodies for specific purposes such as earthquake relief, these instances were few and far between, and their effectiveness was reduced due to the non-participation of one or another of the community's organisations. By engaging in their anachronistic rhetoric and perpetuating disunity within the community, the parties missed the point. As Vartan Abdo pointed out: "The new wave of immigrants has resulted in divisions within our communities that go beyond the two or three party system." In the 1980s and 1990s, it was not party cleavages that primarily defined American-Armenian youth, but rather cleavages based on modes of identity.

Professionalism, New Organisations and 'Symbolic Armenians'

With the increasing marginalisation of the political parties, especially the ARF, and the emergence of new organisations, it is interesting to compare the success of the different organisations in recruiting American-born Armenians. Among my sources and respondents, there was general agreement about the lack of involvement of American-born Armenians in community life, particularly within the traditional structures. This observation was confirmed by Bakalian who found that only 3 of the 150 or so Dashnak party members in New York and New Jersey were American-born; 5 of the 25 or 30 Ramgavar members; and no more than 5 in the Hunchak party. Phillips has estimated a total membership of 2,000 for the ADLP in the United States, and 3,000 for the ARF, which represents a low per capita ratio for a community of well over 600,000.

Concern regarding the absence of American-born Armenians in community life is tied closely to similar concerns about the lack of youth involvement. An SDHP representative made this connection:

"Where are the youth? By that I mean, where are the American-borns?" [SDHP.LA.FB]

A high ranking staff member at the Armenian Embassy in Washington, DC focused more specifically on the problem of recruiting the youth:

"We need to understand and tap into the young generation." [Embassy.DC.FB]

One academic expressed concern over the long term capacity of the present organisational forms to enthuse and mobilise future generations:

"If you're going to make something out of these people, you'll have to create something that will get them involved. . . . The way we're heading now, the diaspora isn't going to be permanent. We haven't been able to communicate beyond the third generation anything of intellectual value. . . . Our organisations are run by immigrants, and still have immigrant mentalities." [Acad.LA.USB]

Finally, a lay respondent from the Eastern Diocese also expressed the same concern, noting that third generation ethnic 'return' was rare:

"Those among the second generation that are spiritually concerned have already gone elsewhere. Socially, they have friends elsewhere. Politically, they're Democrats or Republicans, not Dashnaks or Ramgavars. As for the third generation, they're more likely to be agnostic or atheist. But we want the third generation. They are still part of the family, and it is their grandparents who built what we have.

Q: So how do you get the first and third generations together?

You probably can't at the same event. So the Church will have to have different kinds of activities for both groups.

Q: Why is there a need to perpetuate the Armenian Church at all?

Because some people will only go to that Church; but my is it hard to find such people!" [D.DC.USB]

At the same time, it was widely recognised that the events in the homeland somehow renewed the interest in things Armenian among American-Armenians. Furthermore, these events strengthened the existing non-traditional organisations and fostered the emergence of new organisations. Although the parties were not been able to unite, the events in the homeland were a unifying factor among many of the American-Armenian youth who were now rallying to the cause of the homeland. As explained earlier, involvement in homeland issues provided a method of 'feeling Armenian' without the demandingness of traditional institutions.

Part of the tendency towards symbolic ethnicity is a clear shift from sentimentally-driven nationalism to a greater interest in practical, professional, 'task-orientated' involvement. Aid projects for earthquake-ridden Armenia, lobbying for Karabagh (for example, through the Assembly), and joining an ANC Political Action Committee or Assembly task team, are just a few examples of this kind of involvement. Coincidentally, this sits well with the philosophy of pragmatic realism adopted by the democratic movement in the homeland and by its supporters in the diaspora. Therefore, those American-Armenians who approached the homeland 'non-politically' and 'professionally' won out on all accounts: they were able to recruit symbolic ethnicists to projects aimed at assisting the homeland; and they won the favour of the Armenian government. As a result, many of those American-Armenians who were formerly marginalised now became the centre of the government's attention.

In choosing an organisation to which to belong, American-Armenians increasingly looked for a professional approach to Armenian issues. According to Armand Boghosian, greater professionalism among Armenian organisations - in other words, more paid positions - would recruit more American-born Armenians Disagreeing with this kind of proposal, Khaligian distinguished between the two senses in which the word 'professionalism' can be understood: "quality of work produced" and "being paid for doing the work." With regard to the latter, he lamented the kaghkeniatsoum (embourgeoisement) of American-Armenians for whom voluntary work is stigmatised. He argued that involvement through a sense of 'duty' is a personally enriching experience and must be encouraged. Professionalism, on the other hand, dulls this sense of sacrifice. My ANC respondent agreed:

"I think, by nature of being in the diaspora, you are compelled to be involved. That is, I would think, a very appropriate mechanism that's been created in the diaspora, this sense of 'national peer pressure' that places a sense of guilt and this sense of abandonment on people who fail to come to the call of their mother country. In my personal opinion, I think that's altogether proper. Especially for young people, they need something like that." [ANC.LA.FB]

In an article in the AW, Hovsepian confirmed this argument, contending that an appeal to "emotions or sentiments" can do more to extract "sacrifice than any logic or rational constructs or explanations." Thus, it is more important to activate peoples' consciousness than it is to engage in "futile efforts of shaping the Armenian Cause or packaging it as a rational enterprise." At the end of the day, all that is really needed is to appeal to the Armenians' intrinsic sense of ethnic consciousness or sense of duty.

Others have argued that the reaffirmation of traditional notions of 'obligation' and 'duty' could not be highly successful among American-Armenian youth. Vosbikian argued that the best way to prevent assimilation would be to turn the idea of being Armenian into a positive act and an honour, rather than a duty. As Gans points out, however, when the leaders of ethnic organisations attack symbolic ethnicists as "apathetic or lazy", they are reflecting "the desperation of their own organizations which cannot offer new incentives that would enable them to recruit members." Instead, these organisations must eventually come to the realisation that, if they are to survive, "they must deal mainly with symbols" such as the distribution of artefacts, the establishment of museums, and the study of the ethnic heritage.

Most organisations recognised the problem of low youth involvement. Even among traditional ethnicists, there were those who recognised the inadequacies of the traditional organisations in dealing with the problem. Nevertheless, the most common response was to reaffirm traditional modes of identity and Armenianness, and much of the analysis fell short of offering real solutions. For example, an article by Haroutiun Saghrian started off by correctly observing that, for many American Armenian youths,

"the Armenian Question, political parties, schools, Armenian culture, political activism and similar approaches not only do not exist, but are considered dangerous, since they can threaten their comfortable Americanness."

The problem, he argued, was due to a crisis of identity that is characteristic of Western society in general, and which challenges the basic values that have sustained the Armenian nation over the centuries. He went on to argue that this problem was intricately related to the malaise in Armenian life in general, and called for a more sober assessment of the state of the diaspora. However, he did not call for a reassessment of the expectations placed on American-Armenian youth. Similarly, Kherlopian argued that the changing circumstances in which the diaspora found itself called for the strengthening of certain foundational values that underpin Armenian identity. However, in his article he reaffirmed many of the traditional modes of Armenianness: a sense of belonging to the Armenian culture and the homeland; active involvement in Armenian organisations and community life; and learning and speaking the Armenian language.

There were other commentators who were willing to go further in their critique. In adding her voice to those concerned about American-Armenian youth, Azadouhi Simonian described the youth as idealists fighting against the tide of materialism, cynicism and despair. As a solution she proposed the reaffirmation of the values of discipline and perseverance as the only way they would be able to achieve their goals and take on leadership positions within the community. However, she did not stop there. She recognised that American-Armenian youth instinctively seek to "remould" the world, and to turn it into a more "humane, warm and progressive place." Thus diasporan Armenian youth in general would more likely bring their participation to movements that manifest "freshness, fairness, and freedom of thought and conscience." This observation took her analysis beyond the simple reaffirmation of traditional values and their application in a vacuum.

My second AGBU respondent went even further than Simonian, proposing the kinds of projects that would most likely appeal to the younger generation:

"[A]ll I have to do as my generation helping your generation is to make sure you do well in your individual pursuits, to become successful individuals. Because then you can help your communities to become more successful. In order to do this, we instituted internships in Michigan, LA and NY, under the auspices of the AGBU President's Club. People give $1,000 per annum for membership and they get networking with other professionals, which is a key need. It's a way of opening the doors to you and to all who come after you. But there's one proviso: I ask them to make a contract with their conscience - 'I will help three other Armenians when I'm successful.' This is the success of our nation." [AGBU.DC.FB]

The same respondent argued that professionalism is the key to getting the American-born Armenians involved:

"Armenians set goals, but they don't often set standards. I want Armenians to say, 'Wow, look at the Armenians, they can do things better and differently.' We shouldn't continue repeating the nostalgia of the immigrant generation. . . . My vision is to find out what the youth want. And to bring Armenianness into the mainstream. For example, in 1980, we wanted to honour Saroyan, not at the church hall, but in the National Press Club. And we brought non-Armenians in to speak about Saroyan. We held a similar program for Aznavour with Liza Minnelli in October 1993 at the Armenian Embassy." [AGBU.DC.FB]

My first AGBU respondent agreed:

"Somehow this more educated and successful generation, when they come to Armenian activities, they lower their standards. They tolerate all sorts of things they would never tolerate elsewhere." [AGBU.NY.USB]

The Assembly is another example of an organisation striving for professionalism. When asked whether the Assembly is the prototype of a 'new' American Armenian organisation, the Assembly respondent stated:

"We'd like to think it will be, with paid professionals selected for their competence. The Assembly is an American organisation. It's not an Armenian organisation. . . . So we don't see ourselves as a community organisation, but as a Washington-based organisation with the task of representation." [Acad.AA.DC.FB]

As Bakalian points out, the Assembly is "managed in the best American tradition" of "efficiency" and technology. In this way, it has offered "an acceptable avenue for Armenian-American political action, vicariously", especially among the American-educated and American-born.

Overall, the AGBU, Assembly, and other new organisations were more likely to recruit American-born Armenians than were the parties and their affiliated organisations. However, there still existed a large sentimental component in the ethnicity of American-Armenians, especially among members of the Dashnak community and its youth organisation, the AYF, which seemed to attract at least some of its members from the second generation, though not from the third generation. When asked whether American-born Armenians were more likely to join the AGBU or the Assembly rather than the AYF, the ANC respondent replied:

"I've seen people who were just not around until after the earthquake, and then, after the situation in Nagorno-Karabagh, they were drawn back into the community. Yes, they got into organisations like the AGBU and the Assembly, but they've also come here." [ANC.LA.FB]

Even non-Dashnak observers acknowledged that among people from Dashnak backgrounds there seemed to be a higher percentage among the younger generation joining its youth organisations:

"Yes, because they are much more disciplined and they are much more demanding of their youth. They are fully indoctrinated when they go to school - to a Dashnak school or to a Dashnak camp - You'll find them getting many more volunteers, people who will give up their life." [AGBU.NY.USB]

The AYF, along with the ARF's sporting association, Homenentmen, functioned as a resilient pocket of traditional ethnicism which was replenished partly by the immigrant influx and partly by the strong 'indoctrination' of the party. These organisations maintained a strong role within the community, especially among the immigrants, since they satisfied the desire among some Armenians for community involvement in a 'traditional' sense. As one AYF respondent noted:

"We didn't need a Homenentmen, and it has been said that the Homenentmen was introduced to give the immigrant groups a foothold." [AYF.LA.FB]

Perhaps part of the AYF's appeal can be found in the rich heritage of the ARF and the sentimental appeal of its symbolism. Furthermore, the AYF exudes a sense of 'activity' which appeals to some, and a radical edge that has the same impact on the modern generation as the terrorist movements of the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, organisations such as the AYF provide an alternative to the practical, 'aloof' nature of American society:

"[O]ne of the traditional strengths of, for example, the ARF is a relative sense of discipline. . . . the fact that when you become a member of the ARF, you are given an oath, gives a certain serious about it, and it works. . . ." [AYF.LA.FB]

However, while there are those who continued to be attracted to the more traditional forms of community involvement, American-born Armenians were typically attracted to the indigenous, professional organisations that require little commitment and do not have a strong ethnic 'flavour'. The recent events in Armenia awakened a large number of formerly uninvolved, marginalised American-Armenians and drew them back into Armenian community life, and yet in so doing they were been able to sidestep the traditional modes of involvement and instead participate in indigenous American forms of activism.

The Reimagination of the American-Armenian Community

The turbulent events in the homeland since 1987, and the diaspora's response to those events, reinforced certain long-term trends in the development of the American-Armenian community. The traditional organisations were thrown into disarray as their raison d'etre was challenged by the emergence of an independent homeland. The institutional malaise, particularly of the traditional organisations, was highlighted, and this internal crisis, coupled with the Armenian government's policy of favouring non-traditional American-Armenian organisations, strengthened the alternative organisations. At the same time, although relief efforts for the homeland were to some extent
centrally coordinated, attempts at a unified political and humanitarian response to the events in the homeland were generally unsuccessful or short-lived.

However, the analyses offered regarding this situation varied among my respondents and the newspaper sources. It is interesting to note the degree to which the differences in response follow organisational lines. Although in analysing the interviews I did not initially categorise the responses and sources according to affiliation, I found that the respondents and sources are generally shaped by affiliation. Obviously there are variations within organisations, affiliations and 'mentalities', however they can still be represented in clusters as presented in the matrix below. In the matrix I have not specifically cited people of chezok thinking, since their responses are diverse and can be spread across the whole spectrum of attitudes. However, I have included the three chezok newspapers.

Blame assimilation Propose or offer new
host country, youth opportunities for involvement,
especially for symbolic ethnicists

ADLP AGBU
Nor Hayastan Armenian Assembly

SDHP Evangelical Church

AIM
ARF
TAR
Apostolic Church

Lament, insist on preservation of Blame traditionalists and
institutions and reaffirmation of traditional organisations, possibly traditional forms of identity embrace alternative forms of identity

Thus the homeland provided both a rallying point for the American-Armenian community, while at the same time exacerbating the long-standing cleavages between the ARF and the other parties. In the new diaspora-homeland configuration, however, the partisan cleavages diminished in significance, being superceded by cleavages between the traditional organisations and the more professional, task-orientated and non-partisan organisations. In the American-Armenian community, this development was reflected in the liberation of previously marginalised forces which experienced a renewed homeland orientation and were able to by-pass the traditional cleavages in establishing relationships with the homeland.

©2001 RealChange  ABN 9775 1429
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