CHAPTER 3:
ARMENIAN DIASPORAN IDENTITY REIMAGINED, 1915-1985

[index]  [chapter 4]

The Genocide of 1915 was a turning point in the imagination of modern Armenian nationalism. Firstly, as a result of the Genocide, the Western Armenian population was overnight turned into a diaspora, at the same time that the Eastern Armenian provinces became an independent Armenian state. Secondly, the role of the diaspora changed from being the source of aspirations for a future homeland, to one of assisting (or opposing) a homeland that now existed in reality. Consequently, starting from 1918 the focus of my analysis is on the response of the diaspora to events in the homeland and the impact of the homeland on the diaspora. In this period, the homeland acted as both a rallying point and a source of cleavages within the diaspora. At the same time, I will show how the diaspora sought to shape its own destiny by reimagining its identity and evolving from being a collection of gaghouts (communities) to a spiurk (diaspora) with its own inner dynamic.

Genocide, Diaspora and Independence, 1915-1920

The Armenian Genocide

It is in the context of the radicalisation of the various nationalisms within the Ottoman Empire that the Young Turk government planned and carried out the systematic extermination of the Armenian population within its borders. Libaridian describes the conflict between the emerging Turkish ethnic nationalism and the increasingly nationalistic minorities of the Ottoman Empire in terms of the quest for territorial space:

"Modern nation-states nail down frontiers in order to legitimize their authority and to facilitate the execution of their policies. Yet the more they do so, the more they force the stateless peoples of the world into struggles to secure territorial footholds of their own. Such has been the case for the Armenians."

In 1907, the Committee of Union and Progress was founded in Salonika, Greece. The CUP, or Young Turks as they came to be known, were cosmopolitan and progressive, striving for a 'true Ottomanism', an 'Empire of Equals'. In 1908 the Young Turks staged a coup in which they instituted a revised version of the Constitution of 1860. In response, the Armenian political parties, in particular the Dashnaks, put aside their separatist goals and co-operated with the new ruling elite. However, between 1908 and 1914, the Young Turks' original liberal vision gradually gave way to a xenophobic nationalist ideology. This process was encouraged by a number of external and internal factors. Not long after the coup, the European Powers, taking advantage of Turkey's domestic situation, proceeded to carve up the remaining Ottoman lands in Europe and North Africa. At the same time, a great deal of territory was lost in the Balkan Wars of 1911-13. At the same time, the revolts in the Arab provinces dashed all hopes of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire on a Pan-Islamic basis. In response to these events, by the eve of World War One, the Young Turks had made a complete break from liberal ideals, and from liberal Europe as the source of those ideals.

In their search for a new model, the Young Turks increasingly turned their attention to the ideas of nationalist ideologues such as Ziya Gokalp, who called for a 'return' to Turkey's Central Asian roots. The first step in this plan would be the adoption of an ethnic Turkish nationalism, that is, the abandonment of multinational Ottomanism in favour of an exclusivist ethnic Turkish nation. From this would follow the creation of a pan-Turkish state which would incorporate all the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia. As Gokalp wrote in 1911:

"The country of the Turks is not Turkey, nor yet Turkistan,
Their country is a vast and eternal land: Turan!"

As many prominent members of the CUP began to adopt Turkism and Pan-Turanism, the Armenians, who were traditionally seen as the 'Loyal Millet', were now perceived as the enemy. The Armenians found themselves in an unfortunate geographical position, caught in the path between Eastern Anatolia on the one hand and, Baku, capital of Azerbaijan and pearl of the Pan-Turkish dream, on the other. To this problem a 'final solution' was engineered.

The Genocide of 1915, being as it was part of a deliberate nation-building strategy, was qualitatively different to the massacres of the latter part of the nineteenth century. Those massacres had not sought to change the status quo, but rather to stabilise it. The Genocide, on the other hand, was a revolutionary policy, aimed at radically altering the social structure. Since Young Turk ideology excluded the Armenians from the definition of 'Turkishness', they were automatically defined as 'guilty', whether or not they were in fact posing a threat. The Young Turks had seemingly adopted Gokalp's axiom of Turkism:

". . . to recognise as a Turk every individual who says, 'I am a Turk',
and to punish those, if there be any, who betray the Turkish nation."

The determination to 'punish' or expunge that which was 'un-Turkish' was highlighted in a telegram written by Talaat Pasha, Turkish Minister of the Interior, on September 15, 1915, in which he clearly outlined the genocidal intent of the Young Turks:

". . . Regardless of women, children, or invalids, and however deplorable the methods of destruction may seem, an end is to be put to their existence without paying any heed to feeling or conscience."

The Genocide began with a series of apparently unrelated, localised massacres. Soon after the outbreak of World War One, there were reports of Turkish and Kurdish criminals being released and sent into the Armenian provinces. In August 1914, a 'Special Organisation' paramilitary unit was formed for the purpose of subversive activities on the Russo-Turkish border, and were later used to carry out the Genocide. In February 1915, Armenian soldiers were placed in labour battalions of 50-100 men, and eventually beaten to death, starved or gunned down. In the same month, several Armenian officials were arbitrarily dismissed and their internal passports cancelled. It soon became clear that there was a master plan behind the massacres, and a telegram sent by Talaat Pasha to Jemal in Adana later that month confirmed that a decision had been made earlier to systematically annihilate the Armenian population. Between March and April, mass deportations of Armenians were initiated in Zeitoun, and 24,000 Armenians in Van were massacred by Turkish forces as Russian troops withdrew from the area, on the pretext that the Armenians had collaborated with the Russians.

The Genocide began to take on a more systematic nature when, on April 24 1915, 300 Armenian intellectuals and community leaders in Constantinople, including two parliamentarians, were arrested, imprisoned, deported to the inner provinces, and murdered. This pattern was repeated in the provinces, where a total of 5,000 leaders were killed. With the able-bodied men and leaders now gone, the mass deportation of women, children and the elderly now began in earnest. On May 16, emergency laws were enacted allowing Armenian properties to be 'temporarily' confiscated and for deportation to be carried out on any suspicion of treason. Another decree in the same month specifically called for the deportation of Armenians "from the war zones to relocation centres". However, the deportations were first carried out in Cilicia, hundreds of kilometres from the actual war zone. In Cilicia the Turkish forces met stubborn resistance, particularly from the people of Mousa Dagh, but in the end the Turks were able to crush the rebellion.

The Armenians were organised into convoys and were marched towards the Syrian desert. Once they arrived at the outskirts of the villages and towns, males over the age of 15 years were taken and slaughtered. The women and children were then forced to march through the mountains and deserts. Many of them were raped and killed by bandits, Special Organisation units and soldiers, or kidnapped and sold as slaves. Others committed suicide or killed their own babies. Water and food were rationed, and by the end of the end of the march, food was denied altogether, leading to thousands of deaths by starvation. Those who did manage to survive were brought to Aleppo, and later redistributed to concentration camps. By Spring 1916, most of the Armenians of the eastern provinces and Cilicia had been deported, and many of the survivors who had been placed in concentration camps were dead.

The Genocide was symbolically concluded with the dismissal and arrest of the Armenian Patriarch of Constantinople on August 10 1916. Nine days later, the government issued a decree abolishing the Armenian National Constitution of 1863. Although the perpetrators of the Genocide were tried by a post-war Turkish military tribunal, their sentences were never carried out. On August 10 1920, the property law of May 16 was declared unjust and therefore void, however in April 1923 the Ataturk government passed two new laws which confirmed the confiscation of property of absent Armenians and effectively excluded them from the possibility of return

Out of approximately 2.1 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire, it is estimated that only 600,000 survived. 700,000 were slaughtered in the eastern provinces, 600,000 disappeared during the deportations, and an estimated 200,000 underwent a forced change of identity. Not only were a large number of Armenians killed, but also much of the nation's political, religious, economic and cultural leadership was wiped out.

The Post-Genocide Diaspora

There is a story of an Armenian diasporan man who,
after settling down in his new country and home,
says to his wife,
"OK, it's time to move on!"

The post-Genocide refugees found their home in Russian Armenia, the Arab Middle East, and various countries of the Mediterranean. On the whole, the post-Genocide dispersion consisted of impoverished, famished, divided, "traumatized remnants", whose "one and overriding imperative of the first decades, until the 1930s, was survival." The Middle Eastern communities in particular provided an appropriate setting for reorientation. Firstly, these countries were mostly familiar with the Millet system and so the Armenians were able to transplant many of their old world structures directly into their new environment. This also made it easier to retain the Armenian language. Secondly, the presence of the Anglo-French mandatory powers ensured continuing access to European ideas.

The Armenian presence in the Middle East dates to medieval times, particularly in Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran and Palestine (later Israel). Jerusalem was home to an Armenian Quarters and the ancient Armenian Patriarchate. Lebanon in particular became the new hub of Armenian life in the Middle East. Lebanon was originally populated primarily by Catholic Armenians, the remnant from the Cilician period. These Armenians were highly assimilated and integrated into the Maronite community. After World War One, refugees arrived from Cilicia, who were mainly Catholic or Protestant and Turkish-speaking, and the more Apostolic refugees from Anatolia. An Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) local party committee had been established in Beirut in 1904. Refugee camps brought together many different worlds, but as Shahgaldian has argued the fragmentation persisted and was reinforced by the creation of Catholic and Protestant organisations, and of compatriotic unions based on town or province of origin. Later, some of these compatriotic unions built townships in Soviet Armenia for the resettlement of their compatriots. Only with the official recognition of the Cilician See as spiritual head of the Armenian community by the French mandatory government did the Armenians officially form a unitary political entity.

On the whole, the main institutions that engaged in the reconstruction of the diaspora and the preservation of the heritage were the political parties and their various cultural, educational, sporting and charitable arms. These organisations attempted to integrate the community around a political cause, and in doing so competed with the compatriotic unions. In the early years of the dispersion the ARF in particular saw the Armenians as "a nation in temporary exile that should be ready to return to its homeland as soon as political conditions permitted." However, with the collapse of the Republic of Armenia and the rapid realisation that the Bolshevik victory in Armenia was here to stay, the party was forced to confront the reality that it was now a "government in exile". The fortunes and policies of the parties continued to be intricately connected with the fortunes and state of the diaspora. The period between the two world wars saw the emergence of new cleavages essentially based on the issue of how to relate to the homeland. Different institutions staked their claim for legitimacy on whether they were pro- or anti-Soviet.

Ultimately many of the Genocide survivors made their home in France, the United States and other parts of the world. France was the destination for many Armenian intellectuals, and during the inter-war years France emerged as a Mecca for the Armenian diasporan intelligentsia. Politically, too, France functioned as a major diasporan centre. Between 1920 and 1965 Paris was host to the Patvirakutiun (Delegation), the Armenian government's delegation to the Paris Peace Conference which continued its operations after the Sovietisation of Armenia as a 'government-in-exile. As Adalian writes,

"the entire Armenian nation, it appeared, had been dispersed. . . . the globalization of the Armenian diaspora was underway."

The new dispersion was not only large in number and more globalised, but it was also the result of unique circumstances: Genocide. The psychological impact of the Genocide cannot be overestimated. Though the terms 'exile', 'dispossession', and 'vulnerability' were not new in the Armenian discourse, they took on a new dimension and intensity among the post-Genocide diaspora. Miller and Miller outline the range of typical responses to genocidal experience, and Armenian survivors have at various times and places manifested all of them: "avoidance and repression; outrage and anger; revenge and restitution; reconciliation and forgiveness; resignation and despair; explanation and rationalization." On the whole, however, "avoidance and repression" have been the norm, since the psychological impact of the Genocide has not been widely discussed, and theological and philosophical reflections on the Genocide have been few and far between. At the same time, the political and symbolic expressions of Genocide remembrance have flourished through ethnic education, annual commemorations, the erection of monuments, and the preaching of the Church, to name but a few. In this way the discourse of victimisation and vulnerability has been fuelled, compounding the sense of abandonment and the 'sojourner' mentality, while little has been offered in helping Armenians deal with the psychological impact of the Genocide.

The Genocide had a powerful impact on the Church. Structurally, the Church underwent a great deal of change. While the Patriarchate of Istanbul was drastically reduced in power, the Jerusalem Patriarch flourished, producing the journal Sion, establishing a publishing house, and prospering financially. Also, the Catholicosate of Sis was deported during the Genocide and re-established its headquarters in the city of Antellias in Lebanon. It too flourished as a centre of cultural, educational, publishing and religious activity. Beyond the structural changes, however, Guroian argues that the Genocide ended "Armenian Christendom", and as a result the relationship between the church and the nation is "no longer one of symphonia or of intimate union". In particular, argues Guroian, the Mother Church has been unable or unwilling to engage in theological reflection regarding the Genocide, and has forfeited its opportunity for moral and spiritual leadership among the Armenian people. As a case in point, he analyses the "use and abuse" of the imagery of the resurrection to rationalise the genocidal experience, and finds this to be a theologically inadequate, if not inaccurate and distorted, explanation for the events of 1915-23.

Blanchot, a French-Jewish author writing in 1986, describes the phenomenon of post-Genocide dispossession as "the self wrested from itself, the detachment whereby one is detached from detachment . . .". The circular nature of this description is indicative of the angst of dispossession and its disorientating nature. Blanchot also describes exile as a state of vulnerability, of victim of the 'Other', and attributes to the 'Other' the responsibility for

"dis-identifying me, abandoning me to passivity . . . and then the Other becomes the Overlord, indeed the Persecutor, he who overwhelms, encumbers, undoes me, he who puts me in his debt no less than he attacks me by making me answer for his crimes, by charging me with measureless responsibility which cannot be mine since it extends all the way to 'substitution'."

At the same time, diasporans are themselves 'The Other', the foreigner wherever they go. This sense of vulnerability is described by many Armenian authors. Hovannisian for example writes that the Armenians were "condemned to a life of exile and dispersion, subjected to inevitable acculturation and assimilation on five continents." The Armenians' sense of abandonment and vulnerability has been exacerbated by the denial of the Armenian Genocide by successive Turkish governments, and compounded by the world's geopolitically-driven reluctance to acknowledge the historicity of the Genocide. This combination has had a profound psychological impact on the Armenian survivors and on subsequent generations. One author points out that the denial of the Armenian Genocide does not only affect the survivor generation:

"The distortion of the truth impacts directly upon his own identity, and therefore the identity of his children, because their identity formation is so closely tied to his own perceptions and feelings about himself, his past, and his worth."

A further consequence of the condition of exile is nostalgia. The Armenians' strong sentimental link to the homeland, at least in rhetoric, has created a chronic nostalgia and a longing for independence. Yet Douglass contends that nostalgia is not always regressive:

"there is a futuristic orientation implicit in the political claims of the ethnonationalists, if for no other reason than that they are demanding the revival of an existing political and social order."

Nostalgia is a means for an individual to overcome mortality, by tying his/her self to a timeless community. Many Armenian observers would argue, however, that nostalgia is by its very nature regressive, since it prevents a nation from taking full advantage of the present. This is the argument used more recently by the Armenian National Movement and its supporters in the diaspora, in support for a policy of Realpolitik towards Turkey and on the issue of the Genocide. As I will discuss in later chapters, there are those who argue that the glorification of, and longing for, the past also makes it difficult to contextualise Armenian institutions and to make them relevant to current issues. This makes the task of reimagination all the more necessary and yet all the more difficult.

The sense of dispossession, vulnerability and nostalgia among the survivors spawned a discourse of survival that was often characterised by an intensely conservative and ethnocentric notion of identity. Oshagan lists the key aspects of this discourse: "Haiabahbanoum (preservation of Armenianness), Hai hoki (the Armenian spirit), jermag chart (white massacre or the need for resistance to assimilation), gensabaiakar (fight for survival)". These are common phenomena among ethnic diasporas whose nostalgia compels them to seek to preserve the ethnic structures and discourse of the 'old country'. Oshagan describes this situation as one of chronic malaise, arguing that

"intolerance, xenophobia, authoritarianism, sexism and purism became more and more widespread in Armenian life, while the fear and the hatred of the Turk turned into almost obsessive feelings."

The emphasis on cultural and institutional preservation meant that there was a low level of political activism between the World Wars. The parties and other organisations had no other choice but to focus on rebuilding, on the re-establishment of essential community infrastructures. Furthermore, since the newly established Arab states had inherited the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, the Apostolic Church was able to maintain its pivotal role in the newly formed communities. The Church being essentially conservative and preservationist in nature, there was little space provided for the fundamental re-evaluation of Armenian identity and for a serious analysis of the significance of the Genocide. Finally, the strengthening of the Armenian Democratic Liberal Party (Ramgavar Party or ADLP) as a competitor to the revolutionary parties "strengthened the inclination toward acceptance of reduced political goals and lowered expectations." The ADLP, established in Egypt in 1908, was conservative and non-revolutionary in nature. As the true heir of the Ottoman Constantinople establishment, the ADLP drew its membership primarily from the Western Armenian bourgeoisie. Libaridian summarises the inter-war period in the Middle East as one of waiting, of:

"[a]ttachment of the refugees to their old homes and a continuing, pietistic hope of return enhanced the feeling of Armenian separateness and temporariness in the Arab states."

At the same time, the post-Genocide diasporan experience was coloured by the heritage of the revolutionary movements which had placed much emphasis on the notions of self-determination and independence. The deportees who made it to their new homes in the diaspora for some time held onto the belief that, one day, they may return to their homes. This belief was reinforced by the declaration of independence in Eastern Armenia in 1918, and the work of the Armenian Delegation in Paris throughout 1919-21. Nevertheless, with the Sovietisation of Armenia such hopes were soon dashed, and the revolutionary parties and the other institutions of the diaspora were forced to settle for the role of 'governments-in-exile'.

Torossian argues that, politically speaking, throughout this period a large portion of activity in the diaspora was geared towards keeping alive the Armenian 'dream'. This involved, first of all, the maintenance of a sense of identity. In other words, the most immediate need was "national survival" and the preservation of that which was considered to be unique to Armenian culture. Among the survivors there emerged the concept of the 'white massacre' (jermag chart), referring to "the danger of assimilation into the host countries with a consequent loss of national identity". Secondly, it meant keeping alive the ideal of national homeland by maintaining the rhetoric of return and the homeland as a symbol of the diaspora's aspirations. Third and finally, it involved efforts aimed at regaining the homeland.

The First Armenian Republic, 1918-20

As with 1828, 1915-20 also marked a significant stage in the demographic-territorial configuration of the Armenians. The Genocide effectively emptied those very lands on which the revolutionaries had placed their hopes for self-determination, and many of the refugees were relocated to a sparsely populated land mass which had not been at the centre of the Armenian revolutionaries' aspirations. Concurrently, the concentration of Armenians within the Russian Armenian provinces increased, due to the migration of Genocide survivors and the general chaos of the post-war Middle East. A new epicentre of Armenian political life was established in Russian Armenia, marking the first time in centuries when Armenian affairs were conducted from within the homeland at least as much as they were from without. For the first time also the Armenians were responsible for the establishment of their own state infrastructures.

With the collapse of the Tsarist regime in February 1917, the stated aim of the Russian Provisional Government was to continue the war and fulfil its goal of annexing the Turkish Armenian territories, though this policy was consistently opposed by the Social Democrats and other leftists. The Provisional Government placed the occupied Turkish-Armenian territories under the authority of a 'general commissar', and hundreds of Turkish-Armenians began to migrate back to their emptied towns. In the meantime, as thousands of Russian soldiers in the Caucasus began to desert their ranks, approximately 35,000 Armenian troops were moved to the Caucasus and were left to defend the Russo-Turkish front.

However, even at this stage, none of the Armenian political parties had considered declaring independence. Instead, the ARF for example favoured an ethnic-based division of the Transcaucasus with guarantees of basic civil and ethnic rights according to its Program. This policy was predicated on the continuing positive attitude of the Central Government to Armenian interests. Nevertheless, with the overthrow of the Provisional Government in October 1917 by Lenin's Bolshevik faction, such hopes were dashed. As a result, the more moderate Armenian ARF-Dashnaks and Georgian Mensheviks were now politically isolated from Russia.

With the Bolsheviks now in power, Armenian Russophilia was dampened. Lenin's policy of anti-imperialism meant an anti-British alliance including Muslims, and this ultimately led to a Soviet-Turkish rapprochement. Although the Soviet government did not oppose - indeed, it encouraged - the creation of an independent Armenian homeland in Eastern Turkey and the Caucasus, such a recommendation was unrealistic when the Armenians were in no position to defend these lands. In any case, Turkish troops had already begun their advance across the Russo-Turkish border, and in the humiliating Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of March 1918, the Russians ceded all their annexed territories including the occupied districts of Eastern Turkey.

In April 1918, the three Transcaucasian countries - Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia - declared the establishment of an independent Transcaucasian Federative Soviet Socialist Republic. Nevertheless, as Turkish troops continued to advance into Armenia, they quickly approached Erevan province, and the Armenians were left to defend themselves, defeating the advancing Turkish armies in late May against huge odds. At the same time, as the Georgians sought an alliance with Germany, and Azerbaijan with Turkey, the federation fell apart, and at this point the Dashnak leaders in Tiflis had no choice but to declare Armenian independence on May 28, 1918. In July, an Armenian government was set up in the dusty backwater township of Erevan, where until then nothing had reigned except refugees, famine and disease.

The government established in 1918 in Erevan was initially intended as a government of Erevan province only, that is, as a government of Eastern Armenians. Only in the Declaration of May 28 1919 did it proclaim itself the government of all Armenians, laying claim to the Armenian villayets in Eastern Turkey, while also establishing twelve seats in parliament specifically for the Turkish Armenian constituents within its borders. This Declaration can partly be explained by the retaking of Kars which had emboldened the Armenian government. The Declaration was highly controversial, however, and drew protests from the ARF's coalition partners who immediately withdrew from the government, leaving the ARF in total power. At the same time, since the 400,000 or so Western Armenians living in Erevan province clearly saw themselves as refugees and not immigrants, there was a great deal of tension between the two groups over the Erevan government's perceived preoccupation with Eastern Armenian concerns. Rather than becoming a rallying point for unity, the Declaration created dissension both in the Republic of Armenia and in the diaspora.

The cleavages were further exacerbated by the presence of two Armenian delegations at the Versailles Peace Conference. Broadly speaking, the two delegations simultaneously reflected class and regional cleavages. On the one hand, the delegation of Boghos Noubar Pasha, a diasporan par exemple, represented the interests of the urban, middle class, Western Armenians, hence his inclusion of Cilicia in his territorial demands. On the other hand Avetis Aharonian, poet and Dashnak President of Armenia, represented the Eastern Armenian homeland and the masses of poor peasants and refugees who populated the Erevan province.

Ultimately, the two delegations were able to arrive at an uneasy compromise, presenting a common list of demands, which in the end did include Cilicia. Interestingly:

"Much of this territory . . . had never belonged to the Armenians but was justified for security or commercial reasons. Almost nowhere in this vast territory, except in Erevan province, did the Armenians constitute a majority of the population . . ."

On August 10, 1920, the Treaty of Sèvres was signed which promised an enlarged independent homeland for Armenia, though this homeland was limited to the northeastern provinces of Turkey and did not include Cilicia. However, none of the victorious powers were willing to act as guarantor of the plan, and despite American President Woodrow Wilson's keenness, he was not able to sell the idea of an American Mandate for Armenia to his own Senate and Congress. Subsequently, in late 1920, the Bolsheviks began to regain control over the former Russian Empire as Kemalist troops also began their advance towards Armenia. On November 29, Armenian communists staged a revolt, and the Red Army entered Armenia and established Soviet control. On December 2, 1920, the government of the Republic of Armenia signed a treaty with Turkey renouncing the Treaty of Sèvres and any claim to the Turkish territories, and on the same day signed an agreement with Russia accepting Soviet rule in Armenia.

In conclusion, first of all, the leading revolutionary party, the ARF, adopted a platform of independence only through force of circumstance. Secondly, the short-lived Republic of Armenia was significant in that the Armenians were no longer just a nationality, but also a 'nation-state', though only in one small part of the world. Third and finally, the diaspora played a key role in homeland's establishment, which it had seen as its mission for several centuries. Adalian argues that:

"In an obvious and exceptional reversal of the trend of past centuries, the diaspora helped restore the political vitality of historic Armenia."

However it is not immediately clear why this is a "reversal". Rather, it seems to be the natural and logical extension of a long-term pattern, that of the diaspora functioning as the repository of political resources and the main catalyst for moves towards self-determination. However, what was new was the immigration of Armenians, including some of the diasporan leadership of the political parties, into Eastern Armenia.

The Imagination of the Soviet Armenian Homeland, 1920-1965

The much longed for self-determination was short lived, however, and was quickly followed by a new political separation of the homeland and the diaspora. Adalian comments on this irony:

"Just at that moment, when Armenia and diaspora were merging, Communism sealed off the homeland from the diaspora. . . . For much of the remainder of the century, Armenia and the diaspora would grow apart."

At the same time that the Genocide led to the dispersion of survivors into the Middle East, Europe and North America, with the expansion of communism the Armenians throughout the Caucasus, the former Russian Empire and Eastern Europe were increasingly isolated from their Western compatriots. These factors confirmed the hegemony of Western Armenian culture throughout much of the diaspora, with the exception of Iran and other communities where the Eastern Armenian culture was dominant, such as India and South East Asia. The rough correlation between diaspora-homeland and East-West cleavages is an example of how cleavages can overlap.

In this period, as a result of the separation of the two parts of the Armenian nation, the diaspora was forced to reassess its own identity. The diaspora's understanding of itself evolved from one of a collection of separate gaghouts (communities) to a transnational entity known as spiurk:

"The term 'diaspora' - spiurk - is a neologism in Armenian. As far as we are aware, one of its first mentions can be dated at the end of the twenties, with the journal of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, Sion . . ."

Soviet Armenia contributed to this process of diasporan reimagination, by coining a new phrase to describe the diaspora:

"Another neologism appeared simultaneously and concurrently with spiurk: it is the term ardasahman (lit. 'outside the borders') used by the Soviets, which divided the Armenians into two categories, those who live outside the 'true' homeland, Soviet Armenia, and the others, with the exception of the communities existing in Soviet bloc countries (Bulgaria, Romania)."

The concept of ardasahman acted as a counterforce to the notion of spiurk, since it emphasised the primacy of the homeland in the structure of the Armenian nation. In this way, the centripetal and centrifugal forces operating on the diaspora were kept in dynamic tension. The history of diaspora-homeland relations throughout the rest of the century centred around these themes, and diasporan identity constituted a search for ways to deal with this paradox.

Despite the loss of independence, the Sovietisation of Armenia brought many benefits. Firstly, the rapid modernisation of the Soviet Union led to the reinforcement of republican structures and unwittingly fostered the emergence and strengthening of republican-ethnic elites. This process is referred to by Soviet historians as 'nativisation'. Secondly, Sovietisation completed the shift of the Armenian epicentre to the East, ensuring the preservation of Eastern Armenian culture. For example, Armenian was declared the official language of the Republic. As Suny writes, Sovietisation provided the "restoration of a devastated nationality and the foundation of a new nation."

Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, Sovietisation built a viable Armenian territorial and demographic base in Erevan province, in contrast to the Tsarist policy of establishing ethnically heterogeneous provinces. Thus "[t]erritorially, Armenians were guaranteed a physical space of their own to which those who had been scattered around the globe could return." Now, finally, the Armenians had an autonomous Republic, with fixed borders and its own government, protected from any threat from Turkey. Torossian argues that many Armenians perceived Soviet Armenia as "The Seed for a Future Strong, United, and Independent Armenia", which provided inspiration for the Armenian nationalist movement in the diaspora because it is "a place that belongs to the Armenians and one that is locally run by them". There was now a safe haven for where a new 'ingathering' of all Armenians could take place. Armenians, including many leading intellectuals and literati, immigrated from all over the world, mixing together and integrating into a new homeland. The population of Soviet Armenia, estimated at 720,000 in 1920, had grown to 1.2 million by the eve of the World War Two.

Marx and Engels had predicted that the gradual internationalisation of the world economy would bring about the end of nationalism. However, the persistence of nationalism within the Soviet Union created a theoretical challenge for later Marxist scholars. Though for them the national question was viewed in class terms, they did not call for the dissolution of "distinct national identities". Rather, they opposed exploitative state nationalism whilst viewing nationalist movements among minorities as potential vehicles for revolution:

"When these phenomena are monopolised by the state to serve class purposes, the communal 'nation' they are supposed to represent becomes an alienated and exploitative essence because these are properties of the class state."

Stalin also grappled with this paradox in his formulation of a nationalities policy for the Soviet Union. For example, he wrote that the national struggle:

"In its essence is always a bourgeois struggle . . . But it does not follow from this that the proletariat should not put up a fight against the policy of national oppression."

According to Stalin, the emancipated socialist states needed to form a federation to keep themselves strong. This formula was referred to as "national in form, socialist in content." It proposed that ethnic-national sentiments, loyalties and energies were to be harnessed for the interests of the socialist state and the greater ideology of communism. The Soviet federation should seek to promote a class solution to any nationalities problems that might emerge, and therefore could not give in to every national demand. The 'class solution' meant the removal of capitalist exploitation.

Smith points out, however, that the formula "national in form, socialist in content" was problematic throughout the course of Soviet history. For instance, any concessions made to Armenian nationalism - such as the anniversary celebrations of pre-Soviet writers or the 1600th anniversary of the creation of the Armenian alphabet in May 1962 - simply backfired on the central authorities. Furthermore, de-Stalinisation involved the devolution of power to the local and republican levels, including Armenia. This had the effect of re-strengthening the local elite base, which tried to consolidate its position "by making concessions to local nationalism". An example of the latter was the construction of the symbolic 'Mother Armenia' statue to replace the toppled statue of Stalin in the early 1960s.

The persistence of nationalist sentiment can be measured by the rapid resurgence of nationalist literary works in the post-Stalinist period. "The literary output of the country may be regarded as a reliable index for measuring the growing nationalistic sentiments", writes Dekmejian. If this is so, the late 1950s and early 1960s saw a revival of nationalist expression. Some of the characteristics of that revival were the literary rehabilitation of historic Armenian revolutionary figures, discussion of the Armenian Genocide, and attempts to reverse the Russification of the Armenian language. In the literature of the period, there was a strong emphasis on territorial restoration. It seems that even those living in the homeland lived with a sense of exile and of a longing for self-determination. Mount Ararat was often used as a symbol of this longing. At the same time, a number of prominent Armenians are reported to have visited Moscow to plea for the annexation of the Turkish-Armenian lands. Dekmejian argues that the intensity of the territorial demands "was increasing in direct proportion to the developing Soviet-Turkish rapprochement." In this sense, Soviet policy once again unwittingly fuelled Armenian nationalism.

Despite the political and economic hardships of the era beginning in 1918 and the political controversies that surround these events, it can be safely argued that both the short-lived Republic of Armenia and the subsequent Sovietisation of Eastern Armenia preserved Armenian territorial nationalism both in reality (though in highly limited form) and as an ideal to be aspired to. Like many Armenian authors, David Marshall Lang appropriates the religious imagery of "Death and Resurrection" to describe the painful road from genocide to independence and Sovietisation and beyond. Nevertheless, although Sovietisation at least saved Armenia from absorption into Turkey, the Soviet period, except for rare moments, was not generally favourable to the territorial demands of the Armenians. However, it was those rare moments that unified the diaspora and rallied all its elements behind the homeland.

Diaspora-Homeland Relations and Impact on Diaspora, 1920-1965

Soviet Armenia as a Rallying Point

The creation of Soviet Armenia challenged the diaspora's self-appointed role as custodian of the Armenian heritage. At the same time, Sovietisation created a new role for the diaspora, since the Soviet homeland was limited in its ability to make territorial and legal demands against Turkey. Within the diaspora, the question of the territories provided a unifying point. In this way the exiled diasporan organisations, in particular the parties, functioned as 'governments-in-exile', acting as service-providers for the diasporans and as unofficial 'representatives' of the interests of Armenians in the homeland. With this framework in mind, I will briefly trace the development of Soviet policy on Armenian territorial demands and the impact of this policy on the diaspora.

Lenin's decree of December 31 1917 "defended the right of the Armenian people to self-determination in Russian occupied 'Turkish Armenia' including even total independence" and the return of all deported Armenians to Turkish Armenia. However, these claims were never carried through, and Armenian territorial ambitions were ultimately relegated to the symbolic. Caprielian quotes a number of Soviet Armenian leaders of the Stalinist era who renounced any territorial claims as "bourgeois-capitalist" and as being inspired by the ARF for the purposes of distracting the Armenian people from the construction of the multi-ethnic socialist state. Over time, Armenia was gradually reduced in size through concessions to the other Transcaucasian republics. The Russo-Turkish Treaty of March 1921 set in concrete the established borders. By 1923, the Transcaucasian Federation had been firmly established and Armenia had been fully integrated into the USSR. The Constitution of 1936 dissolved the Transcaucasian Federation and the Soviet republics of Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan were established. By that time, the territorial 'adjustments' had already been made that provided a foundation for the future borders of these republics. Armenia was reduced to a small enclave of 30,000 square kilometres, excluding large Armenian-populated areas in Akhalkalak in southern Georgia, Nagorno-Karabagh and Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan, and the now depopulated provinces of Kars and Ardahan in Turkey.

During World War Two, the process of political integration was temporarily reversed as Armenian nationalism was harnessed for the greater purposes of the Soviet state. The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic (Armenian SSR) was granted its own ministries of defence and foreign affairs in 1944, and the Church was granted major concessions in return for its support of the Soviet war effort. At this point pro-Soviet feeling in the diaspora reached its peak, especially since the denunciation of communism was softened in the West. The Soviet Armenian government was able to rally not just its own people, but also the diaspora. Even the ARF saw the wisdom in remaining silent and in fact some degree of co-operation took place in Lebanon between the ARF and other parties. In 1943, the Armenian National Front was formed in the diaspora, composed of communists and pro-Soviet elements and even Dashnaks, to support the Soviet war effort. Interestingly, though, in this period the ARF split between the left and the right, on the question of whether the Nazis or the Soviets were the most likely to satisfy Armenian territorial claims. Several leading members of the Dashnak party, including Dro Ganayan, met with Nazi leaders to negotiate for territorial restoration if the Nazis invaded the Transcaucasus. The latter incident unfortunately gave weight to the charges of 'fascism' levelled against the ARF by its opponents.

In June 1946, following the end of the War, diasporan and Soviet interests coincided once again when a formal demand for the return of Kars-Ardahan was presented to Turkey by the Soviet Union. This was a brief period of boldness, where Armenia's communist leadership gave its unreserved support to the territorial claims, arguing that it was Soviet Armenia's just reward for its sacrifices during World War Two. As Libaridian points out, in a sense the Soviet Armenian government enjoyed a brief spell as "government of all Armenians". The diaspora was quick in its response to these moves. Various Armenian organisations sent appeals to world leaders to back the claims, and the Armenian Catholicos Gevorg VI called an ecclesiastical conference and urged Stalin to allow for repatriation. Even the ARF established its own committee to deal with the issue, and publicly declared its support for the efforts of the Soviet Union on behalf of the Armenian government. However, as a United States intelligence review rightly pointed out,

"The change [in Dashnak policy towards the Soviets] does not imply Tashnag [Dashnak] reconciliation to Soviet overlordship. The Tashnags have not given up their long-range goal of a 'United and Independent Armenia', but hold that under present conditions, when Soviet might and the Soviet hold on Armenia are unshakeable, it would be unpatriotic to block the efforts that are being made for the progress and territorial aggrandizement of Armenia. They believe that their ideal will have to be achieved in two stages: union of Turkish and Russian Armenia now; and independence whenever they can attain it."

The same applied, wrote the review, to the Armenians as a whole, whose

"present orientation toward the USSR does not derive from sympathy for the Soviet regime but from a realization that the fate of their homeland depends on the USSR."

Nevertheless the review rejected the Armenian territorial claims on the grounds that they were currently impracticable and politically inexpedient.

On October 24 1947, The Soviet Union demanded the return of Kars and Ardahan at the United Nations, but on behalf of Georgia. Uproar among diasporan Armenians led to the retraction of this statement. In any case, these claims were rejected by the United States, which increasingly distrusted Stalin and did not wish to encourage the expansion of Soviet influence nor the disintegration of Turkey. Truman argued that these territories were an integral part of Turkey. Turkey itself felt pressured by these claims and was gradually attracted to the American camp partly as a result. After the death of Stalin in 1953, the territorial claims were completely dropped in the name of 'rapprochement' with the West.

The failure of these territorial claims and the onset of the Cold War left many Armenians in the West in an awkward position: they had supported the Soviet Union in a land claim, and yet they lived in a capitalist society which now considered the Soviet Union as the arch enemy. As a result, "[t]he old divisions within the diaspora not only re-emerged but deepened into irreconcilable differences." The 1940s saw the establishment of the short-lived ADLP's Armenian Affairs and its more successful ARF equivalent, The Armenian Review, both based in Boston. These journals espoused strong and often virulent partisan views, and engaged in heated debate over diasporan relations with Soviet Armenia. As the ARF shifted further to the right, some members of the party split and formed an opposition group, the more radical elements were purged from the party, and pro-Soviet forces were compelled to ally themselves with the ADLP and SDHP.

The homeland's policy on territories had a direct impact on diaspora-homeland relations and the diasporan internal situation. At a few crucial moments in Soviet history, the Armenian government's policy on territorial claims fostered a temporary unity between the various factions in the diaspora. However as soon as the territorial demands abated, the diasporan cleavages resumed with renewed intensity.

Impact on Diasporan Cleavages

Apart from brief moments when homeland-diaspora interests seemed to coincide, for much of the Soviet period cleavages within the diaspora were sharpened as battles were fought over what policy the diaspora should take towards the Soviet Armenian homeland. The main protagonists in the conflict were the ARF on the one hand, and the Soviet Armenian government and its diasporan supporters, the ADLP, SDHP and 'progressives' on the other. Interestingly, this was a reversal of the situation in the past year of the first Republic, when the ARF was in power and its former coalition partners and the Western Armenian delegation of Boghos Noubar Pasha felt increasingly marginalised from the then Dashnak-dominated government in Erevan.

Following the Sovietisation of Armenia, the SDHP experienced a gradual depletion of numbers, a trend that continued throughout the Soviet period. Clearly, the "stigma" of communism placed the Social-Democrat SDHP at a disadvantage in the West. At the same time, the ADLP quickly replaced the SDHP as the main antagonist against the ARF in the diaspora. Following the Sovietisation of Armenia, the ADLP party conferences of 1922 and 1924 put forward two sets of goals: the pursuit of Western Armenian interests, and support for the government of the Armenian SSR in its efforts of "moral and economic reconstruction". The same declaration condemned all those who opposed the communist government of Armenia, which of course was a clear reference to the ARF.

Alongside the ADLP, the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU) dedicated itself to the task of reconstruction in Soviet Armenia. The AGBU was formed in 1906 in Cairo, Egypt. Following the Young Turk revolution in Turkey in 1908, the AGBU was able to expand its philanthropic activities throughout the Ottoman Empire. During the Genocide, the AGBU played a major role in relief efforts among survivors. Throughout much of the Soviet period, the AGBU was the diaspora's major financial contributor to Armenia, this being due in no small part to its affiliation with the ADLP.

Following the Sovietisation of Armenia, most of the former Dashnak leaders who had not fled the advancing Red Army were either imprisoned or killed. In 18 February 1921, those Dashnaks who had managed to flee to Iran organised an uprising in Armenia, which was, however, short lived and only further soured ARF-communist relations. A meeting between representatives of the ARF and the Soviet ambassador at Riga and two representatives of the Soviet Armenian government took place in July 1921. An agreement was reached, however this was never ratified by either party. For the next seventy years, the relationship between the Soviet government and the ARF was consistently hostile. Much of the conflict was over the claim of both sides to control over Armenian affairs in both the homeland and, in particular, the diaspora. The ARF saw itself as a government-in-exile, viewing the diaspora as its own domain. The communists were seen as usurpers, and Soviet Armenian involvement in the affairs of the diaspora was not welcomed. At the same time, the Armenian government and its diasporan supporters viewed the ARF as poor losers and obstructionist. Throughout the Soviet period the name of the ARF was consistently vilified, Dashnaks were arrested, the party blamed for all of Armenia's misfortunes, and its mention removed from successful episodes in Armenian history. Later, in the Stalinist period, communists with nationalistic tendencies were often labelled 'Dashnaks'. In response, the Dashnak press was replete with equally virulent denunciations of the communist regime.

In the early 1920s the ARF experienced a split between its left and right wings over what policy the party should take towards Soviet Armenia. At the same time, the former Prime Minister of Armenia, Hovhannes Kachaznouni, published a book, The ARF Has Nothing More to Do, and migrated to Soviet Armenia. As the title suggests, Kachaznouni argued that the ARF and the other parties had no role to play in Armenian political life, now that Armenia was Bolshevik. The opponents of the ARF, of course, capitalised on this. In the same year, a response was written to Kachaznouni by high-ranking party member Rouben Darbinian, who argued that Kachaznouni was wrong to give up hope, because Sovietisation would be short lived, and the ARF needed to continue the struggle for freedom. By the time it became obvious that Soviet Armenia was here to stay, ARF policy had been set in concrete.

Despite the exclusion of the ARF from formal political life in Armenia, in the eyes of Armenia's communist leaders the influence of the ARF seemed to be pervasive, to the point of paranoia. This paranoia gave the Soviet Armenian government a strong determination to oppose the influence of the ARF in the diaspora. It has even been alleged that the government tried to destroy the party from within by infiltrating its ranks. It also sought to neutralise the nationalistic agenda of the ARF by appropriating various symbols of Armenian nationalism, such as the Catholicosate of Echmiadzin, and later by organising cultural and educational exchanges and expanding its publications that specifically targeted diasporan Armenians.

The Soviet Armenian government also sought to extend the ARF's direct political influence in the diaspora through more direct means. No doubt this was again partly motivated by the desire to counter the ARF's fast growing influence in the dispersion. In September 13 1921, the Hayastani Oknoutian Komite (Committee for Assisting Armenia, or HOK) was formed by decree of the Armenian government. Its stated aim was to gain financial assistance from diasporan Armenian organisations, however it obviously acted as a propaganda tool as well. It played the role of "Armenia's principal instrument of 'diasporan' politics in the inter-war years. Between 1921 and its dissolution in 1937, HOK had established 200 cells with over 10,000 members throughout several diasporan communities. Claire Mouradian records various methods of espionage undertaken by Soviet Armenian organisations such as the HOK, including infiltration of the ranks of the ARF and the assignment of pro-Soviet clergy to the Echmiadznagan Church. In 1933, the HOK created 'The Committee for Victims of Dashnak Terror'. Touryantz confirms the Soviets' desired to win over the diaspora as a propaganda outlet.

In 1934, a year after the assassination of Archbishop Tourian in New York, an anti-Dashnak booklet, Patriotism Perverted, was published by the ADLP in Boston. It is ironic that at the same time that the ADLP and its political allies were collaborating with the Soviet Armenian regime, this booklet criticises the ARF for putting socialism before nationalism. The ARF is also accused of being undemocratic. Part of the motivation for the latter accusation was the desire to present the ideology of the ADLP as compatible with that of the host country. In the opening statement, the author declared that the ARF is "alien to our American ideals and Christian principles".

Upon reading the booklet it becomes apparent that the ADLP-ARF cleavage is based on more than considerations of ideology and method. There is every indication of a new manifestation of the old Eastern-Western Armenian cleavage, which tied in with differences of class and method, but also of region. The rough correlation between the ARF-ADLP and East-West cleavages is an example of overlapping cleavages. Keshishian writes that although in the post-Genocide period the East-West cleavage was largely "superseded by political and partisan considerations", these cleavages continued to "overlap strongly with the East-West divisions". The AGBU -Ramgavar "orbit" is composed primarily of Western Armenians, while "[c]ulturally speaking" the ARF is more pluralistic.

Thus Papazian several times refers to the ARF's alleged lack of sensitivity to the concerns of Western Armenians, and that despite its claim to represent the interests of the Turkish-Armenian population, it "never took the trouble of inquiring into the actual conditions in Armenia, and consulting the Armenians of Turkey." He points out that a large number of the Dashnaks who opposed the alliance with other non-Armenian socialist groups in the early part of the century were Western Armenians, including the famous General Andranik. In support for his case Papazian also cites the ARF's agreement in 1908 with the Young Turks to drop all demands as outlined in Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and the acceptance of empire-wide reforms for all ethnic groups. This agreement undermined the power of the Patriarchate and its conservative allies, the predecessors of the ADLP. Furthermore, argues Papazian most of the ARF's leaders

"were Russian-Armenians, and therefore, ignorant of the peculiar conditions of Turkey; but they concluded agreements with the Turkish authorities, over the heads of established official bodies."

In abrogating the demands of the Treaty of Berlin, and later signing away the Turkish Armenian territories in the Treaty of Alexandrapol in December 1920, Papazian accuses the ARF of disregarding 'the Armenian Cause'. For Papazian, after all, the Armenian Cause "was the cause of the liberation of the Armenians of Turkey". Writes Papazian,

"Instead of liberating Western Armenia, and organizing it into a separate state, they decided to add some of the provinces of Turkish Armenia to the existing Republic. This was consummated in the Sèvres Treaty. . . . The cause of the freedom of Western Armenia was thus killed by Dashnag [Dashnak] intolerance and intrigue. The Treat of Sèvres which recognized Armenia, at the same time, denied freedom to Western Armenia."

Worse still, argues Papazian, the ARF government in Erevan, under danger of Soviet invasion, appealed to Turkey for military help under the provisions of the Treaty of Alexandrapol, and thus, in Papazian's view, "consummated the burial of the Armenian question". As a result, a large number of Western Armenians once again defected from the Party. Furthermore, asks Papazian, why did the ARF oppose the Sovietisation of Armenia, when they themselves had socialistic tendencies, and when their own Program called for a federation of states within a Russian framework?

Partisan cleavages were further exacerbated during the period of immigration (nerkaght) to Armenia. Between 1921 and 1936, an estimated 40,000 Armenians from the Middle East, the Balkans and France had already settled in Armenia. Immediately after the end of World War Two, on November 21 1945, a government decree reopened Armenia's borders to diasporan returnees. This wave of immigration was much grander in scale than that of the 1920s and 1930s. Matossian gives three reasons for this move: "1) the need to replenish the manpower of the Soviet union lost in the war, 2) the desire of the Soviets to win the goodwill of the Armenians, and 3) the desire to put additional pressure on Turkey." Government leaders projected that hundreds of thousands of Armenians would return to Soviet Armenia, and at the time this was used by the Soviets as an argument for insisting on Armenia's "right" to regain the 'lost lands' in Turkey.

Between 1946 and 1948 close to 100,000 Armenians immigrated. Apart from the simple desire to live in "the homeland", many of the repatriates were motivated by the growing instability in their host countries in the Middle East in the wake of the post-war chaos. However these repatriates were often looked down on by the locals and subjected to severe discrimination. Since they were generally recognisable by the traits they had brought from their host countries, the repatriates were often referred to by their country of origin. They were labelled 'younger brothers' (aghpar, a colloquial version of yeghpair). They also were referred to as nerkaghtogh (immigrant) or nor egogh (new arrival), as opposed to deghatsi (native) or Hayastantsi (Armenian from Armenia). There were several reasons for this antipathy. For example, there was a major shortage of food and newcomers were seen as competitors. With the non-eventuation of the territorial claims, these immigrants created added pressures on an already difficult economy. Furthermore, there was widespread suspicion of 'subversive' ideas that might be brought in by Westerners. Touryantz writes further that perhaps "[t]he antipathy traditionally existing between the Eastern and Western Armenians played also a role." In any case, neither Touryantz nor his fellow repatriates felt at home in Armenia.

Touryantz's book, Search for a Homeland, gives interesting insights into the experience of the repatriates. Touryantz is the classic Armenian exile. He writes that "for years I looked forward for the day I would go back to Armenia", and his wish was fulfilled in 1946. However, like many of his fellow repatriates he was to later take the opportunity after the death of Stalin and emigrate to the United States. Indeed the Armenian repatriates, along with the Jews and Volga Germans, were granted special rights of emigration, so that by the end of 1989 about 80,000 Armenians had emigrated. These emigrés were seen as "deserters" by many Armenians in both the homeland and the diaspora. In the case of the latter, the comment made by Shavarsh Missakian, founding director of Haratch in Paris, that "The Homeland is not a hotel" exemplified the prevailing attitude, even among Dashnaks.

The impact of repatriation of the 1940s and on the diaspora was mixed. For some, it strengthened both the real and sentimental ties with the homeland. For others, repatriation was a divisive issue. Non-communist members of the Repatriation Committees set up in the diaspora were approached by Dashnak representatives and encouraged to pull out of the Committee. Rumours spread of a "Dashnak hit list" against members of these Committees, although Touryantz questions the validity of such accusations. The Dashnaks vehemently opposed the repatriation, for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Dashnaks had been ousted by the communists in 1920-21, and so viewed themselves in opposition to that regime. Secondly, there was perhaps a fear that repatriation might lead to the disintegration of the diaspora, leaving the party with no raison d'étre. Thirdly, the Dashnaks raised authentic concerns over living conditions in the homeland, and indeed subsequent experience proved them correct.

In the late 1940s, another form of 'return' was initiated by the homeland government. After the death of Stalin, cultural and economic interaction increased between the homeland and the diaspora. The first sightseeing tour of Armenia was organised by the Jeunesse arménienne de France (Young Armenians of France), formed in 1945. The journal Sovetakan Hayastan, aimed at informing diasporans about the homeland, was first published in the same year. Throughout the next two decades many more such projects were initiated. This new phase of diaspora-homeland relations culminated in 1964 with the formation of the Armenian government's Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Living Abroad (Spiurkahai Kapi Komite). The stated aims of the Committee were the "strengthening of ties between Soviet Armenia and the Diaspora", the "promotion of Armenian culture and language", and the "preservation of Armenian identity (hayabahbanoum)". It engaged in cultural exchange programs with the diaspora, invited diasporan school children to annual camps in Armenia, honoured 'neutral' (chezok) writers and artists of the diaspora, organised celebrations on the occasion of Armenian national holidays, and provided text books for Armenian community schools in the diaspora. However, although there was some degree of rapprochement in the post-Stalinist period, relations between the ARF and the Soviet government remained tense. The ARF was mostly excluded from the cultural and educational activities described above. At the same time, the Cold War intensified the existing cleavages in the Armenian diaspora.

An article entitled 'Our Neutrals', published in the Armenian Review in 1954, reflects the intense political climate immediately following the Second World War and the growing gap between the ARF and the rest of the diaspora. Darbinian argues that there is really no such thing as a "neutral". He contends that since Soviet "imperialism" runs contrary to the democratic values espoused by the "free countries in which we live", a "neutral" stance towards its policies is disastrous for the diaspora because it arouses the suspicion of the host countries and encourages the cultural, political and religious oppression of Armenians in the homeland. Armenians cannot afford to be neutral because the conditions for struggle still exist. In a strange twist from Papazian's virulent attack on the ARF in 1934, Darbinian argues that the Church must be protected from political infiltration and must not become the arena for intrigue. He justifies the ARF's own maneouverings to have their own candidate elected to the Cilician See, by arguing that this is to protect the See from anti-nationalist Soviet forces. Similarly, the compatriotic unions had, according to Darbinian, become the political tool of the Kremlin, and needed to be opposed. He accuses the AGBU and other self-proclaimed neutral organisations of being in fact "underhanded" collaborators, employing communists and discriminating against Dashnaks. In short, anyone who chooses to collaborate with the Armenian SSR in any way, shape or form, is endangering the diaspora and helping the communists spread their anti-national and anti-religious propaganda, and in no way helping the people of Soviet Armenia. Obviously, this kind of black and white policy placed in a difficult situation any patriotic Armenian who chose to offer humanitarian or other assistance to the Armenian SSR.

Another article published in the Armenian Weekly gives us further insight into the times. In a reprint of a speech delivered at Dashnak Day in 1958 in Cairo, Egypt, Khatanasian indirectly refutes Papazian's claims and argues that the ARF is the only organisation which "has stressed in its name the word Armenian with the right priority", arguing that the ARF draws on all "classes, factions, denominations and dialects" who come together without compromising the full "quintessence and . . . unity of the nation." Hence it is not a party, but a federation of like-minded, revolutionary patriots." Written at the height of the Cold War, the tone of the article is very triumphalist, as the author calls for "[o]ptimism" in the face of the forces of assimilation - kaghkeniatsoum - and of the conservative opposition. He represents the ARF as "the organized Armenian nation":

"Armenia is the cradle of our national hopes, our handiwork, and the native climate for the realization of Armenian values. It is this firm conviction which imparts vitality to the young generation of the Dispersion - the determination to survive and to create as Armenians."

"What", Khatanasian goes on to ask, "is the share of Soviet Armenia to (sic) this monumental achievement of the Armenian communities of the Dispersion? Absolutely nothing!" On the contrary, the communists have been doing all in their power to destroy the natural, organic unity of the Armenians, by accentuating class divisions and creating disunity and sowing discord throughout the diaspora. Among his examples, he cites the communists' anti-Dashnak stand in the Lebanese Civil War and the Soviet infiltration of the diasporan Church. On the other hand,

"the Armenians of the Diaspora are a national power, the defender of the Armenian national and territorial claims. . . . The struggle of the victory of the Diaspora is the source of the political virility of the people of Armenia."

Hence the need to temporarily separate the diasporan Church from the Holy see of Echmiadzin, a move which Khatanasian claims was only temporary in intention.

Along similar lines, Atamian confirms the ARF's role as "government in exile" when he writes that:

"The most important requirement for the minorities within the Soviet Union is a psychological preparation which can be stimulated only by the leaderships of these groups living outside the Soviet union to allay possible mistrust of Western motives. The emigrés, intelligentsia and national leaderships of these groups can serve as an effective . . . rallying point around which minority sentiments may gather momentum."

In 1955 Atamian could argue that the ARF still held on to the Armenian Question, that is the dream of a free, independent and united Armenia. However, fierce debate took place in the party leadership over whether the ARF should soften its anti-Turkish stance in favour of vigilance against the USSR and winning the support of the United States. The opposing faction argued that Turkey remained the chief enemy and that the ARF should not compromise its pursuit of the Armenian Question as traditionally defined. The former view came to dominate party policy, and until the 1960s the question of the Turkish lands was placed on the backburner.

Throughout the Soviet period the homeland was both a "shared" and a "contested symbol", since as Phillips has rightly pointed out:

"Much of the argument over symbolic meaning centers on 'Armenia' as a territorial entity. "Where and what is 'Armenia?' What is the correct attitude toward Soviet Armenia?'"

These were the questions that shaped the diasporan discourse for much of the Soviet period, and deepened the cleavage between the ARF and the other forces in the diaspora.

The Church as an Arena for Partisan Conflict

Throughout the Soviet period, the Church became an arena for partisan fighting. The key centres of this conflict were Lebanon and the United States. Once again, the issue was one of Soviet 'control' of the diasporan church versus control of the Church by diasporan forces, namely the ARF.

In Armenia, throughout most of the Soviet period the Church was allowed to function as a relatively autonomous national body. The Soviet government, recognising the centrality of the Church in Armenian identity, did not discard the institution completely. Rather, it engaged in various forms of subtle and obvious persecution and infiltration which were aimed at keeping the Church under control. An example of infiltration was the formation of the so-called 'Free Church' in an attempt to undermine the authority of Echmiadzin. With regard to persecution, the anti-Church drive culminated in the assassination of Catholicos Khoren during the height of the Stalinist purges in 1937.

At the same time, the Church was often mobilised in support of the state in times of crisis, such as during World War Two. Though the freedoms granted to the church during the War were subsequently revoked, the election of Vazgen I as Catholicos two years after the death of Stalin marked a new, bolder period of Church involvement in national affairs. The flip-side of this was the usefulness of the Church in extending Soviet Armenian control over the diaspora. Overall, walking a fine balance between collaboration with the regime and maintaining its ancient role as symbol of Armenian unity, the Church in Armenia "adroitly joined [the religio-national myth] to the concept of a brotherhood of Soviet peoples".

Meanwhile in the diaspora, in response to invitations from various congregations, the Cilician See had begun to expand its influence throughout the Middle East and North America. Viewing itself increasingly as the Mother See of the diaspora, the Cilician Catholicosate established by-laws incorporating the dioceses of Iran, India, and the United States. This expansion was encouraged by the ARF which saw in the Cilician See a counter-weight to the influence of 'Soviet-controlled' Echmiadzin.

When Cilician Catholicos Karekin I died in 1952, his position remained vacant for four years. Taking the opportunity, Catholicos Vazgen I sought to reassert Echmiadzin's authority over the diaspora by bringing the Cilician Catholicosate under his control. In preparation for the 1956 Catholicosate elections, the Dashnak sympathisers of the Cilician congregation proposed Zareh I as their candidate, the non-Dashnaks invited the Echmiadzin Catholicos to intervene, however he was unable to persuade the Dashnaks to back down. He then went to Egypt where he organised a meeting of the Jerusalem and Istanbul Patriarchs, the outcome of which was to declare the Antellias election illegal. The Dashnaks protested that this meeting was itself contrary to the Church by-laws, and proceeded with the ordination and consecration, although it took a year to find enough bishops to validate the ordination. The political parties became directly involved in the conflict, with the ARF taking control of the Cilician see and the DLP and Hunchak parties supporting the cause of Echmiadzin. The Dashnaks even called in the Lebanese army to ensure that the proceedings were not disrupted. Motivated by anti-Soviet considerations, the Greek and Persian governments similarly lent their support to the extension of the Cilician Catholicosate's rule over the Armenian communities in their countries. Subsequent attempts by the Jerusalem Patriarchate to mediate between the two Catholicoses were in vain. By 1969, the jurisdiction of the Catholicosate of Cilicia encompassed churches in Syria, Lebanon, Cyprus, Iran, Greece, Kuwait and the United States.

The Dashnaks argued that the Echmiadzin See had become a puppet of the Soviets, and the diasporan Church needed to be saved from its 'clutches'. Echmiadzin, it was argued, was training its clerics for political intrigue abroad. Therefore, Darbinian argued that the ARF had no choice but to "severe (sic) temporarily the spiritual bond". "It was not we who wanted this separation", he writes, but the split occurred because of Soviet intrigue which turned historical administrative divisions into a political split to serve its own political purposes. If the ARF had wanted to initiate such a split, he argues, they could have done so much earlier. The split would be only temporary, argued Khatanasian, and for the good of both the diaspora and Echmiadzin itself.

In turn, the ARF and Cilician Catholicosate were accused by the Hunchak-DLP bloc of becoming the tool of the CIA. Phillips records the fact that the ARF was, in fact, approached by the CIA, and did engage in cautious collaboration with that organisation insofar as such collaboration was seen as coinciding with Armenian interests. However, the same interviewee also admitted that this was perhaps a naive approach on the part of the ARF.

The repercussions of this split were strongly felt throughout the diaspora. In 1957, in response to a request by the majority of the Central Diocesan Board of the United States, Catholicos Zareh I sent an emissary, Abp Khoren Paroyan, to bring that Diocese under the control of the Cilician See. However, a strong minority opposed this move, and appealed to Echmiadzin with whose approval they established an Echmiadznagan Diocese based in New York City. In Lebanon, these cleavages expressed themselves in fratricidal warfare within the Armenian community during the Civil War of 1958. However, after the death of Zareh I in 1963, a rapprochement was begun, centring mainly around the mutual recognition of each other's authority, although the practical implications of this recognition were not clearly defined. By 1965 this kind of disunity was begun to be put aside, at least with regard to the Genocide and Turkey as the common foe.

Writing in 1969, Sarkissian argues that the Armenian Church has both a spiritual and national mission, and that therefore since "the Church is deeply involved in the life of the nation as such, it is not always so easy to stay aloof and remain unaffected" by political considerations. The Cilician See has always enjoyed independence, and there has been a mutual understanding in this regard for several centuries. The problem, then, lies in "a divergence in understanding of each other's status and position within the Armenian Church". In the final analysis, however, the split in the Church was essentially over diaspora-homeland relations and the question of how to relate with the homeland.

Literature and the Reimagination of Diasporan Identity

Alongside the parties and the church, the literature of the diaspora provided a space for reconciliation with the reality of post-Genocide exile and the reimagining of Armenian diasporan identity. However, as Oshagan writes, Armenian post-Genocide literature "failed to formalize this tragic event into a coherent, artistic format", leaving an open wound in the Armenian psyche. Alishan blames this fact partly on the use of inappropriate metaphors, such as death, burial and resurrection to describe the Genocide and subsequent events, and "martyrdom" to describe those who died. This kind of appropriation of religious symbolism by literati who operate within a primarily secular (or sometimes 'pagan') framework is what has caused the confusion, according to Alishan. Furthermore, the use of nostalgia, when devoid of its religious content, moves from a realistic other-worldliness to a despairing humanism. Furthermore, Alishan notes the inability of diasporan writers to achieve true "reconciliation" with self and the Turk, due to the inability to derive meaning - theological or otherwise - from the Genocide.

Oshagan argues that, because of its failure to confront the Genocide, the diasporan intelligentsia "largely failed to mature" in the twentieth century. Not just with regard to the Genocide, but in every regard, the diaspora did not produce "an erudite, courageous critic to establish an intellectual framework, set up criteria, and initiate a theoretical debate." At the same time, he points out that "the literature of that period remained ethnocentric and highly emotional, repetitive of the pre-Genocide themes and style . . ." These themes included survival, ethnic superiority, and martyrdom; however the writers did not directly address themselves to the tragedy of the Genocide, nor did they attempt to deal with its psychological impact. Rather, they sought to perpetuate the pre-Genocide world of the Armenians, not by creating a new discourse but rather by making the pre-Genocide discourse "absolute". Writes Hamalian:

". . . that the events of 1915 proved to be so traumatizing, so destructive to simple self-esteem, that they may have induced in the survivors a kind of racial amnesia . . . When memory did operate, often the tongue was stunned into silence on the subject."

However, Oshagan is optimistic concerning the future:

"We can say with some assurance that once they have recovered their ancestral homelands, the Armenians will be able to heal the wounds and gradually dilute the poison. Then, and only then, will their creative energies be set free to function to the full."

In Lebanon, Antranig Dzarougian penned Hin Yerazner, Nor Jampaner (Old Dreams, New Paths). Dzarougian left the ARF, criticising it for being unable to determine a realistic policy towards Soviet Armenia. He was invited to Armenia by the government and, upon his return, wrote this book. In his preface he wrote:

"I want these pages to be a truthful testimonial brought from the fatherland to a generation living and dying with a longing for the fatherland which suffers from the trauma of not being able to love the fatherland."

This angst was also seen in Oath to Ararat, where Dzarougian wrote of a 'spiritual' return to the homeland:

"From every city, by-road and field
from every gutter and corner of exile,
watch us gather, adding one to one
and rank to rank, to storm our father's dream.
And watch the black walls with which
fate has barricaded us
shatter.

The ache of our hearts will lead us
like a trumpet call,
to our lands and water.
Let the sun collapse;
let the road lead through hell,
we will reach your peak.

Look at our numbers, swelling rank on rank
brave and burning.
Look at our hunger reaching toward you
with the grasp and reach of Vahakn.
Look at our souls clean as your snows.
And our will, hard as your stones.
God of granite!
Holy mountain!
Believe us that we can,
that we shall reach your peak!"

French-Armenian writer Shahan Shahnour similarly voiced the exile's cry of despair in Nahanch Arants Yerki (Retreat without Song), extracts of which were also published in Haratch daily newspaper. This work describes the impact of the Genocide on the Armenians, and is a story about six survivors in Paris who angrily reflect on their sense of non-belonging and powerlessness in the face of the pressures of assimilation. It is worthwhile quoting the following lengthy extract to gain a sense of the atmosphere of the times:

"One day, while they were having a talk, Souren said to Pierre:

'What need is there to say all the things which have the paleness of having been repeated so many times? What need is there, in particular to be concerned about circumstances, the best cure for which words can never provide the strength? This is not because there is now a war and fighting, not because there is now a battle and struggle of life, but because there is something more predestined, more intolerant, there is something terrifying, irresistible, which bellows its name from all crossroads: it is retreat. Retreat, the retreat of the Armenians. Fighting is something sacred, battles are sometimes even useful: a nation emerges from them defeated or victorious, but in either case, it emerges. But the retreat of souls, that retreat on the slope which makes one's head spin, effaces, assimilates, and makes everything disappear. It is true, such educated, indifferent people are not numerous, but beyond there are crowds of rough, stupid, and withdrawn people, who seem instinctively, who seem in bone and marrow, to be the same as the previous ones. Like them, they become the first ones to recoil, to forget, and to deny. And the formidable mass of those that retreat is formed, and in that big current, they carry away the others, as well as the sparse exceptions.

'Parents, sons, uncles, and sons-in-law, retreat; customs, conceptions, morals, and love, retreat. The language retreats, the language retreats, the language retreats. And we are still retreating in words and in deed, willingly and unwillingly, knowingly and unknowingly: forgive them, forgive them, Ararat!

'There were Armenians who paid in gold to save their skins; there were others who gave up their faith, their virginity; there were those who abandoned their homes, their lands, their sky; there were yet cowards who denied their nation and their language, and heroes who gave their blood, their life, their very existence. While we pay, as a final ransome (sic), that which is to come: as a final ransome (sic), children who could have grown up, generations who could have come after us. Because those that will come in the future will be non-Armenians, in word and in deed, willingly and unwillingly, knowingly and unknowingly: forgive them, Ararat, forgive them!'"

Nigoghos Sarafian also "highlights the disarray of the inner forces and of the sense of destiny of the nation", as in The Train written in Paris in 1927:

"My soul
neither a force
nor a disease
is a poor passenger
going from one city
to another
between what is left
behind forever
and the still uncertain
certain future."

In Diaspora, penned in 1923, Tekeyan echoed the theme of pending doom that confronted the exile:

". . . One by one, blade by blade, like grass
pulled from its ancient fields, it dries.
Life is separated and departs.
Without its own soil it dies. . . ."

Hagop Oshagan (1883-1948), a Genocide survivor, was a pioneer in that he sought to supersede the pre-Genocide rural mythology with a modern, vibrant, diasporan myth. He argued that the birth of the "real diaspora" was being stunted by the perpetuation of old world mythology, and that in doing so the Armenians, especially their literati, were continually reliving the Genocide. At the same time, France emerged as an epicentre of intellectual ferment regarding the issues of diasporan identity. In Paris, the journal Menk (in French, Nous, or 'Us') was established in April 1931 in reaction to the nostalgia and pessimism of the previous generation. Though it ceased publication only a year later, its impact on the reimagination of diasporan identity was long-lasting, and it acted as a catalyst for similar future publications.

Although World War Two broke the continuity of the Paris revival, in the post-War period there were renewed attempts at grappling with what it means to be diasporan. In 1945, the journal Arevmoudk was launched in Paris, edited by Levon Chormissian. For the next seven years this journal gave strength to the idea of the diaspora as an entity in its own right, contrary to the thinking of both the ARF and the Soviet Armenians. He was later joined by Khosrov Toutunjian, former ARF leader in Beirut. In Beirut, the years 1958-74 saw the publication of Spiurk Journal. It was edited by Simon Simonian, a former teacher at Antellias, scholar, writer, journalist, and novelist, who became an anti-Dashnak. This journal later backed the actions of the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. Simonian generalised the notion of an Armenian diaspora, or spiurk, with its own sense of identity. The fact that these journals were independent was significant, since most diasporan literature and periodicals are either published or sponsored by an organisation, most often the ARF.

With the gradual emergence of a new generation of post-Genocide writers in the 1960s, there was a general reaction against the nostalgia and ethnocentric introspection of the first half of the century. In the Middle East, the passing away of the classic writers such as Moushegh Ishkhan and Antranig Dzaroukian opened the way for a new generation of writers who called for an exit from the ghetto and greater integration into the host countries in which they live. In the late 1960s, for example, Lebanese Armenian university students were responsible for launching two major critical journals which gave a forum for the voicing of dissent, calling for the "modernisation" of Armenian culture and reduced ethnocentrism in the literature. Nevertheless, these journals were short-lived, and Oshagan writing in 1986 argued that what the Armenians of the Middle East and indeed of "the entire diaspora have been lacking for the past fifty years is an erudite, courageous critic to establish an intellectual framework, set up criteria, and initiate a theoretical debate." At the same time, he argued, the Armenian communities in the Middle East continue to act as the "center of gravity of the diaspora".

In Paris, too, there was a new movement which began in the 1970s. Avant-garde poet and critic Krikor Bledian and literary scholar Marc Nichanian have both sought to apply modern literary techniques and philosophical angles to Armenian literature. Theirs was groundbreaking work and Nichanian was also responsible for the launching in 1980 of the literary yearbook Gam (I Am). Also in this group are Claire Mouradian and Nigoghos Sarafian. This Paris movement has maintained a strong agenda for the development of a diasporan identity, and on the whole has had little contact with the literati of the Armenian homeland. Even in the diaspora, since they seem primarily interested in theoretical issues, their impact has not been widely felt, despite their much-needed innovative approach.

Nevertheless, despite attempts to strengthen and maintain Armenian intellectual life in Paris and the Middle East, since the end of the Second World War the epicentre of Armenian diasporan life has clearly shifted to the United States. The emergence of a new Arab nationalism, characterised by statism, pan-Arab mass movements and new concepts of citizenship, changed the status of Armenians to one of 'normal' citizenship. No longer were the Armenians a minority treated favourably by a host state, and so they faced restrictive policies, the most extreme of these being the banning of the Armenian media and political parties and prohibition of emigration (Syria), and the nationalisation of foreign-owned businesses (Egypt). Since the formerly powerful French Armenian community had also begun to experience demise (destruction and demoralisation of war, etc), the most logical next place was the United States, which I shall turn to later.

Re-Awakening in the Homeland and a New Era in Diaspora-Homeland Relations

The year 1965 was a turning point in the reimagination of diasporan identity and diaspora-homeland relations, for two reasons. Firstly, it marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide and the emptying into the streets of the capital Erevan of tens of thousands of demonstrators. Secondly, it marked the beginning of the diaspora's move westward, as Armenians in the Middle East began to embark on a mass exodus from the region's trouble spots. In particular, changes in United States immigration laws reopened the United States' immigration floodgates. The result was the gradually increasing influx of Armenian migrants from the Middle East. By the early 1970s, the American-Armenian community had emerged as a new major epicentre of Armenian diasporan life, and by the late 1970s had easily overtaken Lebanon and Paris in this capacity. However, for the moment, I will concentrate my analysis on developments in the diaspora as a whole.

In the homeland, the post-Stalinist era saw the opening up of what Tarrow calls new "opportunity structures" for more public expressions of ethnic nationalism in the Soviet Union. The dual policy of modernisation and renativisation - that is, the strengthening of republican structures and the mobilisation of republican ethnic elites in the service of the state - had the somewhat unanticipated effect of fostering an increasingly aggressive 'unofficial nationalism' which was to ultimately be the downfall of the Soviet Union. The rising educated classes in the republics were confronted with the political limits of Soviet life which did not correlate with their economic gains. The 1960s saw a flurry of new literary works touching on the question of the Turkish Armenian lands. At the same time, a number of appeals were made by prominent Armenian communists for the restoration of these lands to Armenia. The central authorities permitted a kind of 'official nationalism' in which the revolutionary movements of the pre-Soviet period were rehabilitated. In 1963, a demonstration was held by about 200,000 people in Erevan demanding that the government take strong steps to preserve the Armenian language.

The climax of this bold new nationalism was reached on April 24 1965. The government of the Armenian SSR decided, after much deliberation, to hold an official commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, probably as a calculated risk intended to keep check on the growing undercurrent of unofficial nationalism. However, the plan backfired, for as the delegates in the Yerevan State Academic Theatre delivered their solemn speeches, recalling the events of 1915 and condemning the Young Turks for their crimes, a crowd estimated at 100,000 began to gather outside calling for the return of the Turkish Armenian lands. The result was an extensive purge of the communist party of Armenia.

The outburst of 1965 proved to be irreversible. From that point on the leadership of Armenia tried to pursue a policy that walked a fine line between firmness and liberalisation. In his inaugural, speech the newly appointed First Secretary of Armenia called for a battle against unofficial nationalism while at the same time announcing the construction of a monument commemorating the Genocide to be built near Erevan. In the following decades, dozens of other statues and memorials were erected in memory of pre-communist revolutionary heroes, the battles fought by the forces of independent Armenia against Turkey in 1918, and of course the statue of 'Mother Armenia' constructed in 1967.

In 1966, poet Silva Kapoutikian delivered a speech to members of the communist party, which was widely publicised in the diaspora. Kapoutikian boldly argued that the Soviet government had 'sold out' Armenia's territorial interests in return for rapprochement with Turkey. In the same year, the Armenian press picked up on the territorial issue and in particular on the question of Nagorno-Karabagh and Nakhichevan. Both regions had been separated from Armenia through a series of policy decisions in the 1920s which were mainly designed to send friendly messages to Kemalist Turkey. The Bolsheviks had initially promised to restore these lands to the Armenians, but the Moscow treaty of 1921 signed between the Soviet Union and the Kemalist Government conceded Nakhichevan to Turkey, and this was later confirmed by the Treaty of Kars. A few months later Nagorno-Karabagh was handed over to Azerbaijan by internal agreement, again because of Turkish pressure. The Armenian agitators in the 1960s saw the possibility for territorial restoration in the latter case, because that was entirely an internal matter and therefore lay within Moscow's ability to influence. They also feared the possibility that Karabagh could face the same fate of Nakhichevan, that is depopulation. In 1975 an Armenian novelist, S. Khanzatian, wrote a letter to Brezhnev protesting the recent purges of the Party in Karabagh over charges of "nationalist agitation", and called for the return of Karabagh to Armenia.

In 1966 the National Unity Party (NUP) was formed which called for a united and independent Armenia which would ultimately seek "the complete solution of the Armenian question" by incorporating all the 'lost' territories in Azerbaijan and Turkey. The first step, it argued, would be to hold a referendum for secession according to Article 17 of the Soviet Constitution. Needless to say that most of the leaders of the NUP faced arrest. However the NUP did survive well into the 1980s and two of its best known leaders, Silva Kapoutikian and Parouir Hairikian, played prominent roles in the Karabagh Movement of the late 1980s. Several members of the NUP were arrested following the 1977 bombing of the Moscow Metro, in which seven were killed. The success of the NUP reflected a shift in attitude towards Russian sovereignty over Armenia. Traditionally, Armenians had viewed the Russians as having saved them from the unthinkable option of annexation by Turkey. However, the younger generation which had grown up under Soviet (perceived as Russian) rule naturally saw the Russians as oppressors whose help was dispensable. Evidently, even the growing spectre of pan-Turkism did not give them reason to worry about Armenia's vulnerability if it were to become independent.

All of this showed two things. First of all, any "symbolic concessions" made by the central and republican authorities were to no avail, as long as the Soviet policy of rapprochement with Turkey continued at the expense of Armenian interests. Secondly, Libaridian suggests that perhaps the territorial aspirations with regard to Turkey had survived and been revived because many Eastern Armenians could trace their heritage to Western Armenia. Furthermore, there was a large influx of Western Armenians in the late 1940s. Nevertheless, on the whole, the dissident nationalism of this period retained the traditional Armenian Russophilia, though the reversal of this Russian-orientation was beginning to gain momentum as evidenced by the growth of the NUP.

What was the impact of the nationalist renewal in the homeland on its relations with the diaspora? Demirjian, writing in 1969, argued that the leadership of the Armenian SSR, in encouraging immigration and greater 'cultural' contact with the diaspora, was "consciously moving towards a new position with the implicit claim of representing all Armenians throughout the world." An editorial of Sovetakan Hayastan wrote in 1971 that "the fatherland constitutes the chief factor for uniting, assembling and leading [the diaspora] toward a united purpose and activities." At the same time, of particular interest to us is the emergence in Armenia of a new paradigm for understanding the relative roles of the diaspora and homeland. Historian Meliktsetian, a specialist in homeland-diaspora relations, saw the diaspora as a permanent factor of Armenian history, with less emphasis on the theme of 'return', and more on organising the diaspora through its 'progressive' elements.

This shift in thinking had practical consequences for the diaspora. The role of the Committee for Cultural Relations with Armenians Abroad was expanded, and it now began to provide Armenian history, literature and language text books to diasporan schools free of charge. Two new periodicals were launched with the sole purpose of informing diasporan Armenians of developments in the homeland - Haireniki Dzain (1965) and Krounk (1980). The Armenian section of TASS newsagency, Armenpress, was also launched in 1967. A World Congress was held bringing together delegates from Soviet Armenia with 'progressive' delegates from the various diasporan communities. Its stated aim was to work towards the strengthening of cultural relations between the diaspora and the homeland. At the same time, it provided an opportunity for the dissemination of Soviet propaganda, emphasising the idea that the diaspora could not have survived without the Armenian homeland, and the Armenian homeland could not have survived without Mother Russia.

Response from the Diaspora: Unity, New Cleavages and Repoliticisation

The Call to Unity

The outburst of nationalism in the homeland coincided with the Soviet-American rapprochement of the same decade. Combined with the fact that 1965 marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide, that decade was the start of a new bolder era of ethnic mobilisation throughout the diaspora. While strengthening the diaspora's homeland orientation, these events also entrenched the diaspora's sense of permanency, by giving the diasporan institutions a renewed raison d'etre for mobilisation while at the same time facilitating the emergence of alternative discourses and institutions.

On April 24 1965, services in commemoration of the Genocide were conducted throughout the diaspora, in many cases organised by Joint Commemorative Committees incorporating the three political parties, the ARF, ADLP and SDHP. Countless memoranda were published by various groups, coupling the demand for Genocide recognition with the demand for the restoration of the Turkish Armenian lands. Among these was the Memorandum on the Armenian Question published by the Delegation of the Armenian Republic in Paris. This document attempted to present the historical developments regarding the Armenian question, and appealed to the "Great Powers of East and West" to recognise the Armenian Genocide and to bring about the creation of a "free, independent and united Armenia". The Genocide and the territorial question were tied together.

A similar appeal was made in a pamphlet published by the Commemorative Committee which organised the memorial gatherings in Boston. The pamphlet pointed out that:

"April 24 is more than an Armenian day of mourning. The denial of justice is a moral loss affecting all mankind. . . . April 24 is the day the Armenians remind the civilized world that Armenian Rights remain on the agenda of unfinished business."

Such pamphlets were seasonally published from 1965 onwards and in each case a strong appeal was made to the 'civilised instincts' of the Armenians' host countries, particularly the United States. In 1975 a joint memorandum presented to the United Nations called for "the return of Turkish-held Armenian territories to their rightful owner - the Armenian people." Libaridian comments that "the deliberate vagueness of the formula accommodates difference of opinion beyond the crucial idea itself", in other words the differences between Western and Eastern Armenian, and those who held to the idea of a 'Greater Armenia' as opposed to those who abided by the Treaty of Sèvres. By order of the central bodies, local Armenians who had previously refused to speak to each other were now facing each other in joint committees, so that "external pressures are forcing internal organizational and symbolic change".

What is also significant about the 1960s is that due to events in the homeland "the lines of conflict began to blur" between the various opposing blocs in the diaspora. This process had already begun in the early part of the decade with the opening up of Armenia to greater contact with the diaspora through cultural and educational exchanges and the launching of the newspaper Haireniki Dzain (Voice of the Fatherland). The granting of concessions within Armenia, albeit symbolic, also heightened a sense of urgency in the diaspora, with calls for greater unity and the need to rally around the issue of the Genocide and the Turkish lands. With the relaxation of the situation in Armenia, and a growing awareness of the issue of the Genocide, the ARF was willing to soften its anti-Soviet rhetoric and to co-operate with the pro-Soviet Armenia bloc in the diaspora over issues of common interest, namely the Genocide and the Turkish-Armenian lands. On the other side, the Hunchak-Ramgavar bloc began to recognise that there were nationalistic goals beyond what Soviet Armenia had to offer. There was now a common enemy, Turkey, and there emerged what Suny calls a "new discourse around the genocide" involving annual commemorations, increased academic interest, and as already mentioned a political agenda with regard to its recognition.

In this way, the impact of the events in the homeland were greatly felt by the diaspora. The increase in diaspora-homeland interaction revealed the "cultural vitality" of Soviet Armenia and "infused fresh blood into a stagnating and disintegrating Diaspora". It also strengthened the homeland orientation of the diaspora, mobilising its institutions. Apart from events in the homeland, the move towards unity was motivated by the need to confront assimilation. Libaridian points out that the

"vision (however vague) of a territorially integral Armenia . . . establishes an immediate link with the past, through . . . land . . . and it offers a mental framework within which Armenians can continue to perceive themselves as Armenians in foreign lands."

If this is the case, then the assumption seems to be that the diaspora is an entity in its own right, worthy of preservation for its own sake. The homeland as rallying point is helpful in strengthening the diaspora and ensuring its perpetuation, and in this way the diaspora becomes inknanbadag (self-serving).

The move towards unity, albeit slow and in the end temporary, impacted the diaspora in a number of positive ways. In the Lebanese Civil War of the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the three parties were able to agree to a policy of 'positive neutrality', in contrast to the inter-partisan fighting that had taken place in 1958. Two years later, on April 24 1980, the three parties took part in joint commemorations of the Genocide throughout much of the diaspora, though they each carried their respective flags since a common flag could not be agreed on.

With regard to the Church, in October 1979 an historic meeting took place between the two Catholicoi in Echmiadzin. This meeting succeeded in producing a proclamation in which both Catholicoi pledged to undertake positive steps to improve the relations between the two Catholicosates and to work towards the unity of the Church. The main achievement of this meeting was that the Cilician See agreed to delete the clauses in its by-laws whereby it had given itself the power, since 1957, to expand its jurisdiction into Echmiadzin-controlled territory.

However, these attempts at unity were limited and temporary, and fell far beneath the declared intentions of the parties. This, and the apparent inability of the parties to influence any major changes in the attitude of the major powers on the Armenian Question, contributed directly to the development of alternative discourses among diasporan Armenians, in particular that of political violence and also 'non-partisan' and pan-Armenian organisations.

One such attempt was initiated in September 1979, when Evangelical pastor Rev. J. Karnusian convened the First Armenian Congress in Paris. In his book Veradardz Debi Araratian Lernashkharh (Return to the Land of Ararat) published in 1976 and inspired by Simon Simonian of the Lebanese-Armenian journal Spiurk, Karnusian had called for unity among diasporan organisations as the first step towards preventing assimilation and towards achieving a settlement of the Armenian Question. About 3-400 delegates attended the Congress, mainly youth, drawn from almost twenty countries throughout the world. However, despite some initial interest from a number of directions, no Armenian organisation participated on an official level in the proceedings. The parties and churches sent only 'unofficial' delegates. Ultimately, the Congress collapsed. For as long as it existed, though, the Congress was a clear expression of dissent by the non-aligned segments of the diaspora, a statement of protest against the mainstream diasporan polity.

The Challenge to the Parties

In the face of challenges from new organisations and the literature of a new generation, the parties sought to reassert their role in diasporan political life. In the 1960s the ARF boldly proclaimed itself to be the carrier of a renewed mission. In a pamphlet published in 1970 by the ARF in America, in which a glowing assessment was made of the ongoing role of the ARF in Armenian diasporan life, it was stated that the purpose of the ARF was as follows:

"[W]hereas at one time the Federation fought for the objective of Armenian independence with sword and gun, today its battle is being waged through the power of the word, the thrust of truth, the magic of inspiration."

It is easy to see what role the Armenian National Committees (ANC's), as the 'political wing' of the ARF, would be expected to play in this situation: lobby group; public relations arm; and documentation and academic and intellectual refutation of Turkish denialism. Under the auspices of the various ARF Regional Committees, ANC's were set up throughout the diaspora. In the United States, this work was carried out by the American Committee for the Independence of Armenia. At the same time, the Delegation of the Armenian Republic (in Paris) continued to carry out similar on the international front until the early 1970s.

Contrary to the claims of the party literature, however, a strong moral crisis continued to face the traditional institutions, which was exacerbated by new cleavages. First of all, as Suny writes,

". . . the increasingly archaic concerns of the old leaders found less and less resonance among the younger people. Conflict over the support or rejection of the one Armenian 'state' that existed reduced the focus on other Armenian issues, most importantly the question of western Armenia. The Dashnaks, allied as they were in the cold war with the anti-Soviet policies of the United States, were limited in their ability to criticize America's Turkish ally. . . . As a result younger Armenians either moved out of Armenian life into the dominant cultures or in extreme cases, as in the Middle East, demonstrated their rejection of the old politics with a new, violent commitment to the Armenian cause through terrorism."

Libaridian also writes that

"this nationali