CHAPTER 1:
THE IMAGINATION AND REIMAGINATION OF THE MODERN NATION

[index]  [chapter 2]

The Nation: Imagined and Reimagined

Few words in modern times carry as much significance as the term 'nationalism' and its related concepts the 'nation', 'state', 'nation-state' and 'ethnicity'. Yet, as scholars have pointed out, these are perhaps some of the most ill-defined, misunderstood and even misused words in modern academic literature.

Walker Connor seeks to address this definitional confusion. In particular, he distinguishes the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism' from other words with which they are so often confused, such as the 'state', 'nation-state', and 'ethnicity'. However, in striving to arrive at a precise definition of what nation and nationalism are (and are not), Connor runs into a number of problems. Most significantly, by so diligently tracing the word 'nation' to its original usage to describe kinship, breed, or race, Connor is, in effect, limiting the possibility of understanding the historical evolution of the term. His attitude to language is essentially a fundamentalist one, and does not adequately take into account the ongoing process of linguistic reformulation.

The lesson to be learnt from Connor is that, as much as it may be helpful to arrive at an accurate definition of terms, it is also important - indeed more important - to first establish a realistic expectation of what kind of definition can be achieved. After all, 'arriving at' a timeless definition is a tenuous task at best, and at worst it can limit the possibilities of scholarship. The reason for this is simple: words not only represent an existing reality, but are also used to create reality. As Der Derian explains:

". . . language is not the tool of some external thought or purpose . . . but the very space in which the will to power and truth confronts the empire of circumstance, imagined dialogues take on powerful monologues of the past, and the play of difference challenges the permanent war of essential identities."

In examining nationalism, two realities need to be taken into account. Firstly, there is the interplay of the language (the signifier) and reality (the thing signified), which shape and are shaped by one another. Thus the creation of meaning is not a one-way process. Secondly, the understanding of words as representing rigid categories in contrast to one another - what Der Derian calls "a closed structure of binary oppositions", for example, the 'ingroup' versus 'outgroup', democracy versus tyranny, nation versus state - limits the possibility of alternative discourses. More significantly, the setting up of such binarisms ignores the fact that terms are constantly redefined by groups for the purpose of subduing, excluding or competing with another group. Thus as soon as the category represented by one of these terms changes, the other category is also automatically redefined. In some instances, this process can lead to categories actually swapping positions with one other.

This leads to a discussion of the central definitional concept of this thesis. In the case of the nation, the fluidity of categories can be explained in terms of the process of imagination and its derivative, reimagination. The terms imagination and reimagination, taken from Benedict Anderson's book Imagined Communities, provide a cornerstone for any complete understanding of the nation. They describe perfectly the process of reformulation, redefinition and adaptation that an ideology such as nationalism experiences throughout the course of its history.

The nation is imagined, Anderson argues, because the community defined by 'nationhood' necessarily extends beyond the normal world of face-to-face contact between individuals. Thus to conceive of any community on such a large scale involves either the creation or awakening of a new kind of consciousness. As a result, the creation and maintenance of 'national' consciousness involves the transcendence of social inequalities and non-ethnic cleavages within the society.

By 'imagination', however, Anderson does not mean that the nation is a total fabrication of modern ideology. Rather, he is referring to the adaptation of pre-modern forms of ethnic expression to the exigencies of modern life. However Anderson does not provide a clear exposition of what this means. Furthermore, he seems to attribute the phenomenon of nationality-formation primarily to a modern process, placing strong emphasis on economic and technological factors. By paying minimal attention to territory, language, religion and other 'ethnic' factors, scholars such as Anderson do not fully grasp the historical continuities that underlie the modern phenomena of nationalism and the nation.

Despite the limitations of Anderson's thesis, it provides us with a useful framework for understanding the fluidity of terms such as nation, ethnic group, diaspora and homeland. The notion of 'reimagination' is particularly helpful in this regard, because it indicates that the process of imagination did not end with the birth of the modern nation. Rather, as Anthony Smith points out, the formation of nations is by definition an ongoing process, "a recurrent activity, which has to be renewed periodically. . .". As such, it "involves ceaseless re-interpretations, rediscoveries and reconstructions". Communities, writes Smith, are like nature subject to the "laws of birth, growth, maturation and decline - and rebirth". Reimagination describes how ethnic identifiers are being continually reappropriated and re-fashioned by different segments of the nation to suit the political and socio-cultural milieu of the moment. Furthermore, it carries the possibility of ongoing re-formulation in the future:

"[t]he prefix 're' expresses both an understanding that the current concept of the nation was constructed in the past, and the hope that it may be changed in the future . . . The suffix 'ing' suggests that remaining is a continuous process".

All of this makes it more difficult to justify a hard-and-fast, timeless definition of nationalism. In the words of Shafer:

"As [nationalism] changes so must scholarly descriptions of it. Tidy formulas do not fit a sentiment which is itself in the process of becoming."

Understanding the process of reimagination makes easier the task of analysing the changing and yet consistent nature of nationalism.

Reimagination, however, tends to operate within certain limits. This is because the processes of imagination and reimagination generally draw upon pre-existent ethnic materiel which sets the boundary for nation-building. Consequently, as Smith writes, reimagination occurs "within definite emotional and intellectual confines . . . within a limited matrix". Ethnie - a term used by Smith to describe pre-modern ethnic-based communities - are "clearly yet flexibly demarcated; their boundaries persist yet change their meanings and even their forms to suit changed circumstances". Thus various aspects of the national identity, including even its physical boundaries, may change, without necessarily challenging "a nation's core heritage" nor, indeed, constituting an erosion of that identity or the structures that support it.

Therefore, although there may take place certain changes in the form of nationalism, this does not necessarily imply the radical alteration of its ethnic essence. Rather, as Smith puts it, "it is possible to see these changes as a revolution in the means of communication and association rather than in their ends". Smith concludes that:

"So far, then, modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of ethnie associated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human association. Even in the realms of 'new imaginings' and new thoughts, there is less novelty than one might expect. . . . [Thus] nationalism simply makes a fetish of the unique culture and does more effectively what pre-modern ethnicists tried to do, that is, keep out foreigners and diffuse to their kinsmen the traditions and myths of their ancestors, using the modern mass education system."

Chaliand agrees:

"From the ethnic community to the nation there is then not necessarily a change of community, but there is a change of project. There is a movement from the order of tradition to a future-oriented modern political enterprise."

Smith's contribution to the understanding of reimagination is of immense value, because he highlights the ongoing possibilities of change in the form, whilst at the same time maintaining the essence, of the nation. A nation's "core heritage" is generally retained in one form or another, even if in symbolic form, as will be discussed later. Yet the form this heritage takes is subject to constant re-formulation.

Fox's contribution to this subject is also helpful. He describes ethnic culture as "a set of understandings and a consciousness under active construction by which individuals interpret the world around them." He uses another metaphor, that of culture as "a tool kit or set of scenarios that individuals use to implement or to stage their daily life." He summarises this process as one of "cultural production", which, he argues, "is a continual activity, coincident with ongoing social life itself. . . ."

Reimagination, then, describes the fact that the characteristics that are used to distinguish one group from another shift over time. As Doty explains:

"Identity . . . must be continually constructed through practices which suppress differences and inconsistencies. It is not just the case that identities are relational and dependent upon collective understandings; identity itself is contingent and exists only by virtue of strategies which expel the surplus meanings that would expose the failure of identity."

Chaliand writes that "[i]dentity is not a sign but a practice". Yet, understood from this perspective, the whole argument about the fluidity of boundaries can be taken a step further. Not only do words undergo change, but they are also inherently subject to redefinition. This is because the very concepts they represent are subject to continual reimagination and because, as has been pointed out, words over time both reflect and contribute to this shift. Thus the boundaries that define them are never firmly fixed, but are in a constant state of flux, subject to ongoing reconstruction, a "dynamic process" of reimagination.

An understanding of the fluidity of boundaries is crucial to understanding why the most useful definition of the nation is one which focuses on the imagination and reimagination of the boundaries within which communal consciousness is permitted to operate. At the same time, this understanding further highlights the complexities involved in attempting to produce a timeless definition of nationalism. If such a task is at all possible, it would need to incorporate the notion of reimagination as an in-built dynamic of nationalism. Such an understanding is best understood in the context of an historical overview of the process of nationality-formation. To quote Eugene Kamenka: "Definitions, if they are useful at all, come at the end of an inquiry and not at the beginning." This is the approach taken in this thesis, and it is the process of formulating an historically-placed definition of the nation and related concepts to which I now turn.

The purpose of the next two sections is to trace the historical origins and evolution of modern nationalism and the notion of national territory, and to understand this process in the light of the imagination and reimagination of the nation, with special reference to Armenia. The first section will deal with the primordial roots of nationalism, namely the existence of pre-modern forms of ethnie, and the tendency for groups of people to manifest some kind of attachment to the land. Ethnic identity is not a new phenomenon, but has existed throughout history, albeit in a form different to that which is seen today. Thus nationalism, however modern its form, is rooted in pre-modern identities. The second section will examine the evolution of the modern form of the nation, and the central role of territory in its formation. An understanding of the origins of modern nationalism, and of the evolution of the notion of the homeland, will help our understanding of the reimagination of these ideas, as well as their persistence. Examples from the Armenian case will be used throughout the remainder of this chapter.

Nationalism as Modern Ethnic Identity

Identity is that which distinguishes one person or group from another. On the one hand, this distinction may be based on objective attributes such as geography, language, religion, race and so on. On the other hand, it can also be seen as subjective, in that the specific traits that are used to distinguish one group from another tend to change over time and space. For example, if a group establishes contact with another group of the same religion, it may begin to emphasise language or race as primary ethnic traits to ensure ongoing distinction between the two groups. The shift in the definition of the boundary involves a change in people's awareness, or consciousness, of their identity and of what that identity entails. To take the point even further, it is appropriate to quote Doty again:

"Rather than depending upon some notion of foundational categories of identity or some inner psychological self, identity is reconceptualised as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being 'written' or constructed. Identity and difference are not mutually exclusive."

Thus the dynamic of reimagination is in-built in the notion of identity. This co-existence of identity and difference ensures the flexibility of that identity, gives it a greater ability to persist over time and space.

Not only do the attributes that identify a particular group change over time, but, more significantly, the types of attributes that are used to distinguish one group from another also change from epoch to epoch. In other words, throughout history, there have existed numerous forms of communal identity, variously based on family, tribe, city-state, theocracy, dynastic empire or kingdom, republic, ecclesiastical community or parish, political or historical commonality, language, and so forth. In fact, "[t]he process of history", writes Kohn, "can be analysed as a succession of changes in communal psychology, in the attitude of man (sic) toward all manifestations of individual and social life".

What is common to most of these pre-modern forms of identity is a sense of belonging to a community. In many cases, too, there is an affinity with a common land or communal 'space' - something that is characteristic of both pre-modern and modern forms of identity. However, it appears that in pre-modern times there was little or no systematic link-up between local districts and provinces on the basis of similar culture, language, religion, or historical experience. Instead, loyalties tended to be particularistic, and any trans-parochial linkage that did exist was usually brought about through dynastic interests. Even in the Jewish case, where a sense of national cohesiveness and common history was strong, the nation was invested in a sovereign power, Jehovah-God, who only reluctantly gave in to the peoples' request for a human king.

Thus, in pre-modern times there did exist a variety of basic forms of territorial, linguistic, cultural or purely political identity which provided the building material for the formation of modern nations. For the purposes of this thesis, the term ethnie will be used to describe these pre-modern forms. Certainly the pre-modern forms did not have the necessary "intense and active devotion to the national group and to the nation-state that [they] can rightly be called nationalism in the fullest modern sense". It has been shown, also, that the contrast with the modern phenomenon of nationalism is evident not only in intensity, but in scale as well.

Nevertheless, modern nationalism is not a total invention. Rather, it typically entails a reformulation of pre-modern forms of identity, both ethnic and non-ethnic. The historical continuities between pre-modern and modern forms of (ethnic) identity are given an excellent treatment in the works of Anthony Smith, who has gone to great lengths to show that the phenomenon of ethnicity is not restricted to modern times. This is not to say that Smith does not recognise, as modernists do, that modern nationalism is a unique manifestation of the ethnic phenomenon, created by intellectuals, politicians and bureaucrats:

"Nationalism, as a doctrine and ideological movement, did arise in the modern era, in the eighteenth century, to be more precise. 'Nation-states' are, largely, modern phenomena. Similarly, nations as territorially bounded, even impermeable, communities, are recent developments, consequent on the increasingly effective operations of the modern 'rational' state."

However, whereas modernists view nationalism as primarily a result of modernity, Smith argues that the modern nation has its roots in ethnic communities which pre-date modernity. In pre-modern times, he points out, various communities or ethnie manifested a degree of awareness of their ethnic distinctiveness, some more than others. This is not to say that ethnicity itself is necessarily a primordial instinct, but simply that it pre-dates modern nationalism. Smith describes these ethnie as exhibiting a number of features, including:

" 1. symbolic, cognitive and normative elements common to a unit of population;
2. practices and mores that bind them together over generations; and
3. sentiments and attitudes that are held in common and which differentiate them from other populations."

Taking the example that is relevant to this thesis, Armenia could certainly be considered an ethnie by about the early fourth century. By that time, the Armenians had developed or adopted a unique religion, Apostolic Monophysite Christianity, which distinguished them from their pre-Christian, and later Muslim, neighbours. The invention of an Armenian alphabet at the turn of the fifth century further distinguished the Armenians from their neighbours, and gave rise to a literary 'Golden Age' which, however, was cut short by invasions. Throughout the extended periods of foreign occupation that followed, it was these two institutions - the language and the church - that continued to keep the Armenians separate from other ethnie.

Smith's argument that nationalism finds its root in the ethnie is premised around two assumptions. Firstly, he places great emphasis on the distinction between "ethnic community and nation, and ethnic identity and nationalism" - in other words, between the cultural and political manifestations of ethnie. Cultural nationalism, he points out, is rooted in ethnie which have their basis in pre-modern communities and identities. Political nationalism, on the other hand, is a modern, highly politicised, intentional form of ethnie. Of course, this is not to imply that ethnic identity was not at all politicised in pre-modern times, but rather that modern nationalism is characterised by a high degree of politicisation and an unprecedented cohesion of ideological expression.

This distinction leads us to the second emphasis of Smith's thesis, that is, his arguments concerning the durability of ethnie, despite the changing form of its political and social expression. He writes that factors of modernity have:

"not obliterated or rendered obsolete many of the cultures and identities formed in pre-modern eras. They have certainly transformed many of them; others they have destroyed, yet others, amalgamated and revived."

Smith is essentially presenting a synthesis - it seems a sensible one - between the two extremes of primordialism and modernism. It appears that he is able to do this because he accepts both the political and cultural aspects of nationalism, without setting up (at least not consciously) an either/or binarism. While accepting that the nation is not simply "a 'primordial' and natural unit of human association outside time", he also argues that to consider nationalism purely as "the nervous tic of capitalism", as a wholly modern phenomenon, is equally incorrect, because this approach "mistakes form for content". By thus accepting both aspects of nationalism as being legitimate, Smith is able to set up a scale of typologies of nationalism, ranging from predominantly 'cultural' nationalisms, which carry a strong sense of ethnic heritage, to 'political' nationalisms, whose national consciousness relies on a high degree of imagination. Smith's attempt at a synthesis is best revealed in his definition of the nation, which incorporates both political and ethnic components:

"The nation then becomes a named human population sharing a myth of common descent, historical memories and mass culture, and possessing a demarcated territory, common economy and common legal rights and duties."

From Smith's perspective, then, it is important to recognise that modern nationalism finds its roots in pre-modern ethnicity. After all, Smith argues, modern nationalism and the nation-state would have nothing on which to model themselves if there did not pre-exist any form of ethnie. Nations cannot survive unless they are built on an "ethnic core". If they do not possess such a foundation, they are forced to "re-invent" one.

For Smith, the fact that, to survive in the modern world, nations require some kind of ethno-cultural justification, is in itself evidence of the ethnic origins of nations. Why was not some other form of identity chosen as the primary categorisation of human society in the modern world? Why the tendency to resort to nationalistic loyalties over and above other ideological demands? The answer is that "[i]f there was no model of past ethnicity and no pre-existent ethnie, there could be neither nations nor nationalism. There would only be states and etatisme imposed from above, a very different phenomenon." Even Hobsbawm, a scholar of the modernist school, concedes with some reservation that

"proto-nationalism, where it existed, made the task of nationalism easier, however great the differences between the two, insofar as existing symbols and sentiments of proto-national communities could be mobilized for a modern cause or a modern state. But this is far from saying that the two are the same, or even that one must logically or inevitably lead into the other . . . a proto-national base may be desirable, perhaps even essential, for the formation of serious state-aspiring national movements - though in itself not sufficient to create them."

Thus nationalism must be understood in the context of the historical continuity afforded to it by pre-modern ethnicity. The fact that in modern times nationalism and not some other form of 'ism' has emerged as the primary focus of human loyalties is explained by the ethnic origins of nations. What, then, distinguishes modern nationalism, "as a political ideology, as an 'ism'" from previous manifestations of ethnic identity or consciousness is its form, scale, intensity and intentionality. Modern nationalism is a highly pervasive, indeed universal political ideal. It has become an "all-pervading" ideology, the object of "supreme loyalty" for the bulk of humanity.

This brings the discussion to a synthesis of the primordial and modernist views. On the one hand, the specific form of modern nationalism is politically necessitated and a product of historical conditions, and, on the other, that modern nationalism is simply a variation of a powerful ethnic and communal essence that preceded it. Thus to speak of the nation as 'imagined' does not imply the creation of something out of nothing. Rather, nationalism involves the marriage of real (objective) and imagined (subjective) identifiers. The aspect of fabrication, or imagination, comes in the way in which these identifiers are mythologised and synthesised for political purposes.

By recognising the form-essence interplay, and by viewing reimagination as an ongoing process, the discussion is freed from the either/or bounds of the scholarly debate. It becomes easier to understand that the modern nation is not so much distinguished from pre-modern ethnie by its ethnic essence, so much as by its unique form and place in modern political, social and economic life. With this in mind, it now becomes possible to discuss the specific circumstantial factors contributing to the emergence of nationalism (the modernist focus), without confusing this with the issue of the ethnic origins of nations (the primordialist focus). The modernists' observations regarding the political forms and structures of modern nationalism are indeed best understood within the framework of the ethnic origins of nations.

Imagining the Nation: Mythology, Technology and Communication

"Nationalities as 'ethnographic material', as 'pragmatic' and accidental factors in history, existed for a very long time; but only through the awakening of national consciousness have they become volitional and 'absolute' factors in history . . . in modern times it has been the power of an idea, not the call of blood, that has constituted and molded nationalities."

The fact that the modern world has often been called the 'age of nationalism' implies that there is something distinct about the manifestation of national identity in this age compared to others. Modern nationalism is an ideology, a conscious act, creating a new, highly politicised form of ethnie. Most scholars, from both the primordialist and modernist schools (and everything in between), agree that what ultimately distinguishes modern nationalism from any previous manifestations of (ethnic) identity is the depth of consciousness of being a nation. Here, consciousness is used to mean the 'sense', or inward sensibility, of being a nation - that is, the subjective component of nationalism. Putting aside the question of the ethnic origins of nations, there is a general consensus that the feeling of nationalism can be described as "first and foremost a state of mind, an act of consciousness, which since the French Revolution has become more and more common to mankind (sic)." In a similar vein, Mayall calls nationalism "a product of a specifically historical consciousness". Hertz argues that in the act of nation-building, "[t]he fundamental issue is that of national consciousness." Hobsbawm introduces his work by stating that: "As an initial working assumption any sufficiently large body of people whose members regard themselves as members of a 'nation', will be treated as such." Seton-Watson writes that "a nation exists when an active and fairly numerous section of its members are convinced that it exists. Thus, not external objective characteristics, but subjective conviction is the decisive factor." Although scholars such as Seton-Watson may tend to overstate their case, often to the exclusion of ethnic factors, the central role of consciousness in the process of nationality-formation should not be underestimated.

This emphasis on consciousness helps us see nationalism as a political movement par excellence, providing ethnicity with a greater significance, purpose and intensity of conviction than in pre-modern times. Connor summarises this notion well when he writes:

"[A] nation is a self-aware ethnic group. An ethnic group may be readily discerned by an anthropologist or other outside observer, but until the members are themselves aware of the group's uniqueness, it is merely an ethnic group and not a nation. While an ethnic group may, therefore, be other-defined, the nation must be self-defined."

In the next two sections, I will discuss in greater detail two distinguishing characteristics of modern nationalism that have already been touched on: ideological intentionality and the role of the national mythology; and the dissemination of this ideology via the vernacular and modern technology and its transformation into a hegemonic force. The third feature, and the one that is the most central to this thesis, is the universalisation of the nation, in particular as this relates to the importance of territory and the nation-state. This will be discussed later.

Nationalist Mythology

Modern nationalism is characterised first of all by a strong sense of intentionality. Using various ethnic criteria as their starting point, nationalists seek to arrive at a systematic or standard national identity or national myth, for the purpose of the generation and maintenance of a national consciousness. By 'myth' is meant a strongly held belief which may or may not be based on truth, or partially based on truth. Shafer provides the following useful definition:

"[A]n ill-founded belief held uncritically by a people (or an individual) to explain what otherwise is or seems to be inexplicable or unclear. Psychologically a myth can be wish fulfilment (Freud), an expression of an unconscious dream of a people (Jung), or, more simply, an invented, irrational story to explain what is mysterious in order to provide assurance. . . . [Myths] are generally regarded as partly or completely false and therefore lacking in reality."

The problem with this definition, however, lies in the dismissal of myths as "invented" and "lacking in reality". A more accurate perspective would be to argue that myths, like the nation, have their basis in reality, although in their politicised form they often become far removed from that reality. The longings, character traits and values alluded to in the nationalist mythology may indeed be representative of the longings, traits, and values of the bulk of the nation, but the fact that they are neatly packaged and laced with political rhetoric distorts their true meaning. Thus mythology, in the language of this thesis, is the outcome of the reimagination of a pre-existent reality or set of realities for political purposes. A myth is therefore a mixture of truth and untruth, and "no clear line separates selection from artificial construction". To quote Shafer further: "The fact is that myth and actuality and truth and error are inextricably intermixed in modern nationalism."

There is yet another aspect of the national myth that must also be considered. It is the understanding that myths not only describe a (perceived) reality, but that they also determine reality by providing aspirations that have the power to shape the political and social agenda and behaviour of a group. Thus perceptions and beliefs, however elusive or unfounded, do affect peoples' behaviour. As Shafer writes, there is no doubt that when "people believe [myths] their belief has reality, or that people act, or even base their lives, upon them, especially in times of crisis." In this way, myths become "not true but real".

Perhaps it would be more accurate, then, to emphasise the fact that whereas myths claim to be universal and timeless, reality is usually time-and-place specific. Therefore, any claims that the 'eternal truths' concerning the nation can be enshrined in any one national mythology should be taken with a grain of salt. In any case, even the myths themselves are never as timeless as they are made out to be, since the national mythology is constantly reimagined to suit the political purposes of this or that elite group. Every act of reimagination involves the selection of certain strands of the ethnic heritage to the exclusion of others. Zubaida's description of the process of myth-making is reminiscent of Doty's reference to the "suppression of differences and inconsistencies":

"[A]n assertion of ethnic homogeneity becomes an arbitrary definition. All we can say is that common elements of identity were available, at least at the centre, co-existing with a multitude of divisive identities. Which ones are adopted and by whom and under what conditions are open questions."

Interestingly, Haas rightly points out that the very fact that there is a need to find a unifying ideology is evidence that the nationalists within a particular nation find it difficult to agree on the common symbols and distinguishing characteristics of their nation. The task of the nationalist, then, is to find those things in the nation's heritage that will provide an acceptable point of unity for the nation at a particular point in time. These may be as simple as a pre-modern political, territorial or linguistic unit, or the memory of a common historical event, or even a deliberate act of nationality-formation undertaken by the nation's elite, such as a war of independence or unification. In fact, the most common mythologies are those of a 'Golden Age' in the distant past which often provide a vision for the future 'perfect' society; the claim to a homeland which is purported to have been the exclusive property the nation since time immemorial; and a shared destiny based on a history of common events or of a common cultural, racial, economic, social or political heritage.

Thus, in the process of its emergence as a major ideological force, nationalism selectively synthesised various aspects of primitive parochial and trans-parochial identities into what became the nation, providing a coherence, continuity, tangibility and sanctity which would not otherwise have been evident. As a deliberate act of political will, nationalism transformed ethnic entities, wherever they had previously existed, from "pragmatic and accidental factors in history" to "volitional and absolute factors". In the case of nations where national identity was close to non-existent, nationalism constructed a politically viable identity on which to execute its nation-building program. As a result of this process, "nation-ness", writes Anderson, became "virtually inseparable from political consciousness".

This, then, is the process whereby nationalism as an ideology became a comprehensive and hegemonic political agenda. The very strength of the myth-making process is that, through the process of constant reimagination, the nation is ensured an ongoing central place in human affairs. This is the double strength of nationalism: from the primordial angle, its origins are rooted in ethnicity; and, from the instrumentalist angle, it is politically useful.

The present discussion has shed additional light on the question that was posed earlier in this chapter: "why nationalism, and not some other form of identity?". It was previously concluded that an understanding of the ethnic origins of nations goes some way in providing an answer to this question. Furthermore, nationalism has met certain individual and communal needs for identity, belonging and significance. A third factor can now be added: at a crucial juncture of historical events, it seems that national identity was deemed politically useful, being viewed as an appropriate means of solving ideological issues specifically arising out of modernity.

Technology and Communication

The second characteristic that distinguishes the modern world from the pre-modern era is the apparent pervasiveness of nationalism on a structural-institutional level, which has been achieved primarily through the appropriation of the modern means of technology, in particular communication technology:

"The 'national question', as the old Marxists called it, is situated at the point of intersection of politics, technology and social transformation. Nations exist . . . in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development."

One of the key defining features of modernity is its concern with the rationalisation or systematisation of the whole of life. Haas' defines rationalisation as:

". . . an effort to impose coherence on societies undergoing modernisation . . . Rationalisation means integrating diverse ways of perceiving into a single social vision and to make that vision coherent with a set of institutions."

Historically, the first step towards rationalisation on an institutional level was the process of the administrative centralisation of the state that accompanied modernisation. "[A]dministrative organisations create meaning", writes Anderson. In other words, people find themselves doing the same things, referring to a central city, living under an increasingly standardised system, and even having a common enemy. Although initially this rationalisation may not necessarily have been motivated by nationalist zeal, it laid the groundwork for the later formation of the (nation-)state.

The juncture of administrative centralisation and modern technology induced what Haas calls the "five 'crises'" which, he argues, rationalisation aims to solve: the search for identity; political legitimacy; popular participation and legitimation; equal distribution; and "penetration" or hegemonisation. Nationalism represents the most successful attempt so far at providing a solution. It has done so by making use of several tools at its disposal, which have been granted to it by modernity: the growth of communication technology; the process of democratisation or social mobilisation, and the notion of popular sovereignty; and the appropriation of the vernacular language.

The advent of modern technology made possible the large-scale movement of peoples, the broadening of the possibilities of education, and the creation of tighter and increasingly hegemonic political entities, climaxing in the universalisation of the ideal of the nation-state. In particular, through the rapid development of communication and transport technologies, the advent of modernity not only allowed, but also compelled, humanity to transcend its previously held parochial identities. Karl Deutsch, in his classic work Nationalism and Social Communication, argues that the key element which differentiates modern nationalism from any previous manifestation of ethnie is its strong dependence on communication technology. In particular, Deutsch points to the ease with which an ideology such as nationalism can be disseminated, and the efficiency with which a 'national will' can be shaped. The rapid growth of the means of communication ultimately "gave the feeling of nationality a permanent intensity which soon made it appear as the expression of something 'natural'". This made it easier for both states and minority nationalist movements to create a systematic mythology of 'the nation' and to streamline the whole or part of a society in conformity with this mythology.

The crux of Deutsch's argument is that the concerns and interests of a disaffected minority - in most cases the bourgeoisie - easily take on a 'national' character as they are disseminated via public education, various forms of the media, and mass democracy. This is how the nationalistic aspirations of the elite have been popularised across all socio-economic classes and interests, thus creating at least the semblance of a mass-based, democratic nationalism. In this way, nationalism becomes "a living and active corporate will" in which the elite co-opts mass support, particularly in moments of crisis. This creation of a 'national will' involves "the ability to inhibit, partially or wholly, any further learning". It is the "closing of the 'national mind'", and "the ability to freeze the setting of the goal, and even the course chosen towards it, once the decision has hardened." This, argues Deutsch, is made possible by

"the gradual manipulation of the decision system of the community; the tacit premises established by endlessly repeated statements, or, more effectively, by endlessly repeated indirect suggestion; the stereotyped images of other peoples or ideas; the frozen policies and policy objectives, the provinces, territories, or borders made too sacred for reexamination - the building up of whole systems of goals, fears, and beliefs, and finally of actions, beyond the point of no return."

Particularly in the twentieth century, states have been able to use various communication media, such as the printing press, radio and television, to disseminate the nationalist mythology more rapidly and widely, especially during times of emergency. In particular, the invention of the printing press meant that medieval forms of imagining, such as art and music, were surpassed by the novel and the newspaper, which helped re-represent the imagined community and to give the impression of "a solid community moving down (or up) history". Novels helped to standardise and enshrine the past in the form of print, and newspapers were also significant in that they helped to "conjure up a social space full of comparable persons", thus creating "unified fields of exchange and communications". In this way, it has become possible to collate an often unrelated and scattered set of experiences across society and to give them a common theme. The printing press also helped to synthesise the national experience through time by connecting the past with the present, and the experiences of one sector of the population with those of another, in the process creating historical continuities and commonalities where these did not necessarily exist. "The very conception of the newspaper," writes Anderson, "implies the refraction of 'world events' into a specified imagined world of vernacular readers", and the projection of "an idea of steady, solid simultaneity through time."

The growth of communication technology also increases the possibilities of the opposite to democracy, totalitarianism, as was evidenced between the two World Wars in the case of both fascism and Soviet communism. These systems canonised the concepts of nation, state and enemy in the form of a total-life philosophy, by taking full advantage of all the instruments of modernity at their disposal - the thorough use of modern technology; reliance on mass support; and the use of mass education and other, often violent, "political methods and techniques". More than ever before, the state and its concomitant ideology became the "religion" and "church", attended by "plenty of ritual, sermons and fanaticism . . . banners and rituals and slogans".

Deutsch's focus on social communications helps further identify the process of the imagination of community. It is helpful in explaining the ease with which nation-states have consolidated their legitimacy and with which nationalism has been disseminated. However, increased communication is not in itself sufficient for the creation of a national community. Thus, communications theory is only useful for explaining the conditions in which nationalism is made possible; it does not explain why nationalism has, with very few exceptions, won out over other forms of political expression, such as liberalism or Marxism or even religion.

Territory, Homeland and the Nation-State

In attempting to understand how nationalism has become so central to modern political life, I will now turn to the third feature of modern nationalism, namely the canonisation and universalisation of nationalism in the form of the nation-state, and the role of territory in the reimagination of the nation. Before proceeding any further, however, it is necessary to clarify precisely what is and what is not meant by the 'nation-state'. The nation-state is not the same as the state, since the state refers simply to a political unit which may attribute its legitimacy to a variety of ideological bases, ethnic or otherwise. Nor is it the same as the nation, since nationalism is technically loyalty, not to the state, but to the nation. Rather, the term nation-state is the description of an ideal type, an aspiration to possess a sovereign territory of one's own. In other words, the nation-state is the pinnacle of the nationalist achievement, because it is here that nation and state are combined. As Gellner writes:

"Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and national unit should be congruent. . . . In brief, nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones."

In the light of this definition, the name 'United Nations' is somewhat of a misnomer, as are the phrases 'a world of nation-states' and 'international relations', since only a small portion of modern states could qualify as nation-states in the strictest sense of the word. In fact, according to a survey of 132 countries conducted by Connor, in 53 percent of states the largest ethnic element accounts for less than 74 percent of the population. Connor argues that only 9.1 percent of these states "can justifiably be described as nation-states".

The modern notion of national sovereignty as territorially determined, manifested as it is in the ideal of the nation-state, "expresses an historically specific articulation between universality and particularity in space and time". In other words, it delineates 'us' and 'them' in a way that is specific to the present historical epoch - it is a tidy, rational, and closed-set boundary delimiting the 'national' political space, what Smith refers to as the ideal of the "compact nation". As Minogue writes, modern nationalists propagate

". . . a conception of the nation as a solid lump of territory, inhabited by a homogenous people, and visualised as a circle. The frontiers are the circumference of this circle, and the capital should be its centre, for in this way is minimised the distance between the capital and any of the provinces."

This conception of the territorial space, argues Smith, is different to the pre-modern understanding of territory. "Pre-nationalist outlooks tend to treat territory as 'land' to be worked and settled. Nationalists go much further, viewing territory as material for a political construct . . ." The loyalty to territory invoked by nationalist ideology stretches peoples' allegiances beyond the familiar proximity or parish to a larger, more impersonal territorial space. Certainly it may be 'natural' for a human being to feel loyalty to his or her village, town or region, but it is harder to argue that it is in the same way 'natural' to feel the same loyalty for a greater homeland.

The modern concept of the homeland offers a boundary within which people can experience "visions of safety, enclosure, special and particular ties." It provides a neatly defined space, easily defensible, and within which cultural sites can be created and maintained for the inspiration of future generations. Furthermore, this national space allows for the greater pursuit of economic self-sufficiency. At the base of it all, the national territory provides "freedom from external interference" and a "sense of social recognition" within the international community.

In the context of the hegemonic place of the ideal of the nation-state in international politics, the concept of the 'national' homeland has come to play a crucial role in the nationalists' myth-making process, because it offers an opportunity for sacrifice to something bigger. Wars are often fought in the name of 'defending the soil', as though the land itself has 'called' its 'children' to sacrifice their lives for its preservation. A good example of this can be found in the national anthem of both the first and current republics of Armenia:

"Our Fatherland, miserable, abandoned,
Trampled underfoot by our enemies.
It calls upon its sons
To carry out vengeance on its behalf . . .".

The use of hyperbole is a common tool in the nationalist literature, as seen here in the use of the pronoun "she" to describe the homeland. Another common form of personification is the reference to the homeland as the 'Motherland', 'Fatherland', or in the Armenian case, the 'Mother Fatherland'. Other images of protection, nurture and sustenance are frequently used, with the land being viewed as a source of both "comfort and awe". At the same time, the infusion of man-made monuments into the landscape implies that these monuments are part of the territory and inseparable from it, as are 'its' people. Both the monuments and the natural scenery provide a "continuity with an 'unchanging' past that can be 'rediscovered' beneath the centuries of change". Indeed, the homeland and 'its' people are often so closely associated that the homeland becomes something which, in times of exile, "we carry in our hearts". The homeland is often viewed as "the body of the national organism and the language as its soul". Therefore, to have the homeland taken away, or even to have it reduced, can be compared to ripping a human body, or part thereof, away from a person.

The myth of the homeland is central to the creation and perpetuation of the national mythology also because of its strong nostalgic power. A nation's language may have changed, as may its political system, religion and other cultural identifiers, but the territory is more often than not considered the 'property' of the ethnic community dating back to time immemorial. It is more than a piece of property, though, since it is the eternal resting place of the ancestors, and the soil of the homeland is mixed with the blood of the martyrs, so that nation and territory are seen to be in some kind of mystical union with one another. The nineteenth century German Romantics were the first to popularise this view. Its influence spread to other emerging nations through a generation of scholars who were educated in Berlin, many of whom came from Armenia and other parts of the Russian and Ottoman Empires. For many emerging nations in particular, the longing for the homeland provided a sense of continuity with the past that would not otherwise have been attainable in the absence of an independent homeland.

I return, now, to the question of how the nation-state (as both an ideal and a reality), and its companion nationalism, came to take their place at the centre of modern political life, over and above other forms of political expression. Quite apart from the question of the ethnic origins of nations, it is important to understand the role of territory in both defining the modern state and in shaping the myths of nationalism. Historically speaking, the rise of nationalism coincided with the erosion of dynastic empires in Europe at the end of the Middle Ages and the subsequent reorganisation of these empires along centralist administrative lines. Through this process, nation-states were gradually transformed into the highest form of political organisation, the main source of economic well-being, and the focus of supreme loyalty. Modern means of social communication, operating as they did within the bounds of the nation-state, by default gave legitimacy to that political entity.

Thus, in the process of the emergence of the modern nation, the relationship between nationalism and the nation-state has been a mutually-reinforcing one. On the one hand, the form of the modern state has been pivotal in the development and entrenchment of nationalism as an ideology. As Kohn writes, "[n]ationalism is unthinkable before the emergence of the modern state", since "[n]ationalism presupposes the existence, in fact or as an ideal, of a centralised form of government over a large and distinct territory". The inverse is also true, since the ideology of nationalism has provided the state as territorial entity with a powerful source of legitimacy. Even though the nation and state are not often congruent, the perception of legitimacy is significant.

It therefore becomes almost impossible for any nation to challenge the dominant discourse of the territorial imperative. Consequently, the struggle for power typically takes place in the arena of the state:

"[N]ationalism is, above all and beyond all else, about politics, and . . . politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is primarily about control of the state. . . A nationalist movement seeks to bind together people in a particular territory in an endeavour to gain and use state power."

From this perspective, nationalism is a political movement "seeking or exercising state power and justifying such actions with nationalist arguments . . .". In other words, the emphasis of nationalism is on "self-determination [through] . . . the domination of a specific territory" and the attainment of territorial self-rule. Smith echoes the same thought when he writes that "nationalism always involves a struggle for land, or an assertion about rights to land; and the nation, almost by definition, requires a territorial base in which to take root and fulfil the needs of its members." This is why the struggle between nations has consistently manifested itself in the form of territorial competition. Through this process, which reached its peak in the nineteenth century, the more powerful ethnie have often been able to achieve the congruence between nation and state described by Gellner.

Certain other ethnie have succeeded in establishing nation-states primarily as a response to the military advances or encroachment of a more powerful state. This is called the 'imitation effect'. Examples of this phenomenon are Germany in the Napoleonic era, Japan's Meiji Restoration in 1861, and the establishment of an ethnically homogenous Turkish state in 1922. This phenomenon continued well into the twentieth century in the form of the creation of independent post-colonial states in Africa and Asia. Thus the early model of the West European states has provided the "blueprint" which the rest of the world has since tried to emulate.

A great many ethnic minorities, however, have been unable to establish nation-states of their own, particularly if they existed within another powerful state. In such cases, they developed national movements of resistance in opposition to the state. However, whether a nationalist movement develops in tandem with, or in opposition to, a state structure, the upshot is that nationalism in its modern, hegemonic form has developed in interaction with the state.

The perpetuation of the hegemonic place of (the ideal of) the nation-state is guaranteed by an international system where only territorially represented peoples can have a permanent role in international affairs. The League of Nations, and its successor the United Nations, along with a proliferation of regional and pan-state organisations, have formalised the consensus that the acceptable form of political entity is now the nation-state. The very names of these organisations indicates the importance placed on the preservation of the sovereign integrity of existing states, even while striving to establish a harmonious world order where the interests and territorial boundaries of these states are kept in check. The obvious criterion for membership is that a society should constitute itself in the form of the nation-state. Consequently, an ethnic community can only find its 'place under the sun' by transforming its sense of ethnic distinctiveness into a political movement (nationalism) and thus laying claim to a territorial space (the nation-state). In this context, the "claim to nationhood" becomes, of necessity, "the claim to equality of international treatment, at least in theory . . ." It is for this reason that, for seventy years between the collapse of the first Armenian Republic in 1920 and the declaration of the second independent Republic in 1991, the Armenian political parties placed such an emphasis on the Treaty of Sevres of 1920. This Treaty guaranteed the creation of an independent Armenian homeland, and continues to be used as a legitimation of the Armenian claim to sovereignty.

The persistence of nationalism can also be attributed to the fact that nationalism continues to be politically expedient in the conduct of international relations. A powerful example of this was found in the policies of the superpowers during the Cold War. Both superpowers assisted in the establishment of indigenous governments in the interest of countering the influence of their adversary. Furthermore, even internationalist regimes such as communism often couched their propaganda in clearly nationalist terms. For example, the Soviet effort during World War Two, referred to as the 'Great Patriotic War' by the Soviet government, was proclaimed as the "Defence of the Great Soviet Fatherland".

Finally, the perpetuation and ongoing entrenchment of the nation-state ideal also owes a great deal to the impact of modernisation on society. Modernisation's tendency to "routinise" the social fabric has meant that nationalism has become entrenched by being "ossified in the bureaucratic machine" that accompanies modernisation. Even in the case of the Soviet Union and the multiethnic states of Eastern Europe, the communist regimes inadvertently encouraged the growth and entrenchment of nationalism. The official policy of the Soviet regime was to co-opt ethnic elites by offering them economic, social and political mobility, with the belief that economic progress would put a lid on wholesale nationalist mobilisation. Paradoxically, however, the communist party's policy of encouraging popular culture and the development of a broad-based modern economy in fact accelerated and entrenched the process of "ethnic consolidation", both in the Russian Federative Republic and the minority republics, in contrast to the assimilation that was supposed to have occurred.

In conclusion, there is the universalisation of what I have described as the 'territorial imperative', even in those states that sought to discourage nationalism among their ethnic minorities. This is not to say that territory had not been a significant factor in group identity before the modern era. However, modernity brought with it the intensification of the territorial imperative by tying the ethnic nation and 'its' territory, and thus the state, closer together, at least in theory. In the past, there have existed ethnie such as the Kurds, Basques and Tartars, who did not possess a territory, and did not necessarily aspire to possess a territory. This was because the possession of land was not seen as pivotal to the survival of these ethnie in the same way as it is seen today. Once it became apparent that statelessness would clearly disadvantage the ethnie's position in the world, many of these peoples sought the acquisition of a nation-state of their own. This was as true of the Germans and Italians in the nineteenth century, as it was of the Armenians at around the same time, the Jews at the turn of the century, and the Kurds today. This hegemonic place of territory in the nation-building process has so far been ensured by the persistence of the international system and also by stateless minorities seeking territorial recognition. In such a system, no ethnie, no nation, can find its ultimate place in the international system without making a legitimate claim to a territorial unit.

Diasporan Nationalism

In modern times, nationalism pivots around the possession of, or aspiration to possess, a territorial space. However, the exact role of the homeland in the national mythology varies according to the type of nation that is being discussed. For those few nations that have been able to secure a homogenous nation-state, the homeland is a tangible reality that can be taken for granted, and there is no need to be driven by a political agenda of territorial restoration. At the other extreme, there are peoples for whom the concept of a secure, independent homeland remains a seemingly impossible dream. In either category, and all the way in between, there exist as many typologies of nationalism as there are attempts to identify those typologies.

However, since the purpose of this thesis is to examine Armenian nationalism, it is necessary to focus on a specific type of nationalism, namely the diasporan model, which is the model that best describes at least half of the modern Armenian nation. The focus of this next section, therefore, is to examine the phenomenon of diasporan nationalism, and to explore the relationship between the notion of 'diaspora' on the one hand, and that of territory, or the nation-state, on the other. This will provide us with the necessary background for my discussion of Armenian diasporan nationalism in the United States.

Diasporan nationalism is not an exotic or merely transient form of nationalism, nor is it an anomaly. On the contrary, diasporas are, to quote Armstrong, "the norm rather than the exception", and in fact provide a powerful alternative to the nation-state model. Indeed, due to historical circumstances, for nations such as the Armenians and Jews a diasporan existence has become a 'normal' state of existence. These ethnie are, in their very essence, diasporan, as seen in the Armenian case. Even as a more general phenomenon, however, Tololyan describes diasporas as "the exemplary community of the transnational moment", where transnational (better, 'trans-state' ) communities are defined as those "forms of economic and political interaction, communication, and migration [which] combine to erode [the] sharply defined borders" of the nation-state. Amongst the variety of transnational communities that exist in today's world, such as transnational corporations (TNC's) and non-governmental organisations (NGO's), diasporas stand out as "emblems of transnationalism because they embody the question of borders, which is at the heart if any adequate definition of the Others of the nation-state" and of territory in general.

In contrast to the situation in the study of nationalism, there does seem to exist a core description of 'diaspora' that is generally agreed on. Armstrong uses the term 'diaspora' to describe "any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base within a given polity, i.e., is a relatively small minority throughout all portions of the polity". A diaspora, then, is an ethnic community that exists outside its homeland, maintains some degree of consciousness of being different from its host society, and interacts in some way with the homeland. Both these definitions show how far the usage of the word has evolved since the days when 'diaspora' was used solely to refer to the dispersion of the Jews awaiting the re-establishment of the Promised Land. This expansion of meaning was only to be expected, however, since the word 'diaspora' itself simply means 'dispersion'. It is derived from the Greek word diaspeirein, which means to scatter, which is itself a derivative of the word speirein, that is to sow. The term can thus generally be applied to any dispersion, or scattering, of a people of common origin.

Nevertheless, the pursuit of hard and fast definitions is always fraught with danger, and there is certainly room for debate over many of the aspects of the diasporan phenomenon. For example, can a scattering that does not aspire to possess or return to a homeland be considered a diaspora? What about scatterings of people who have evolved an identity quite distinct to that of the homeland, and have no desire to return there? Do groups that have left their country voluntarily qualify as diaspora? Can the term 'diaspora' be extended to include political, religious, and social minorities with roots in another country - in which case the diaspora would be understood as a social category rather than an ethnic one? Furthermore, could a diaspora ever become viewed as a 'nation' in and of itself, in which case it would then lack a territorial base or even the aspiration to possess one? As a corollary to this last question, if part of the nation lives within the homeland, and another part continues to live outside, could this constitute two nations? These are some of the questions that will be dealt with in the course of this thesis.

There are many possible loose ends, and just as many possible ways of delineating what is and what is not a diaspora. As with the debate over what constitutes a nation, many of the definitional problems can be attributed to the fact that there exist a variety of types of diaspora - transient diasporas, assimilated diasporas, diasporas with or without a homeland, diasporas with a strong, self-sufficient homeland, and diasporas with a homeland that largely depends on diasporan goodwill and lobbying of their host governments. There are diasporas, such as the Chinese, which do not seek to return to their homeland, and, on the whole, exercise very little allegiance to any homeland. This is in contrast with the Armenians, Palestinians, Kurds, and others who actively seek the restoration of a homeland, though the last group have never previously inhabited a specific territorial space for any extended period of time.

In the midst of so many typologies, Safran proposes the following list of helpful criteria in an attempt to summarise those elements shared by groups commonly referred to as diasporas: dispersion "from a specific original 'center' to two or more 'peripheral', or foreign, regions"; the retention of "a collective memory, vision, or myth about their original homeland"; a sense of being pilgrims in a foreign land, of alienation from the host country; a belief in the ancestral homeland as their "true, ideal home and as the place to which they or their descendants would (or should) eventually return - when conditions are appropriate"; a commitment to the "maintenance or restoration" of the homeland; and, most importantly, the fact that "they continue to relate, personally or vicariously, to that homeland in one way or another, and their ethnocommunal consciousness and solidarity are importantly defined by the existence of such a relationship". In addition to Safran's observations, Marienstras points out that a crucial aspect of the study of diasporas is the notion of being a "minority" group in relation to a dominant "majority", and with this come "the ideas of a relation to the state, to a central or regional administration, to structuring institutions or associations."

Safran's list is fairly comprehensive and can be applied to most, if not all, groups that are commonly referred to as diasporas. To help simplify the definitional process, three common elements can be gleaned from Safran's criteria. First of all, all six criteria emphasise the consciousness of being a diaspora. Ultimately, if 'diaspora' as an analytical concept is to provide a useful tool for scholarly analysis, it must incorporate some notion of consciousness. The reason for this is that much of what is interesting about diasporas is the way they relate both to their host country and to their homeland (or the idea of a homeland). If a diaspora is not conscious of being a diaspora, then its relationship with these entities ceases to be special, the community is no longer a politically meaningful entity, and the 'diasporan' community simply becomes another minority sub-culture within a pluralistic society, or alternatively assimilates into that society. In such cases, the community may still be a diaspora in the literal, politically neutral sense of the word - that is, a dispersion of people - but it has no meaning as an analytical or political concept. Examples of such communities include Italian-Americans, Polish-Americans, and various other European immigrants to the United States, who although loosely qualifying as ethnic communities, nevertheless have little or no interest in the political life of their homeland, nor about others of similar descent in other parts of the world.

This consciousness is reinforced by the diaspora's relationship with the host society and the homeland, which constitute the second and third elements that appear in Safran's list. First of all, the receptivity of the host country towards the diasporan community will determine the degree of that community's sense of affinity with the homeland. The more multicultural or tolerant the host country, the less likely the diasporan community is to seek to return home. The prosperity of the host country can also have a similar effect. For example, diasporas living in the United States are less likely to forfeit the comforts of their Western lifestyle to return to an economically poor and unstable homeland.

On the other hand, when a diasporan community faces persecution by the host government, its interest in the homeland will typically intensify, as in the case of the Jews in Europe from the turn of the century through to World War Two, and the Turks in Bulgaria. In this way, the tendency to hold onto ethnic symbols varies depending on the circumstances in which the community finds itself, that is, the degree to which the community faces opposition. This same phenomenon can be observed among an ethnic community living in its homeland, where the national consciousness will be heightened during, say, wartime, or in the face of any other kind of threat. Indeed, any nation - diasporan or otherwise - that has had to struggle for its independence will tend to manifest a more forceful nationalism than a nation for whom independence was more easily acquired, or for whom the nationalist struggle ended several generations ago.

On the whole, though, diasporan nationalism is characterised by a unique intensity. This is mainly due to the fact that a diasporan community is intrinsically vulnerable by virtue of its being located in a foreign society, and so is often faced with two choices: assimilation or nationalism. The starkness of these alternatives means that the diasporan elite feels compelled to adopt and disseminate an all-absorbing nationalist paradigm, since the alternative - assimilation - is so dangerous, total and irreversible. In such a situation, where an ethnic community perceives itself to be under constant threat of losing its distinctives and/or political and economic rights, survival requires much more than a "feeling of belonging". Rather, what is needed is a program, a sense of solidarity, that "must on occasion be capable of leading to an active commitment". This is true of any minority, but particularly of diasporas, even those that are well-off and politically secure, since their well-being is entirely contingent on the ongoing favour of the host country. It is for these reasons that, from a diasporan perspective, the possession of a homeland is often seen as an issue of cultural and political security, indeed of survival. Furthermore, diasporan nationalism will also tend to attribute greater significance than homeland nationalism to the preservation of certain national symbols, in particular language and religion. However, if the homeland is under foreign domination, or facing the threat of foreign domination, these symbols increase in importance in the homeland as well.

Thus the diaspora's relationship with the host country is characterised by uncertainty, with the fortunes of the diaspora often fluctuating according to their treatment by the host society and government. It is not unusual for diasporan communities, therefore, to move from one country to another every few generations, as the Armenians and Chinese are known to do. Wherever they go, diasporas often fulfil important economic, social, political or military roles, while at other times they are the scapegoats for persecution, especially during periods of 'national danger'. Interestingly, though, in either case they are considered instrumental in the maintenance of the social order, and seen as playing an essential role in the economic and political system of their host societies. As such, diasporas may be viewed as a class phenomenon which has provided a crucial ingredient in the perpetuation of social structures, both in pre-modern and modern times.

The diaspora-homeland relationship constitutes the third element in Safran's analysis of the diasporan phenomenon. This element is perhaps the most central to diasporan identity, since a diaspora by definition exists in relation to the territory from which it has emigrated, whether voluntarily or by force. As pointed out earlier, there are several possible types of diaspora-homeland relationship: there may be a strong relationship with the homeland, as in the case of the Greeks; there may be hardly any relationship at all, as with the Chinese; there may not even exist a homeland, as with the Kurds; or the homeland may have lost its independence for a long time, as with the Jews (1900 years until 1948) and the Armenians (600 years until 1918). Yet, in each of these cases, the diaspora has, in one way or another, been propelled by its relationship with, or aspiration to possess, its homeland.

The diaspora-homeland relationship is, to varying degrees, defined by a myth of election, that is, "the active cultivation by specialists and others of a heightened sense of collective distinctiveness and mission." Smith argues that the election myth is crucial for the survival of all types of ethnic communities, including emigrant and diasporan peoples. An ethnic community that holds to an election myth will view its place in the world as unique and irreplaceable. Emphasised also is the need to maintain the purity of those values and distinctives that give the nation its unique place in the world. This election myth is more than "plain ethnocentrism". Rather, it typically involves a sense of mission to bring spiritual, cultural political or economic enlightenment and progress to the rest of humanity. For some peoples, the election myth involves a mission to redeem the world, as in the case of Judaism; for other groups, it is expressed through a belief in that nation's economic, cultural and/or moral superiority, as with the Koreans, Japanese, Armenians. For the last group, a sense of religious and moral superiority is gained through pride in the fact that they were the first nation to adopt Christianity as the state religion in 301 AD, ten years before Rome. An example of cultural ascendancy is found in the legend of the monk in 406 AD who, in seeking to develop an Armenian alphabet, was dictated the final version in a dream from God, thus giving the alphabet the status of being inspired. Like most legends, this story has some truth in it, in that the monk sought divine assistance and apparently the final version of the alphabet came together as the result of a dream. However, he had also undertaken extensive research into the alphabets of neighbouring ethnie.

In the case of diasporas, the election myth often lies at the basis of the group's longing to one day return and repossess the homeland. This is referred to as the 'myth of return'. The ancient exodus from the homeland is often explained in spiritual terms, as being either a test of the chosen people, or as a punishment (both of these views are held variously by different parts of the Jewish nation), or as a confirmation of that nation's victim status and therefore of its right to territorial restoration (as with the Armenians and Poles). Indeed, the return to the homeland is seen almost as an eschatological concept, being viewed as "the precondition of collective redemption" and "spiritual regeneration". Many Armenian Orthodox clerics use the Christological illustration of death and resurrection when describing the Armenian experience of the genocide, and the clearly spiritual imagery of 'rebirth' is often used to describe the re-establishment of the Armenian homeland.

The myth of return functions as a source of purpose and destiny for the diaspora in a second way, that is by providing an ideological justification for the perpetuation of the diaspora and its structures. Although the diasporan elite will often verbalise their adherence to the goal of the restoration of the national space, this myth of return is somehow used to justify the preservation of often anachronistic modes of operation and a traditional social fabric within the diaspora. Whilst things in the occupied homeland may have 'moved on', the diasporan communities will tend to desperately cling to pre-diasporan customs and structures, because they view themselves as the custodians of the national heritage, the repository of the 'true believers', at least until such time as the homeland is able to take over this role.

Thus, while the myth of return looks forward to the restoration of the homeland, it is also backward-looking in that it often seeks a return to an historical epoch which, in most cases, is no longer tenable. This gives the diasporan communities a rather nostalgic and romantic character, and hence a nationalist fervour that is often more intense and conservative than that experienced in the homeland. The institutions of the 'old world' are idealised, and the geography of the homeland sentimentalised and compared to heaven, or to a beautiful woman, or to a mother. Typically, then, the diaspora's image of the homeland is far removed from the current reality. Consequently, the restoration of the national homeland is unrealistically seen as a panacea to all national problems.

It is not surprising, therefore, that this myth of return should run into problems once the homeland is re-established. At that moment, the diaspora must face new realities, and is called on to reassess its self-appointed role of custodian of the national heritage. What the diaspora faces at this point is nothing short of a crisis of identity, calling for a radical reimagination of this identity and its understanding of the diaspora-homeland rhetoric. I will explore more of this in my discussion of the Armenian diaspora's response to events in the Gorbachev era.

The diaspora-homeland relationship and the myth of return are also useful as far as the diaspora's host government is concerned. A government may seek to encourage the ethnic distinctiveness of a diasporan community to mobilise that community against an enemy nation, as with emigres from communist countries living in the United States; or for any other foreign policy purpose, as with the promises made during the two world wars to ethnic minorities living under enemy rule; or for the purpose of scapegoating, as with the Jews in Nazi Germany.

Finally, the myth of return can also be useful for the homeland government. There are countless examples of a homeland government (or an aspiring homeland government) seeking the political, economic and/or military support of its diaspora - Sun Yat-sen and the Chinese, Nazi Germany and the Sudeten Germans, and Greece, Armenia and Israel and their respective diasporas. In the Jewish, Armenian and Greek cases, the segment of the diaspora living in the United States has provided a useful lobby on behalf of the homeland against Arab interests in the first case, and Turkish interests in the latter two. At the same time, the homeland can play on the nation's sense of being "in a 'diaspora' condition", and use this to keep diaspora-homeland ties strong. In the Jewish case, this sense of being forever a 'diasporan nation' is heightened by the ongoing hostility from Israel's neighbours. Although the use of the term 'diaspora' in this way could be questioned, it is nevertheless helpful in highlighting the sense of uncertainty, fluidity and 'exile mentality' of nations that have experienced extended periods of living outside the homeland.

Despite the usefulness of the diaspora to the homeland, however, diasporans are not always welcomed 'home' with open arms. For example, diasporans are variously perceived as too Westernised, or too capitalist, or even politically dangerous. Further to this, the cultural disparities that have already been alluded to run both ways - the diaspora and the homeland have often drifted apart, like two long-lost siblings, to the point where it becomes pertinent to ask whether they should be considered two separate nations, and, as a corollary, whether the exile community should continue to be called a 'diaspora'. Disparities also exist between the nationalist ideologies of the two parts of the nation, particularly with regard to the question of identity and what constitutes membership of that nation, but also in the area of how the homeland is perceived. The diasporan response to the chaos and uncertainty of the diaspora-homeland relationship is typically to engage in ongoing reimagination. As Marienstras writes, both the Jews and the Armenians "produce countless definitions of themselves, from the narrowest to the broadest, to understand what they are."

Somewhat different to the Armenian and Jewish cases is the Chinese diaspora. Although the Chinese communities of South East Asia operate as a tightly-knit network across state borders, they typically do not hold any allegiance to an ethnically Chinese homeland such as China, Hong Kong, Macau, Singapore or Taiwan. Most ethnic Chinese have their roots in non-Chinese states, and in general seem to show little or no political interest in their 'homeland(s)'. Nevertheless, these communities are often held together by things other than a political ideology. What has held the Chinese communities together are the things that set them apart from their peers - language, physical features, culture, religion, but most important of all their economic status and co-operation. Chinese businessmen still operate largely through kinship networks and thus conduct much of their trade amongst themselves or with the Chinese states. Significantly, though, in the Chinese case the cultural, political and even economic links are more horizontal - that is, they run between diasporan communities - rather than vertical, that is, with China.

The Chinese case is of interest to us, because it opens up the possibilities of a more flexible understanding of what constitutes a diaspora, and perhaps even opens up new horizons in understanding the nation. Is it possible for a diaspora to survive, or even create its own identity, in the absence of a homeland, or when attachment to the homeland seems anachronistic or unrealistic? To some extent, the Chinese diaspora provides an alternative to the traditional model of diaspora so far described. The Chinese case could also be useful for providing insights into the future of those diasporas that adjust to a state of 'permanence' - that is, diasporas whose homelands have gained independence, and yet which continue to maintain a distinct diasporan culture, economy and polity.

For the moment, however, I will turn to an examination of the historical development of Armenian nationalism, with particular emphasis on the diaspora and the longing for an independent homeland. The next chapter will lay the groundwork for the later chapters in which I will discuss the reimagination of the Armenian diaspora-homeland relationship in the post-Soviet era.

Nations and Nationalism: Towards a Working Definition

At this point it is possible to settle on a 'working definition' of the nation. It has been shown that the nation, though in many ways a modern phenomenon, finds its roots in pre-modern ethnic identities and communities. What distinguishes the modern nation from its pre-modern form is its radical intentionality, the depth of consciousness of being a nation, and the extension of the boundary or 'space' within which communication occurs. Further to this, the modern nation is distinguished by the universal emphasis that is placed on the possession of a territorial space - a homeland or nation-state - as a core requirement for nationhood. As Gellner puts it, in an ideal world, the national and political units must be "congruent".

From these observations, it is possible to propose the following working definitions for the terms 'nation' and 'nationalism':

nationalism
= ethnic myths, symbols and heritage ('objective' characteristics)
+ consciousness ('subjective' characteristics)
=> political discourse or project (nationalism)

nation
= 'politicised' ethnie (self-aware ethnic group)
+ (aspiration to) nation-state (territory)
=> imagined community (nation)

A nation, then, is the realisation of the idea of nationalism, "a politicized, territorialized and homogenized ethnie, a fusion of ethnic with civic-territorial identities". However, not all politicised ethnie possess a state. A major form of stateless nation is the diaspora, as I have discussed in this chapter. The development of Armenian diasporan nationalism, and the relationship between the diaspora and the homeland or the idea of the homeland, will be the focus of this thesis.

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